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FOREWORD
JENNY ARWADEt & JIM FREEMANtt

In recent years, a remarkable consensus has developed in the United
States, among political leaders from across the ideological spectrum as
well as the general public, that our justice system is dramatically oversized.' There is now broad recognition that over the last few decades, the
United States has invested excessive resources on a narrow set of "toughon-crime" strategies to address not only public safety issues but also public
health concerns such as the effects of poverty, mental illness, and drug
2
use.
As described in the report The $3.4 Trillion Mistake: The Cost of
Mass Incarcerationand Criminalization, and How Justice Reinvestment
Can Build a Better Futurefor All, the U.S. already had an expansive justice system in the early 1980s.3 For example, if police, corrections, judicial/legal, and immigration enforcement expenditures are combined, the
United States totaled $90 billion in justice spending in 1982 (note that all
justice spending figures have been adjusted for inflation and presented in

t

Jenny Arwade is Co-Executive Director of Chicago-based Communities United (CU),

which brings together young people and adult allies to advance social change and systems transformation through a racial justice framework. CU's approach is centered on the creation of intentional
healing and justice spaces, transformative civic engagement and leadership development approaches,
and the development of broad-based alliances. Jenny has sixteen years of organizing experience during
which time she has supported young people and adult allies in dismantling the school-to-prison pipeline, addressing mass incarceration and advancing community-led justice reinvestment efforts, and
promoting health and housing equity. Jenny is a graduate of Princeton University, serves as Vice Board
Chair of the Edward W. Hazen Foundation, and is a field representative on the Board of Advisors for
the Funders Collaborative on Youth Organizing.
tf Jim Freeman is the Founder and Executive Director of Grassroots Action Support Team,
which assists community-based organizations and coalitions in their efforts to create large-scale, transformative social change around key social, racial, gender, and economic justice issues. He assists
grassroots-led efforts to address mass incarceration, promote justice reinvestment, and dismantle the
school-to-prison pipeline, among other issues. Freeman was formerly a Senior Attorney at Advancement Project where he directed the Ending the Schoolhouse-to-Jailhouse Track project. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and the University of Notre Dame and has been an Adjunct Professor of
Law at the Georgetown University Law Center and the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
I.
See, e.g., Alex Altman, Koch Brother Teams Up with Liberals on CriminalJusticeReform,
TIME (Jan. 29, 2015), http://time.com/3686797/charles-koch-criminal-justice; Russell Berman, The
Moment for Criminal-JusticeReform?, ATLANTIC (July 10, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/congress-obama-criminal-justice-reform/398045.
2.

See,

e.g., NAT'L

RESEARCH

COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,

THE GROWTH

OF

INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 15-16 (Jeremy

Travis et al. eds., 2014); Criminal Justice Facts, SENT'G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
3.

CMTYS. UNITED ET AL., THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE: THE COST OF MASS INCARCERATION

AND CRIMINALIZATION, AND HOW JUSTICE REINVESTMENT CAN BUILD A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL

7 (2016), http://www.reinvest4justice.org/report [hereinafter THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE].
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2016 dollars).4 Indeed, our incarcerated population then, 621,885, would
still rank as fourth highest in the world today, behind only China, Russia,
and Brazil.5 Nevertheless, we continued to aggressively expand both the
size and role of our justice system. Thus, by 2012, total justice spending
had increased by 229% to nearly $297 billion. 6 Cumulatively, over the
thirty-year period from 1983 to 2012, we spent $3.4 trillion more on the
justice system than we would have if spending had remained steady since

1982.7
Alongside the growth in spending has been a dramatic increase in the
number of people who are under the control of the justice system. As of
2013, there were nearly eight million adults and youth behind bars or
within the probation and parole systems in the United States.8 In other
words, one in forty U.S. residents was either in prison, in jail, on probation
or parole, or otherwise under control of the justice system. 9 For Black and

4.
JUSTICE MGMT. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET TREND DATA: FROM 1975
THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S 2003 REQUEST TO THE CONGRESS 105 (2002), https://www.justice.gov/archive/j md/1975_2002/2002/pdf/BudgetTrand.pdf (citing immigration enforcement spending for 1982-2002); TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT, FY 1982-2007, at 2 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jee8207st.pdf (citing police, corrections, and judicial and legal services expenditures).
The figures were adjusted to 2016 dollars using the CPI conversion tables produced by Professor Robert Sahr. Individual Year Conversion Factor Tables, OR. ST. U., http://liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/spp/polisci/faculty-staff/robert-sahr/inflation-conversion-factors-years- 1774-estimated2024-dollars-recent-years/individual-year-conversion-factor-table-0 (last visited Feb. 11, 2017). Note
that some civil judicial functions are included in the judicial/legal category (for example, state appellate and supreme courts hear both civil and criminal cases, and those expenditures were not differentiated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics). However, the Bureau of Justice Statistics figures do not take
into account many additional spending areas. See CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA
INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 2 (Jules Verdone ed., 2012), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version-021914.pdf.
5.
Highest to Lowest - Prison Population Total, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?fieldregion taxonomy-tid=All (last visited Jan.
29, 2017).
6.
THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE, supranote 3, at 7.

7.

Id

&

8.
LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 1 (2014),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus I 3.pdf (counting adults living under supervision by probation or parole and those in local, state, and federal detention facilities); ERINN J. HERBERMAN
THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 1 (rev. 2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppusl3.pdf (counting adults in probation, parole, or any other post-prison supervision
(note that Oklahoma did not report 2103 probation data and thus its 2012 data was used)); JOHN F.
SIMANSKI, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013, at 1 (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois enforcement ar 2013.pdf (counting detained aliens); EZACJRP: Year of Census by Sex for
United States, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/display.asp (last visited Feb. 11 2017) (counting juveniles detained, committed, or
supervised in 2013).
9.
Data: National Population Totals Tables: 2010-2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/data/tables/2015/demo/popest/nation-total.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
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Latino residents, it was approximately one in eighteen and one in thirtyfour, respectively, compared to one in fifty-five White residents."o
However, despite all of the additional resources devoted to the expansion of the justice system, it is not at all clear that this approach has
been effective at promoting public safety." Indeed, there is substantial evidence demonstrating that the harms caused by this approach have far exceeded whatever benefits have been realized.1 2 That is especially true
within the communities of color where law enforcement resources have
become highly concentrated.' 3 Moreover, the evidence suggests that the
policies that have produced mass incarceration and criminalization are far
less effective than other options available to us.14
Fortunately, some progress has been made in addressing this misallocation of resources.' 5 In recent years, several "justice reinvestment" initiatives have been successful in beginning to "right-size" and reprioritize
our justice system, and reallocate resources to address other community
10.
11.

THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE, supranote 3, at 3.
See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 2, at 16; RYAN S.

KING ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 8

(2005), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Incarceration-and-Crime-AComplex-Relationship.pdf.
12.
See sources cited supra note 3. See generally About, VERA INST. JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/about (last visited Feb. 11, 2017); About the CSG Justice Center, COUNCIL ST.
GOVERNMENTS JUST. CTR., https://csgjusticecenter.org/about-jc (last visited Feb. 11, 2017); About the
Justice Policy Center, URB. INST., http://www.urban.org/policy-centers/justice-policy-center/soundstrategies-combating-crime-and-promoting-public-safety (last visited Feb. 11, 2017); About Us,
SENT'G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 11, 2017); Mass Incarceration, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration (last visited Feb. I1, 2017); Public
Safety Performance Project, PEW CHARITABLE TR., http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/projects/publicsafety-performance-project/about (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
13.
THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE, supra note 3, at 10-13; see also Intro, CHICAGO'S MILLION
DOLLAR BLOCKS, http://chicagosmilliondollarblocks.com/#section-1 (last visited Feb. 11, 2017);
Publications, JUST. MAPPING CTR. (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.justicemapping.org/archive/category/news.
14.
CONNIE RICE ET AL., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, A CALL TO ACTION: LOS ANGELES' QUEST
TO ACHIEVE COMMUNITY SAFETY 3 (Mike Areyan et al. eds., 2013), http://www.advancementproject.org/resources/entry/a-call-to-action-los-angeles-quest-to-achieve-community-safety;
JAMES
AUSTIN ET AL., ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: CHARTING A NEW JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 2-3, 17-

18 (2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Ending-Mass-Incarceration-Charting-a-New-Justice-Reinvestment.pdf; WILLIAM CHRISTESON ET AL., FIGHT CRIME: INVEST
IN KIDS, PROVEN INVESTMENTS IN KIDS WILL REDUCE CRIME AND VIOLENCE (2014), https://strong-

nation.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/37/3293c393-2978-4bc6-aa2-9d8fb62430cf.pdf;
ECON. ADVISORS,

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION

COUNCIL OF

AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SYSTEM
52-54
(2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160423_ceaincarcerationcriminal justice.pdf; KiM GILHULY ET AL.,
HUMAN IMPACT PARTNERS, REHABILITATING CORRECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA: THE HEALTH IMPACTS
OF PROPOSITION 47, at 3-5 (2014), http://www.humanimpact.org/downloads/hia-full-report; SARAH
LYONS & NASTASSIA WALSH, JUSTICE POLICY INST., MONEY WELL SPENT: How POSITIVE SOCIAL

INVESTMENTS WILL REDUCE INCARCERATION RATES, IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY, AND PROMOTE THE
WELL-BEING OF COMMUNITIES 54-58 (2010), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/1009_REPMoneyWellSpent_PS-DC-AC-JJ.pdfP see sources cited supra note 3; see also President
Barack Obama, Weekly Address: Building a Fairer and More Effective Criminal Justice System,
WHITE
HOUSE
(Apr.
23,
2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/photos-andvideo/video/2016/04/23/weekly-address-building-fairer-and-more-effective-criminal-justice.
15.
See, e.g., THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE, supranote 3, at 19.
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needs.1 6 However, despite this undeniable progress, it is vital that these
initial steps be kept in perspective. The advances made thus far represent
only a tiny fraction of the overall distance that must be traveled if we are
to address our oversized justice system while actively building safer and
healthier communities across the country.17
To cover the rest of that distance, we submit that there are four essential steps that must be taken:
1. Justice reinvestment initiatives must be pursued at the federal,
state, and local levels.
Of the nearly $297 billion spent nationally on the justice system in
2012, local budgets accounted for 45% of the total, state budgets comprised another 30%, and federal spending contributed 25%.'8 All three areas have expanded dramatically over the past few decades and will require
attention if we are to effectively reform our justice system. 19
2. Futurejustice reinvestment initiatives should address all areas
of excessive justice spending.
Previous justice reinvestment initiatives have focused almost exclusively on reducing corrections spending. 20 However, that represents only
29% of what the United States spent on the justice system in 2012.21 Successful justice reinvestment will require a comprehensive approach that
also addresses over-spending on police (45%), judicial/legal functions
(20%), and the fastest-growing component of the justice system: immigration enforcement (6%).22

3. Justice reinvestment initiatives should prioritize the meaningful involvement of the communities that have been most affected by mass incarceration and criminalization.
Justice reinvestment efforts can have profound "on-the-ground" consequences, yet one of the key weaknesses of many existing efforts is the
lack of participation by individuals and organizations from the most affected communities.23 Creating more inclusive processes, with ample opportunities for meaningful grassroots involvement, is critical to ensuring
that justice reinvestment efforts are able to accurately diagnose the most
critical community needs and design appropriate and community-specific
solutions.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.

18-19.
19.
9.

23.

Id. at 5; AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 19.

11.
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4. A substantial portion of the savings realized should be reinvested, not in other areas of the justice system, but rather in addressing the root causes of unsafe and unhealthy communities,
particularly in the communities that have been most affected by
mass incarceration and criminalization.
To date, many justice reinvestment efforts have not produced substantial reinvestment, and many of the funds that have been reinvested
24
have gone toward other programs within the justice system. As such,
they neglect the harm caused by decades of mass incarceration and criminalization policies as well as the root causes of crime and violence.
To create safe communities, we must of course be able to respond
effectively to violence and crime. But the most effective response to such
actions need not involve the justice system, and our understanding of pub25
lic safety should not begin nor end with the justice system. We must recognize that communities cannot be safe if:
*
*

*
*
*

There are not enough good jobs and affordable housing opportunities for the people who need them;
Children are not being provided with high-quality educational
opportunities, wraparound supports, and access to good afterschool and employment opportunities when needed;
There are significant unmet mental, physical, and behavioral
health needs;
They are facing the threats posed by environmental degradation
and climate change; and
There is deep social, economic, and political inequality within
them.26

Addressing these basic needs will result in far less crime and violence
and far fewer people entering the criminal justice system, yet we have con27
tinually neglected these other key components of safety. However, if we
are truly to end the devastating cycle of crime and incarceration that continues to plague communities all across the country, we must stop using
so many of our resources to merely respond to crime and the symptoms of
unhealthy communities and instead focus more on preventing crime and
addressing its root causes.

There are many who will be resistant to the type of robust and comprehensive justice reinvestment initiatives described above. In particular,

24.

THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE, supranote 3, at 19.

25.
26.
27.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
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many policymakers will be reluctant to support the substantial reallocation
of resources from the justice system to meeting other acute needs, especially within the communities of color that have been most affected by
overinvestment in the justice system. What they must recognize is that we
are already making massive investments in those communities. However,
instead of investing appropriately in the education, employment, or health
of individuals from those communities, we have been allocating far too
-28
many of our resources to their criminalization and incarceration.
So we face a choice. Do we continue to invest public dollars in destructive mass incarceration strategies that overwhelmingly affect our
most vulnerable and marginalized residents? Or do we seek a new path
forward that is focused on making positive investments in the long-term
health and safety of our children, families, and communities?
It is our hope that the articles that follow can help to chart such a path.

28.

Id. at 20.

PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN PRISON: USING

HEALTHCARE

ECONOMICS TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
W. DAVID BALL
ABSTRACT

For much of the last seventy-plus years, healthcare providers in the
United States have been paid under the fee-for-service system, where providers are reimbursed for procedures performed, not outcomes obtained.
The result has been a system that incentivizes resource consumption, not
health improvements. Healthcare economists and policymakers have reacted by proposing a number of policies designed to control costs without
sacrificing quality. One approach is to reimburse providers on the basis of
health outcomes obtained. Under a pay-for-performance strategy, providers are incentivized to deliver healthcare in ways that are both efficacious
and efficient. This means providers are no longer paid for simply doing a
given "something" but, rather, are paid for doing "something effective."
The criminal justice system is plagued by many of the same distorted
individual and organizational incentives seen in health care. In all but a
handful ofjurisdictions, states wholly subsidize commitments to prisonthe fee-for-service model of doing "something"-without tying any of
these subsidies to outcomes obtained in prison. This means prison is paid
for even if it is neither effective nor efficient. An outcome-oriented, payfor-performance framework borrowed from healthcare economics might,
if applied to criminal justice, improve its efficacy and efficiency.
This Article focuses on the similarities between health care and criminal justice, the ways in which an outcome orientation might provide a
useful framework for controlling criminal justice costs without sacrificing
public safety, and the suggestion that we begin considering sentencing
choices within that framework.

t Many thanks to participants at the Stanford Criminal Justice Roundtable, the "Rationing
Criminal Justice" Panel at the 2016 Law & Society Conference, the Southwest Criminal Law Workshop, and the Santa Clara scholarship series for their insightful comments. I wish to particularly thank
Rachel Barkow, Jack Chin, Sharon Dolovich, Donald Dripps, Deep Gulasekaram, Carissa Hessick,
Sam Kamin, Pam Karlan, Maximo Langer, Justin Marceau, Tracey Meares, Erin Murphy, Michelle
Oberman, Daniel Richman, David Sklansky, David Sloss, Avani Sood, Bob Weisberg, Jeff Wu, and
Frank Zimring. All errors remain mine, of course.
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This is what I gathered. That in that country if a man falls into ill
health, or catches any disorder, or fails bodily in any way before he is
seventy years old, he is tried before a jury of his countrymen, and if
convicted is held up to public scorn and sentenced more or less severely as the case may be. There are subdivisions of illnesses into
crimes and misdemeanours as with offences amongst ourselves ....
But if a man forges a cheque, or sets his house on fire, or robs with
violence from the person, or does any other such things as are criminal
in our own country, he is either taken to a hospital and most carefully
tended at the public expense, or if he is in good circumstances, he lets
it be known to all his friends that he is suffering from a severe fit of
immorality, just as we do when we are ill, and they come and visit him
with great solicitude, and inquire with interest how it all came about,
what symptoms first showed themselves, and so forth,-questions
which he will answer with perfect unreserve; for bad conduct, though
considered no less deplorable than illness with ourselves, and as unquestionably indicating something seriously wrong with the individual
who misbehaves, is nevertheless held to be the result of either pre-natal
or post-natal misfortune.
Samuel Butler, Erewhon
INTRODUCTION

Healthcare economists have written extensively about the perverse

incentives of fee-for-service reimbursement, where healthcare providers
are reimbursed for each medical service rendered.2 Fee-for-service rewards quantity, not quality-providers get paid for doing something, not
for doing something well. In fact, under fee-for-service, a hospital's ineffective treatment resulting in a patient rehospitalization could be a finan-

cial gain to the hospital despite being a bad outcome for the patient. The

I.
2.

SAMUEL BUTLER, EREWHON 49 (Xist Publ'g 2015) (1872).
See infra Part I.
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hospital could be paid for the additional treatments its own ineffectiveness
made necessary.
One proposed alternative to fee-for-service is performance-based reimbursement, where providers are reimbursed based on patient outcomes.
This Article employs Professor Michael Porter's formulation of pay-forperformance, value creation, where value is measured in terms of health
care outcomes per dollar spent. 3 Porter's formulation has the advantage of
combining efficacy and efficiency in a single measure. It measures both
whether something improves health and whether it does so using the fewest resources possible. Health is promoted without making it subservient
to cost control; value cannot be created simply by saving money if those
savings result in worse health outcomes. At the same time, parsimony is
embedded; ceteris paribus, treatments which use the fewest resources are
preferred. Under a value-based system, a hospital is paid for results, not
processes. For example, if a heart surgery were performed and the hospital
subsequently had to readmit the patient, it would pay the resulting expenses itself. If the hospital's doctor performed the surgery and the patient
were healed, it would break even or make a little money. But if it treated
the condition effectively through other, lower-cost means (including effective aftercare), it would keep the surplus itself.
Much of the existing economic analysis of criminal justice has focused on the economic incentives of criminals, not on the structural relationships and organizational incentives of "providers" in the criminal justice system (e.g., law enforcement, prosecutors, correctional facilities, and
probation and parole). Looking at the incentives of providers in the system
might help to explain why the cost and scope of criminal justice have exploded in a manner similar to the way healthcare costs have exploded under fee-for-service reimbursement regimes. As in fee-for-service, criminal
justice providers face few cost constraints on their menu of interventions.
The government subsidizes particular responses, such as prison, in the
name of public safety without demanding evidence that these responses
work. Just as a readmitted cardiac patient under fee-for-service imposes
no financial hardship on providers who failed to cure her, so too does a
recidivist impose no financial losses on the institutions that failed to reform him. On the contrary, prison budgets tend to get bigger as prison
populations increase, even when those increases are the result of ineffective (or non-existent) rehabilitation programs. Given these similarities,
perhaps it is time to consider replacing our existing subsidy-for-service
criminal justice approach with funding based on performance.
Such an approach would have several advantages: providing economic incentives for non-carceral (and non-criminal) alternatives, promoting the development of evidence-based practices that are less resourceintensive, and providing incentives to adopt the state-of-the-art in criminal
3.

See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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justice policies. At the very least, it would require agencies to justify their
existing practices on efficacy and efficiency grounds-a justification that,
in our era of mass incarceration, will likely be found wanting.
This Article is both a thought experiment about how criminal justice
might be funded and a potentially useful source of lessons for those interested in reforming the system. Defining health outcomes is an ongoing
process that has encountered political, organizational, and theoretical obstacles. Getting constituencies to agree on measures, getting organizations
to implement them, and even deciding what health means and which data
are best associated with it has been a long and difficult process-and yet
progress has been made.4 I do not, in any way, mean to suggest that building an outcome-based system of criminal justice centered around improving public safety will be any easier or quicker. But I also know that health
outcomes were once seen as impossibly and hopelessly vague, while now
they are utilized in funding health care. In this Article, I will not-and
could not-come up with precise, operational definitions of public safety
that will apply to all or even most situations. At the very least, imposing a
standard by fiat would fail to get the practitioner buy-in necessary to make
an outcome orientation work. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned
from the health care experience, and the framework has clear benefits.
This Article builds on work-including some of my own-about the
decentralized nature of criminal justice and the concomitant cost-passing
and externalities among criminal justice agencies.5 It suggests new ways
to harmonize social welfare with the welfare of individual organizations.
The main thrust of the argument is to actually give weight to the invocation
of criminal justice goals-in this case, public safety-by making sure that
what criminal justice agencies are doing achieves that goal in the most
resource-efficient way. This means that the least-expensive alternative that
gets the same public safety result should be adopted, or else those agencies
which decide to pursue other options will have to pay the difference in
cost. One can readily imagine some policy changes that might result. Some
problems might not be worth any criminal sanctions at all, as the riskneeds-responsiveness principle has taught us. 6 Mentally ill offenders get
worse, at great expense, in prisons and jails;7 under pay-for-performance
4.
See infra Part II, Section IV.A.
5.
See infra Part III.
6.
See D.A. Andrews, James Bonta & R.D. Hoge, Classificationfor Effective Rehabilitation:
Rediscovering Psychology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19, 20 (1990) ("Higher levels of service are
reserved for higher risk cases ... . [L]ower risk cases do as well or better with minimal as opposed to
more intensive service."); see also Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Understanding
the Risk Principle:How and Why CorrectionalInterventions Can Harm Low-Risk Offenders, TOPICS
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, 2004, at 3, 3 ("[W]e see intensive treatments and supervision leading to
no effect or increased recidivism for low-risk offenders.").
7.
See E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND PRISONS
THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 9-11 (2010), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/final jails_v hospital ssrudy.pdf (finding that mentally ill inmates
are more likely to stay longer, commit suicide, and be abused, while incurring greater costs).
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they might be removed from the criminal justice system entirely. Lengthy
criminal sentences might not be worth the cost (both human and financial)
in terms of what they add to public safety and could be shortened.
The approach taken in this Article differs from my prior work in the
way it treats incarceration. At the time of sentencing, prison is almost
always treated as an undifferentiated mass. I propose instead that prison
and other dispositions in a given system be individuated, where individual
institutions begin to specialize in various subpopulations with particular
risks and needs. This means that a system would no longer consider that
prison time and jail time are fungible, where sentencing is just an assignment to be "treated" generally. Instead, sentences would be tailored to individual needs, with individual treatment programs in individual institutions. This would move beyond the current conception of "tailoring" custodial sentences, which, at most, considers only how much time in a generic prison or jail an offender should get.9
There are a few assumptions that underlie this analysis. First, this Article does not assume that "nothing works" in rehabilitating criminals, a
phrase often attributed to Robert Martinson, albeit one he did not write,
and one which flies in the face of recent criminological research.o The
Article does not take a position on any particular rehabilitative program
but is, instead, concerned with how to improve the uptake of the most robust and promising approaches to offender treatment, whatever they may
be. Just as medical techniques continue to improve, so too will the treatment of offenders. A system that provides financial incentives for the development and dissemination of the most effective programs need not be
locked into a particular theory or method. Second, this Article assumes
that data is better than intuition about "what is right" or "what works," and
because people often make claims about what criminal justice is, what it
does, or how the justice-involved anticipate or react to it, I want to test
these claims with the best techniques we have, even if they are not infallible. Intuition is subject to implicit biases that are both harder to detect and
correct than those embedded in actuarial instruments-provided, of
course, that those instruments are open to public scrutiny (which is not
always the case). Given the overwhelmingly racialized nature of American
criminal justice, the greater potential transparency of actuarialism could
allow us to more easily diagnose problems and adjust policies.

8. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245, 249-50 (2005) (discussing tailoring
in terms of sentence length and matching offense and offender facts to the federal sentencing guidelines); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 100-01 (2007) (discussing tailoring in
Booker and only referring to time sentenced).
10.
See Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INT. 22, 48-50 (1974). For a discussion of Martinson's legacy and a rejoinder to the idea that
"nothing works" is still the criminological state of the art, see Francis T. Cullen et al., Nothing Works
Revisited: DeconstructingFarabee'sRethinking Rehabilitation, 4 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 101, 10306, 110-11 (2009).
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This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I outlines the similarities between the healthcare and criminal justice systems, emphasizing how feefor-service reimbursement tends to promote overuse, not effective and efficient use. Part II briefly summarizes what value-based healthcare economics is, and how it promises to control costs in healthcare without sacrificing health outcomes. Part III sketches out the ways in which a focus
on value provides new possibilities for a law and economics analysis of
criminal justice systems, while building on the policy and analytical work
already being done. Part IV lays out possible new models for the funding
and administration of criminal justice, building on some of my own prior
work as well as that of others. Part V discusses some shortcomings of this
approach and attempts to address them.
I. A TALE

OF Two SYSTEMS

The model of medical care provision and reimbursement in the
United States after World War II is notable for its complexity, perverse
incentives, and uniqueness among industrialized countries. There is nothing logically or legally necessary about it. Universal healthcare was considered beginning with the New Deal, but efforts to adopt it failed due to
opposition from the American Medical Association (among other factors).11 Employer-provided health insurance filled the gap, gained traction
as the federal government froze private-sector wages (but not private-sector benefits, including health benefits), and became solidified with favorable tax treatment after the end of World War 11.12 The healthcare "system"
that resulted was far from systematic in terms of who pays and who is paid.
It is a complex amalgamation of government-run and private for-profit and
non-profit providers, paid for by private and public health insurance (the
latter starting with Medicaid and Medicare), with medical care provided
by a mix of independent doctors, practice groups, Healthcare Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs).13
Different parts of the system have coordination problems across health
provider and insurance networks, specialists, emergency medicine, longterm care, and the like. There has always been a need for more data-and
more incentives to study that data-on what works. 14 Doctors are not necessarily expected to get feedback about what eventually happens to their

11.
David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States-Origins
and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82-83 (2006).
12.
Id. at 83-84.
13. Julie Barnes, Moving Away from Fee-for-Service, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-for-service/256755.
14.
For a review of the subject, as well as an introduction to the Cochrane Collaboration, an
international clearinghouse for "what works" in medicine, see John N. Lavis et al., Working Within
and Beyond the Cochrane Collaboration to Make Systematic Reviews More Useful to Healthcare
Managersand Policy Makers, 1 HEALTHCARE POL'Y 21, 23-32 (2006).
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patients because those problems are often passed on to other "downstream" institutions and doctors. 5
Fee-for-service reimbursement was, until recently, the dominant system for reimbursing healthcare providers.' 6 Fee-for-service pays providers
per procedure-whether a doctor's visit, MRI, blood test, or other procedure-as long as it follows generally established protocols. 17 The problem
with fee-for-service is that it incentivizes additional procedures and interventions.' Providers are paid for doing something whether or not it leads
to demonstrated improvements. Even as health is invoked, there is little
financial pressure to improve health since reimbursements are not made
on that basis. In other words, providers are not paid for doing something
that works, just for doing something at all-and, in fact, sometimes more
interventions result in worse outcomes. 19 It is hard to control costs under
this system: one critic described the "perverse incentives" in the U.S.
healthcare system as "producing what they are designed to deliver: cost
inflation, inefficiency, and inequity."20
Under the fee-for-service system, participants have incentives at odds
with each other. Consumers want health care but do not bear the full cost
of consuming it (even with co-payments). 2' Providers are paid per service,
giving them no financial incentives to do less or even to know what a procedure costs. Insurers cover the costs that result, but they have no real control over them. The result is that costs balloon. There is little investment
on the front end of prevention, there is rationing of one kind or another
(price or services offered), and the drive to cut costs is met with justifiable
resistance by a population that views health as beyond the purview of dollars and cents. One of the enduring questions is which group-if any-is
really steering health policy. Is the ultimate decision maker the insurer,
who pays? The doctor, who treats? And who benefits? The patient, who is
healed? Society, who is made safe from communicable diseases?

15.

Michael E. Porter, A Strategyfor Health CareReform-Towarda Value-Based System, 361

NEW ENG. J. MED. 109, 110-11 (2009).
16.

John T. Preskitt, Health Care Reimbursement: Clemens to Clinton, 21 BAYLOR U. MED.

CTR. PROC. 40, 40-44 (2008).
17.
See Robert A. Berenson & Eugene C. Rich, US Approaches to Physician Payment: The
Deconstruction ofPrimary Care, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 613, 613 (2010).
18.
Hendrik Schmitz, Practice Budgets and the PatientMix of Physicians-TheEffect of a Remuneration System Reform on Health Care Utilization, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 1240, 1240 (2013)
("[T]his literature mainly finds that doctors provide more services in fee-for-service systems . . . .").
19.
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Op-ed, Are Good Doctors Badfor Your Health?,N.Y. TIMES Nov. 21,
2015, at SR7. For the systemic effects of overprescribing antibiotics, see Sarah Childress, Dr. Arjun

Srinivasan: We've Reached "the End of Antibiotics, Period," PBS: FRONTLINE (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/dr-arjun-srinivasan-weve-reached-the-end-of-antibioticsperiod.
20.
Alan Maynard, Health Reform: Reinventing the Wheel, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2006/10/12/health-reform-reinventing-the-wheel.
21.
For a suitably consumer-focused treatment of the problem, see Leslie Goldman, How Much

Is This Gonna Cost Me, Doc?, 0 MAG., July 2015, at 72, 72.
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It is well known that the U.S. health care system is exceptional (although not in a good way), and the country has recently made significant
changes under the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). 22 All along, however, attempts to change the system have been met with fierce resistance
by insiders who fear lost rents or lost discretion to treat patients as they
see fit.23 In many instances, the very idea that medical care could be subject to cost-effectiveness analysis by outsiders was rejected. Only doctors
knew what was medically necessary, and they had to be given complete
freedom to pursue what was best for the patient.24
The model of criminal justice provision and reimbursement in the
United States is also notable for its complexity, perverse incentives, and
uniqueness among industrialized countries. There is nothing logically or
legally necessary about it. States did not originally pay for prisons, and
there were no state prisons at the time of the founding.25 The economics
of prison provision used to be different: governments got (or at least
thought they would get) revenues from prison labor, and this meant that
control over carceral populations was an economic benefit, not a loss.
State-provided prisons became the norm under different economic circumstances and remained even when the value of prison labor vanished. The
criminal justice "system" that resulted was far from systematic in terms of
who pays for it and who controls access to it. It is a complex amalgamation
of government-run and private for-profit prisons, local jails, and treatment
facilities, paid for by state, local, and federal funds. Each part of the system
has effects on the workload and efficiency of other parts, but there is little
coordination among them (with the exception of the few states with uni26
fled corrections systems). If prisons do a good job rehabilitating, it means
less work for police. If police arrest marginal criminals, it places more
stress on courts and jails. The system as a whole passes costs from agency
to agency and fails, in many cases, to treat the offender in a consistent and
22.

See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.

119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
23.
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 23-28 (1982) (discussing doctor resistance to change generally); id. at 252-54 (discussing doctor resistance within the
progressive era); id. at 271 (discussing doctor resistance during the New Deal); id. at 280 (discussing
the introduction of "socialized medicine"); see also Sven Steinmo & Jon Watts, It's the Institutions,
Stupid! Why Comprehensive NationalHealth InsuranceAlways Fails in America, 20 J. HEALTH POL.

POL'Y & L. 329, 330-35 (1995) (identifying structural reasons in the U.S. political system as well as
resistance from medical professionals).
24.
STARR, supra note 23, at 26-28.
25.
This treatment largely reproduced that of a prior article. See W. David Ball, Why State Pris-

ons?, 33 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 89 (2014) [hereinafter Ball, Why State Prisons?]. For a Californiaspecific treatment, see W. David Ball, "A False Idea ofEconomy": Costs, Counties, and the Origins

ofthe Calfornia CorrectionalSystem, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 26, 28-31 (2016)
[hereinafter Ball, A False Idea]. For a lengthier treatment on the origins of state prisons (one which
does not focus on political economy), see generally REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF
IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776-1941

(2008).
26. . For background on unified corrections, see generally BARBARA KRAUTH, NAT'L INST. OF

CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE JAIL FUNCTION WITHIN STATE UNIFIED
CORRECTIONS SYSTEMS (1997), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/014024.pdf.
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coordinated manner. There is little data on what works, and few incentives
to study what data there is. 27 District Attorneys (DAs) and judges are under
no pressure to get feedback about what eventually happens to individual
criminals in their cases because those problems are passed on to other
downstream institutions and practitioners. Even as public safety is invoked, there is little financial pressure to improve public safety since reimbursements are not made on that basis (though perhaps actors face some
political pressure, an element of the equation discussed at length in the
literature).2 8
Under the prison subsidy system, participants have incentives at odds
with each other. Local taxpayers want public safety but do not bear the full
cost of consuming prison beds (even though they pay for police and, sometimes, local courts). DAs and judges are not required to consider the cost
of sentencing outcomes (except in states like Missouri) 29 and in no case
must they systematically consider whether the cost paid is either an efficient or efficacious use of resources. The value of prison is assumed to be
greater than zero, but its costs are not borne by the local officials whose
decisions drive prison admissions. More interventions or prison time does
not always improve criminal justice outcomes-they can make them
worse. 30 The state government covers the prison costs that result, but it has
little control over prison utilization (in part because the legislature continually expands the penal code, as William Stuntz has observed). 3 1 The result is that costs balloon. There is too little investment on the front end of
prevention, there is rationing of one kind or another (overcrowding or programming and treatment), but the drive to cut costs is met with justifiable
resistance by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits
cruel and unusual punishment. 32 Again, one of the enduring questions is
which group-if any-is really steering criminal justice policy. Is the ultimate decision maker the legislature, who writes expansive penal codes?
The DA or judge, who charges and sentences? And who benefits? The
inmate, who is incarcerated? The public, who is made safe from crime?
The victim, who is vindicated?3 3

27.

For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Samuel R. Wiseman, The CriminalJustice

Black Box, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017).
28.
For a skeptical view on the efficacy of prosecutorial elections, see Ronald F. Wright, How
ProsecutorElectionsFail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 583 (2009).
29.
Chad Flanders, Cost as a Sentencing Factor: Missouri's Experiment, 77 Mo. L. REV. 391,

391 (2012).
30.

Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Jonson & Daniel S. Nagin, PrisonsDo Not Reduce Recidi-

vism: The High Cost ofIgnoring Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S, 50S-51 S (Supp. 2011).
William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519
31.
(2001).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32.
33.
Not all crimes have victims in a tangible sense-who is the victim in a consensual drug sale
or in resisting arrest? Moreover, victims do not drive decisions-the prosecutor does. In some cases,
for example, prosecutors seek the death penalty over the objections of surviving family members. See,
e.g., Wayne A. Logan, DeclaringLife at the CrossroadsofDeath: Victims'Anti-Death Penalty Views
and Prosecutors'ChargingDecisions, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41, 43-45 (1999).
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It is well-known that the U.S. penal system is exceptional, and not in
a good way. As with medicine, attempts to change the system have been
met with fierce resistance by insiders who fear lost rents (e.g., prison
guards) or lost discretion to treat crime as they see fit. In many instances,
the very idea that criminal law could be subject to cost effectiveness analysis by outsiders is rejected. Only prosecutors know what is best for public
safety, and they need to be given complete freedom to pursue what is best
for society. DAs are, in many ways, the entire system, able to charge under
expansive penal codes and drive bargains; John Pfaff has made a convincing argument that changes in prosecutorial charging patterns helped drive
increases in incarceration from 1994 to 2008.34
To say that the criminal justice and healthcare systems are similar is
not to say that crime and disease are identical. Crime and disease share
some similarities, but also have important differences. But one need not
address crime when one is talking about incarceration; crime is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for incarceration.35 Crime goes unreported, unsolved, and unprosecuted. Poor health also goes undetected, undiagnosed,
36
and untreated. Crime is seen as much more a result of human agency than
is disease-choices about engaging in activities that are criminal as well
as choices about which activities will be deemed criminal-although some
lifestyle choices, such as smoking, increase risks of disease and some conditions, such as female hysteria in the 19th century, were the result of
which behaviors society deemed abnormal or worthy of treatment.3 7 Some
might say that crime is always bad and health is always good, but consider
whether using the criminal justice system as a form of social control is
universally acknowledged to be desirable, or whether extending the life of
a terminally ill patient through treatments with many unpleasant side effects is desirable.3 8

34.

See John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV.

1239, 1241 (2012); see also Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, The Role ofDiscretion in the
Criminal Justice System, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 258 (1998) (examining sentencing evidence in
California to conclude that prosecutors seek to maximize prosecution).
35.
See, e.g., W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State's Dime): How Violent Crime Does
Not Drive CaliforniaCounties'IncarcerationRates-and Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987,
994, 1035-49 (2012) (noting reported crime rates in California counties explain only three percent of
the variance in new felon admissions).
36.
Nate Silver makes this point in his book. NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY
So MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL-BUT SOME DON'T 217-19 (2012). Silver states that disease reports
tend to increase with news about the disease, citing one expert's opinion that the statistical signs that
swine flu was spreading rapidly "may have come from people reporting symptoms to their doctors
which they might otherwise have ignored." Id. at 219. In other words, knowledge about disease depends on perceptions of disease. In the next paragraph, Silver explicitly likens the situation to crime
reporting: if the police report an increased number of burglaries in a neighborhood, is that because
they are being more vigilant and are catching crimes that they had missed before, or have [they] made
it easier to report them? Or is it because the neighborhood is becoming more dangerous? Id.
37.
Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Hysterical Woman: Sex Roles and Role Conflict in 19th-

Century America, 39 Soc. RES. 652, 652-55 (1972).
38.
To cite an example from the lives of economists (and the psychologists who influenced
them), Richard Thaler recounts that psychologist Amos Tversky decided not to seek cancer treatments
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Our understanding of disease is ultimately driven in part by what is
successful in treating it, and our ability to design successful treatments is
similarly affected by our understanding of disease. So perhaps the reason
medical analogy might seem strange is only because we are in the "four
humours" stage of our understanding. 39 We treat crime in a uniform fashion because we do not understand it, and we do not understand it because
we have not experimented with treating different crimes and criminals in
different ways.
II. THE VALUE CREATION MODEL

In healthcare, fee-for-service has been challenged by pay-for-performance, a term that describes a system in which providers are paid for improving health outcomes by whatever means the provider chooses.40 In
pay-for-performance, providers are no longer paid by the procedure, but
by the case, and they have freedom to treat cases according to their judgment, with two limits: they are budgetarily limited from doing too much,
and they are limited by malpractice from doing too little (or doing something harmful). Pay-for-performance is designed to improve efficiency,
and one recent study found that "financial incentives significantly influence physicians' supply of health care" and that value-based payments
"hold the promise of curbing costs without jeopardizing quality." 4 1 These
incentives are designed so that doctors will only order those interventions
that are, at the margin, necessary to treat the patient. Doctors should be
less inclined to order unnecessary interventions than under fee-for-service,
which reimburses the interventions even if they are not demonstrably tied
to the outcome.
Pay-for-performance is part of a lengthy project that is still very much
in progress, a project that seeks to improve the quality of doctors and their

at the end of his life: "[R]uining his final months with pointless treatments that would make him very
sick and at best extend his life by a few weeks was not a tempting option." RICHARD H. THALER,
MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, at xiv (2015). Medicine more generally
has had to grapple with what "health" exactly means, as is seen in, e.g., the concept of quality-adjusted

life years (more life of lower-quality might be less desirable than a shorter life of higher quality).
Abraham Mehrez & Amiram Gafni, Quality-AdjustedLife Years, Utility Theory, and Healthy-Years
Equivalents, 9 MED. DECISION MAKING 142,142-43 (1989).
39.
GUIDO MAJNO, THE HEALING HAND: MAN AND WOUND IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 178

(1975).
Health care costs are also controlled by capitation systems whereby large organizations will
40.
be paid a certain per-person amount for a large population on the theory that the individual health
differences (and financial risks) of each member of the population will even out. See Meredith B.
Rosenthal, Beyond Payfor Performance-EmergingModels of Provider-PaymentReform, 359 NEW

ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1198-99 (2008). 1 do not address this model in this article but note this only to
complete the view of recent trends in healthcare economics.
Incentives Affect Medical
Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottleib, Do Physicians'Financial
41.
Treatment and Patient Health?, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1320, 1347 (2014). Contra Marina N. Bolotnikova, Are Hospital Pay-for-Performance Programs Failing?, HARV. MAG. (June 29, 2016),
http://harvardmagazine.com/2016/06/are-hospital-pay-for-performance-programs-failing.
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42

treatments. This project has taken a long time, in part, because both the
healthcare system and disease itself are complex, and measuring quality
and outcomes is difficult. Part of the explanation is also that it is very difficult to make major changes in the healthcare system without running into
intense opposition from doctors and other players in the system-a problem that would certainly also be true of attempts to change criminal justice
along the lines proposed. Pay-for-performance has built on earlier attempts
to standardize medical treatment, measure quality of care, and audit providers and institutions, 43 part of the professionalization of medicine so meticulously detailed in Paul Starr's The Social TransformationofAmerican
Medicine.44

Though quality improvements have been taking place at least since
the 1870s, 45 one early example of the more recent pay-for-performance
trend was the emergence of Diagnosis-related Groups (DRGs).4 DRGs
classify patient conditions and tie them to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. If a patient needs a hip replaced, for example, his treatment is
billed according to that DRG, and the provider is paid a set amount to treat
the condition. DRGs give providers incentives in the average case to follow some form of the state of the art, on which the DRG payment is based,
while simultaneously offering incentives to adopt new techniques that are
as effective but cheaper in order to save the difference between the cost of
the procedure and the amount of reimbursement.
In a series of articles47 and a book,4 8 Michael Porter (and, occasionally, co-authors) refined the idea of pay-for-performance, identifying the
42.
For a recent history that focuses on the beginning of the quality movement in the 1980s
using a framework that, like this article, combines economics and "what works" and ultimately employs a "value-for-money competition," see Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Man-

aged Competition, 12 HEALTH AFF. 24, 25-28, 38-39 (Supp. 1 1993).
43.
Malpractice cases have already created some penalties for grossly substandard quality. The
focus of this article is on incentives to improve quality. The Eighth Amendment, like malpractice,
penalizes grossly substandard interventions, but it does not promote quality improvements beyond the
minimum. For the most influential early theoretical work on quality in healthcare, see Avedis Donabedian, Evaluating the Quality of Medical Care, 44 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 166, 166-70

(1966).
44.
STARR, supra note 23, at 37-40. Pay-for-performance has also proceeded in parallel with
certain structural changes, such as the increased uptake of vertical integration in the provision of
healthcare (via HMOs and the like), which seeks to save money by focusing on prevention, coordinating care, and internalizing inter-departmental externalities. This Article focuses only on the concept
of pay-for-performance; an analysis of greater structural integration will be left to another article.
45.
Id. at 102-06 (discussing reforms to medical education and the re-imposition medical licensing).
46.
Robert B. Fetter et al., Case Mix Definition by Diagnosis-RelatedGroups, 18 MED. CARE,

at i, 3 (Supp. 2 1980).
47.

See, e.g., Robert S. Kaplan & Michael E. Porter, How to Solve the Cost Crisis in Health

Care, 89 HARV. Bus. REV. 46, 49-50, 58-61 (2011); Porter, supra note 15, at 109-10; Michael E.
Porter & Elizabeth Olmstead Teisberg, Redefining Competition in Health Care, 82 HARv. Bus. REV.

64, 66, 75-76 (2004); Michael E. Porter & Thomas H. Lee, The Strategy That Will Fix Health Care,
91 HARV. Bus. REV. 50, 51-53 (2013); Michael E. Porter, What Is Value in Health Care?, 363 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2477, 2477-78 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, What Is Value].
48.
MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH OLMSTED TEISBERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE:
CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION ON RESULTS 6-9 (2006).
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key problem in health care as a lack of value creation. He criticized some
pay-for-performance schemes as encouraging cost control without necessarily maintaining or improving health. For example, a provider reimbursed for a DRG procedure might cut corners, not just costs. Paying on
the basis of the state-of-the-art without measuring whether the intervention
worked does not incentivize effective healthcare. Porter argues that value
is created only when patients get healthier, when costs decrease, or both.49
One cannot focus only on outcomes or cost-one must focus on both. The
healthcare system can only evaluate outcomes by following the patient's
progress from beginning to end, even if she passes from one doctor in one
department to another doctor (or several others).
The value concept rejects a simple focus on cost cutting because if
cutting
comes at the expense of health outcomes, no value is added.51
cost
At its most radical, pay-for-performance calls for a restructuring of the
healthcare system; at the other end of the spectrum, pay-for-performance
simply encourages existing procedures to be done more effectively and
efficiently (including, sometimes, not at all). There is still considerable
autonomy within the system for doctors to pursue different treatments.52
The incentives built in to the system-the "pay" in pay-for-performancemean that evidence-based ideas, ones that can demonstrate real improvements in health outcomes, are favored. It also means that improvements
can be disseminated more rapidly because there is a financial disincentive
to continue ineffective or inefficient practices.
Pay-for-performance can be implemented in several ways, with a focus on particular treatments, on institutions, or on overall allocation of resources to maximize social welfare (by, e.g., focusing on prevention instead of treatment in the emergency room).5 3 One pay-for-performance

49.
Porter is not the only one to have latched on to this idea-the Jackson Hole Initiatives, for
example, also proposed accountability on health outcomes and cost-but I prefer his formulation because it combines efficacy and efficiency in a concise phrase. See, e.g., Paul M. Ellwood, Alain C.
Enthoven & Lynn Etheredge, The Jackson Hole Initiativesfor a Twenty-First Century American

Health Care System, I HEALTH ECON. 149, 149-50 (1992); see also Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G.
McGuire, Provider Behavior Under Prospective Reimbursement, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 129, 148-49
(1986) (concluding that a mixed lump sum and fee for service system would encourage better outcomes while controlling costs).
50.
Porter, supranote 15, at 110.
51.
The individual case is not always the sole focus of pay-for-performance-sometimes payfor-performance looks at the population level. Accountable Care Organizations, for example, are paid
bonuses if they are able to treat their patient populations at a lower cost than public medical programs
would have, presumably by promoting prevention over responsive treatment. Since this policy is more
aligned with prevention and restructuring of care rather than care improvements, I will not discuss it
in detail but for more see, for example, Alison Ritchie et al., Shifting Reimbursement Models: The
Risks and Rewards for Primary Care, MED. ECoN. (Apr. 8, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.modemmedicine.com/medical-economics/content/tags/aca/shifting-reimbursement-models-risks-and-rewards-primary-care.
52.
Indeed, one pair of doctors wrote to endorse the Affordable Care Act on the basis that it
might enhance physician autonomy. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Steven D. Pearson, Physician Autonomy

andHealth Care Reform, 307 [J]AMA 367, 367-68 (2012).
53.

For a general overview, see Rosenthal, supra note 40, at 1199.
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scheme that has recently been deployed by Medicare and Medicaid is hospital readmission penalties for certain procedures-the heart surgery example mentioned in the introduction. 54 Hospitals get reduced payments for
excessive readmissions following heart attacks, heart failure, and pneumonia.55 Excessive readmissions are defined as the risk-adjusted rate of readmission within thirty days relative to the national average. A hospital now
has an incentive to promote surgical aftercare, a patient-outcome-centered
approach that will lead to better results without incurring additional expensive hospital stays. These bonuses are a net gain to all parties: the patient is healthier and the cost savings can potentially be split between the
government and the provider. Another pay-for-performance scheme pays
for chronic conditions that cannot be cured, such as diabetes. 5 6 The outcomes evaluated in this instance include management of symptoms, quality of life, survival times, and cost of treatment.
Performance-based programs have to be adjusted; different types of
cases employ different incentives and metrics. The end goal in the cardiac
readmission example is a return to health; the end goal with chronic conditions like diabetes is maintaining quality of life (or slowing its decline).
The former has outcomes that are easier to quantify (readmission within a
certain time), the latter outcomes are much harder to quantify (quality of
life per unit of cost). This points out an operational problem with pay-forperformance. The goal of measuring and rewarding value for money can
be the same, but the means of getting there are often different.
While this vagueness is undoubtedly a weakness when viewed from
one perspective, it also, like many legal terms (e.g., "reasonable"), has the
advantage of being flexible enough to encompass a variety of situations.
Different definitions of health will have to be hashed out for different sets
of cases. Asking what outcome to measure in a given case assuredly involves decisions about the particular measurement, but, crucially, it does
not question the centrality of measuring and evaluating itself. The act of

54.
See supra Introduction. Hospital readmissions are a focus because they are both "prevalent
and costly" among Medicare patients. Stephen F. Jencks, Mark V. Williams & Eric A. Coleman, RehospitalizationsAmong Patients in the Medicare Fee-for-Service Program, 360 NEY ENG. J. MED.

1418, 1418 (2009).
55.
Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), CMS.GOv, https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/acuteinpatientpps/readmissions-reduction-program.html
(last

modified Apr. 18, 2016, 5:08 PM).
56.
Porter & Lee, supra note 47, at 55 (discussing "patients with complex chronic conditions
such as diabetes, or disabled elderly patients"). Note that there are often issues with comorbidity in
chronic conditions: patients often have more than one disease, and the treatment for someone suffering
from more than one condition is not always a matter of combining the individual treatments. The
regime can change entirely. For a study that evaluates long-term care for comorbid chronic conditions,
see Wayne J. Katon et al., Collaborative Carefor Patients with Depression and Chronic Illnesses,

363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2611, 2611-12 (2010).
57.
The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute was established to fund studies on effective treatments and then to disseminate information and training based on those studies. PATIENTCENTERED
OUTCOMES
RESEARCH
INST.,
2015
ANNUAL
REPORT
3
(2015),
http://www.pcori.org/sites/default/files/PCORI-Annual-Report-2015.pdf.
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negotiating what outcomes to measure and how to measure them cannot
be made once and set permanently for all cases because each case presents
different challenges. 58 Having the goal of improving outcomes per unit of
cost spent provides a criterion for improvement, some kind of yardstick,
even if the units of measurement on that yardstick (mortality, health, time
to recover, pain) might be different. Even if it were possible to set uniform
outcomes from on high for all cases, it would not be desirable because
those governed by pay-for-performance need to buy into the quality measurements selected or they will not effectively implement them.
Finally, an outcome orientation also needs to consider who the target
audience for a given incentive is. 59 Is it hospitals, as they make their decisions about capital purchases or staffing of departments? Doctors, as they
prescribe treatment? Insurers, as they decide what to cover and how much
to pay for it? Individuals, as they choose treatments? Pay-for-performance
is flexible enough to appeal to all of them. Hospitals can free up resources
by treating conditions in ways that are cheaper but as effective. Insurance
companies can improve fiscal health through lower-cost treatments and
lower demand as health improves. Individuals benefit by suffering less.
Doctors benefit through greater autonomy.
Any attempt to move towards a pay-for-performance system has certain prerequisites built into it. 60 First, providers need to know information
about cost structure, which involves learning about staff costs, staff time
per intervention, drug costs, and time spent waiting for open rooms or open
slots in a schedule. Providers need to dig deep into their procedures and
understand where potential efficiencies can be exploited. Second, reimbursement must be based on a standardized measure of health outcomes.
Some of this is definitional on the part of the initial diagnoses-which hip
replacements are garden variety and which present other factors that will
make them either easier or more difficult to treat. Some of this also depends on the ways in which health outcomes are defined-time to recovery, pain and suffering, or mortality. Third, outcomes need to be stored in
an apples-to-apples data format for easy comparison across institutions
and patient populations in order to measure the value created by a particular intervention or institution. Fourth, the healthcare system needs to
move beyond the viewpoint of the provider (whether an institution or a
department within that institution) and take a more holistic approach to the
health of an individual. What combination of action will improve the patient's health the most? This means avoiding cost-shifting from one department or organization to another and focusing, instead, on the total cost
of treatment. Such a focus might reveal that outpatient procedures are just
58.

Factors include the costs of measuring a particular outcome, the feasibility of measuring

that outcome, and issues concerning precision and inter-rater reliability.
59.
Laura A. Petersen et al., Does Pay-for-PerformanceImprove the Quality of Health Care?,

145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 265, 265 (2006).
60.

See Kaplan & Porter, supra note 47, at 52-58.
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as effective as inpatient procedures, or that phone calls rather than nurse
visits are effective forms of aftercare. More-and more intrusive-is not
always better, even in terms of efficacy. 61 An efficiency focus pushes institutions to act on what they learn about efficacy, whereas fee-for-service
pays institutions to ignore what they learn-if they bother to learn anything.62
There are many criticisms of pay-for-performance, focusing primarily on the difficulties of defining and measuring outcomes. Because these
criticisms also apply in a criminal justice context, and because criminal
justice is the focus of this Article, I will address them in Part IV.A. 63
III. CURRENT APPROACHES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ECONOMICS

The general shortcomings of the medical fee-for-service model help
explain similar problems in the criminal justice context. A pay-for-performance approach might provide similar potential solutions. Comparing
criminal justice and healthcare economics comports with a long line of
viewing prisons themselves through the lens of medicine. Nineteenth century prison reformers were on board with the centralization of prisons under state control because they thought it would make them more professional and rehabilitative. 64 Wardens expressly invoked medical metaphors
to advocate on behalf of indeterminate sentences, saying that they alone
knew when an offender was cured. Health care also happens to be the centerpiece of the most significant prison case in a generation, Brown v.
Plata,'6 though Plata is about minimum standards-avoiding carceral
malpractice-rather than incentivizing quality and efficiency improve66
ments above the minimum. This Article proposes a measured return to
the medical model, albeit one that corrects for certain shortcomings ad-

61.
More can also be worse in medicine. Atul Gawande, Foreword: Positive Deviance and
Health Care to RICHARD T. PASCALE ET AL., THE POWER OF POSITIVE DEVIANCE, at ix, xi (2010)
("[S]tudies find that ... where doctors order more frequent tests and procedures, more specialist visits,
and more hospital admissions than the average-the patients do no better, whether measured in terms
of survival, ability to function, or satisfaction with care. If anything, they seem to do worse.").
62.
Some changes might imply new types of organizations to better treat certain segments of
the patient population. Porter envisages the creation of integrated practice units (IPUs) for the treatment of certain standard or chronic conditions. Porter & Lee, supra note 47, at 53 (describing IPUs as
organized not by department and service, but "around the patient's medical condition"). By specializing in, say, diabetes, an IPU can develop expertise that should allow it to treat diabetic patients more
efficiently and effectively than a jack-of-all-trades, master-of-none medical practice could.
63.
1 should also note that Porter's analysis assumes that there is a market for medical providers.
Porter & Teisberg, supra note 47, at 65. Even though hospitals are a mix of for-profit and nonprofit
institutions, they all compete for patients and for insurance dollars. Porter's framework assumes that
more money can be directed to good performers and that positive and negative incentives can be directed at poor performers. Without a shift in funding and resources, the incentives available to promote
value-creation are limited. The same is true for corrections: dollars have to flow to promote valuecreation.
64.
For a general background and extensive references to more detailed historical treatments,
see Ball, Why State Prisons?,supra note 25, at 90-92.

65.
66.

563 U.S. 493 (2011).
Id. at 500.
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dressed infra in Part V. The historical emphasis on treatment is reintroduced with better (but not perfect) social science and much better ability
to crunch the data.
To start, health care and criminal justice are two of the fastest-grow67
ing areas of state budget expenditures. There is very little downward cost
pressure in either. Prison, in particular, is free to local decision makers,
except in unified corrections systems.6 9 This means that prison, the most
expensive-and maximally intrusive-treatment is likely to be used even
when it is unnecessary or when less intrusive and expensive alternatives
exist. No prosecutor or judge ever needs to measure the efficacy or efficiency of a prison sentence; providers in the criminal justice system are
not accountable in terms of creating value. 70 Various parts of the system
can get blamed for cost overruns or for particular outcomes, but the structure and operation of the system as a whole are seldom blamed. On the
contrary, the decentralized nature of criminal justice practically encourages the shifting of cost and blame. The prisons blame parole, parole
blames the prisons, the county blames the state, and the state blames the
county.
Even where there is some discussion of total costs of interventions,
these costs do not drive policies. In Missouri, for example, judges are presented with the costs of various sentencing options, but not their efficacy
or efficiency-the exact kind of misplaced incentives that Porter's value
formulation seeks to avoid. 7 1 A judge knows that jail is X dollars and
prison is Ydollars, but she does not know which works better-indeed, the
very question would probably seem strange. Best practices across jurisdictions and departments are diffused slowly, if at all. There are no financial
incentives to improve outcomes; at best, there are incentives to cut costs
without improving outcomes. Even if good policies are deployed, there are
no financial incentives to train people to deploy those policies with fidelity
to their design, to follow up about quality control and, generally, to ensure

67.

Solomon Moore, Study Shows High Cost of Criminal Corrections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,

2009, at Al3.
However, for an analysis of the economic downturn on criminal justice systems, see HADAR
68.
AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
PUNISHMENT 14-15 (2015). Professor Aviram also points out that this focus on costs could result in
substandard care, what she calls "tough 'n' cheap," a valid complaint about the present system that a
value focus would address. Id at 164.

The following paragraph largely replicates the analysis found in W. David Ball, Defunding
69.
State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1060, 1061-63, 1075-78 (2014).
Two proposals in this regard serve as apt examples. See Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informa70.
tional Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 50 (2008) (proposing prosecutors be regularly informed of the status of prison capacities); Russell M. Gold, PromotingDemocracy in Prosecution,86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 72-73 (2011) (proposing that the costs of prosecution be
made public but using prosecutorial elections as the mechanism for internalizing the externality). But
DAs might not care at all about these costs unless they have to pay for them, either via their budgets
or at the ballot box.
Flanders, supra note 29, at 391.
71.
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that the policies are implemented well. Better policies are costs whose external benefits mostly make the jobs of those in other agencies easier. A
prisoner reformed by prison means more work for prison employees but
less work for police. A police officer who successfully defuses a situation
without arresting anyone might make more work for herself even as she
makes less work for the rest of the system.
Even the outcomes that are discussed, such as political claims about
deterrence and the effectiveness of particular sentences, are never put to
the test. The general rule is no data collection, no follow up, no outcome
tracking, and no feedback loops to decision makers such as judges and
DAs.72 This means there is little opportunity to learn, little opportunity to
improve, and little accountability. All sentencing is treated as downstream-someone else's problem. In fact, many law schools, which train
the judges and prosecutors who drive sentencing and charging, teach little
about prisons, even as first-year criminal law classes routinely address the
purpose of punishment.7 3
There is a spate of recent research analyzing the costs and benefits of
various approaches to crime. Darryl Brown outlined the approach in 2004,
discussing cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in detail (using, inter alia, environmental law as a comparison) and concluding, in part, that "[o]ffender
treatment . . . has fared well in cost-benefit analyses."7 4 Brown's analysis
is extensive, analyzing the wide-ranging effects of criminal justice policies
and discussing how prevention is effective and efficient, but his policy
prescriptions focus primarily on how CBA could be incorporated into the
executive branch (prosecution and police). Though he discusses the decentralized nature of criminal justice, he does not discuss the implications
of the prison subsidy, nor does he advocate pay-for-performance. A recent
issue of Criminology and Public Policy focused on the use of CBA in
criminal justice, with articles by Patricio Dominguez and Steven Raphael

&

72.
For an overview of the problem that focuses on California, see W. David Ball, E Pluribus
Unum: Data and Operations Integration in the CaliforniaCriminal Justice System, 21 STAN. L.
POL'Y REV. 277, 277-78, 280 (2010).
73.
Sharon Dolovich, Teaching Prison Law, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 218, 218 (2012) ("It is during
the administration of punishment that the state's criminal justice power is at its zenith, and at this point
that the laws constraining the exercise of that power become most crucial. Yet it is precisely at this
point that the curriculum in most law schools falls silent.").
74.
Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 323, 351

(2004).
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(providing a comprehensive summary of the issue),7 5 Michael Tonry,76 and
Brandon C. Welsh and David P. Farrington,77 among others.
Criminal justice CBA approaches are not just theoretical; they have
gained traction in the policy realm as well. 78 The Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) has long been considered a model program,
analyzing proposed policies in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency.79 WSIPP is now actively distributing its model via a partnership
with the Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative8 0 and has posted an exhaustive technical documentation that breaks down exactly how it models
costs and benefits. 8 ' The Vera Institute and the Bureau of Justice Assistance have also partnered to promote CBA in criminal justice and have
produced a series of extremely informative, practitioner-centered publications. 82 The Justice Reinvestment Initiative of the Bureau of Justice Assistance is also working to promote data-driven policies that improve public

Patricio Dominguez & Steven Raphael, The Role of the Cost-of-Crime Literature in Bridg75.
ing the Gap Between Social Science Research and Policy Making: Potentialsand Limitations, 14
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 589, 589 (2015). The authors are particularly concerned about the way
in which the income levels of rich victims might skew the costs of crime and promote unequitable
distributional effects of resources like police, as well as the methodological problems with estimating
the costs of crime by either the contingent valuation or the willingness to pay methods. Id. at 599-600.
76.
Michael Tonry, The Fog Around Cost-of-Crime Studies May Finally Be Clearing:Prison-

ers and Their Kids Suffer Too, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 653, 660-62 (2015) (emphasizing
problems with the cost of crime literature, pointing out that the costs of punishment-in terms of
hedonic losses to prisoners and collateral effects on their families-are not included in some of the
most influential cost of crime estimates).
Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Monetary Value of Early Developmental Crime
77.
PreventionandIts Policy Significance, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 673, 675-76 (2015) (suggesting that if costs of offending are high, many social welfare programs will be justified).
78.
For an excellent overview, see CAMERON MCINTOSH & JOBINA Li, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN CRIME PREVENTION: THE WHY, HOW AND SO WHAT 3-11 (2012),
See also PEWhttps://www.publicsafety.gc.calcnt/rsrcs/pbletns/cnmc-nlss/cnmc-nss-eng.pdf.
MACARTHUR RESULTS FIRST INITIATIVE, STATES' USE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: IMPROVING
RESULTS FOR TAXPAYERS 9-12 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs assets/2013/pewresultsfirst50statereportpdf.pdf.
79.
See, e.g., STEVE Aos, MARNA MILLER & ELIZABETH DRAKE, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB.
POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS To REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME RATES 2, 8-16 (2006), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/952/WsippEvidence-Based-Public-Policy-Options-to-Reduce-Future-Prison-ConstructionCriminal-Justice-Costs-and-Crime-RatesFull-Report.pdf.
80.
For a report on the New York State experience, see MARC SCHABSES, DIV. OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVS., N.Y. STATE, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEPLOYMENT AND
INITIAL APPLICATION OF THE RESULTS FIRSTCOST BENEFIT MODEL 1 (2013), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/resultsfirst/rf-technical report cbal_oct2013.pdf.
WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, BENEFIT-COST TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION 6-175
81.
(2016), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/TechnicalDocumentation/WsippBenefitCostTechnicalDocumenta-

tion.pdf.
82.
See, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & JOSHUA RINALDI, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS AND JUSTICE POLICY TOOLKIT 4 (2014), http://cbkb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/cba-justice-policy-toolkit.pdf; CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
USING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR JUSTICE POLICYMAKING 1 (2014), http://cbkb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Using-Cost-Benefit-Analysis-for-Justice-Policymaking.pdf; CARL MATTHIES,
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, ADVANCING THE QUALITY OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR JUSTICE
PROGRAMS 1 (2014), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/advancing-thequality-of-cba.pdf; CARL MATTHIES & TINA CHIU, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PUTTING A VALUE ON
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safety in a cost-effective manner, taking a holistic approach that includes
all parts of the criminal justice system (redistributing from less cost-effective programs, like prison, towards more cost-effective programs dealing
with prevention). The Obama Administration rolled out the Police Data
Initiative in 2015,84 the Data-Driven Justice Initiative in 2016,85 and recently published Economic Perspectives on Incarcerationand the Criminal Justice System, summarizing a host of cost-benefit research.86 There
have also been attempts for private entities to fund criminal justice improvements using "social impact bonds," with payment contingent on successful outcomes.
There is certainly much to admire in the CBA literature and policy.
What is missing, however, is a systematic discussion that goes beyond the
desirability vel non of individual policies. The literature needs a more holistic critique of why diffusion of sensible policies is not more widespread,
a critique that includes the ways in which the incentive structure of criminal justice-both institutional and budgetary-might contribute to the
problem. Prisons themselves are also inadequately considered as potential
sources of improved public safety.88 The thrust of this Article is not, then,
to replace CBA, but to provide a framework in which prisons and the individuals who sentence (and charge) offenders have incentives to insist on
best practices at the ground level. CBA will do very little if prison is free
to local decision makers and they have no incentive to pursue the social
good. Ultimately, good policies can only go so far on their merits. How
can the system be structured to encourage wider rollout and diffusion?
The economic literature engages with the incentives faced within the
system by providers of criminal justice. These articles are a recent discovery on my part and many advance the argument that misalignment is bound

CRIME ANALYSTS:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES 4 (2014),
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/Vera-CrimeAnalysts.pdf.
83.
JusticeReinvestment Initiative,OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.bja.gov/programs/justicereinvestment/what isjri.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
84.
Megan Smith & Roy L. Austin, Jr., Launching the Police Data Initiative, WHITE HOUSE:

BLOG (May 18, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/05/18/launching-policedata-initiative.
85.
Christopher 1. Haugh, The White House Has a New Data-Driven Criminal-JusticeProject,
ATLANTIC (June 30, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/white-house-datacriminal-justice/489614.
86.
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON
INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/CEA%2BCriminal%2BJustice%2BReport.pdf
87.
Chris Fox & Kevin Albertson, Payment by Results and Social Impact Bonds in the Criminal
Justice Sector: New Challengesfor the Concept ofEvidence-Based Policy, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM.

JUST. 395, 395-400 (2011) (noting advantages of payment by results and difficulties in determining
outcomes).
88.
Though Brown discusses the larger framework of criminal justice including issues of diffusion, alternative sentencing, and tailoring programs to needs in community prosecution, his otherwise
outstanding article gives only one paragraph to prison treatment itself. See Brown, supra note 74, at
351. He does discuss alternatives to incarceration later in some detail. Id. at 367-71.
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to happen when the state subsidizes prison while local governments control who goes there-an argument that predates the same analysis from
Zimring and Hawkins (the "correctional free lunch") I explored in earlier
articles.89 So, while Zimring and Hawkins coined the "correctional free
lunch" phrase, the idea predates them, and these prior formulations deserve to be more widely acknowledged in the legal academy. What follows
is my attempt to correct my own errors in this regard. (Many of the arguments discussed below are summarized in Kenneth Avio's excellent 1998
survey of the economic literature, The Economics ofPrisons.)90
In 1983, Robert Gillespie of the University of Illinois observed the
disjuncture between state payment for prison and local control over who
is sent there, proposing, as his solution to the inevitable overcrowding that
results, that the state instead allocate prison bed spaces to counties who
91
can then sell them to or buy them from other counties as needed. Fred
Giertz and Peter Nardulli made similar observations in 1985, describing
the "basic misalignment" between local governments who benefit from
prison and the fact that "these services are provided by state government
at virtually a zero cost to localities."9 2 Giertz and Nardulli suggested a
complete decentralization of the system, where incarceration is provided
93
by local government and funding is replaced with block grants. Nardulli
had earlier developed this idea in 1984 in an article which analyzed county
usage of prisons in Illinois, again starting with the premise that "local pol94
iticians have funded law and order campaigns at state expense." Alfred
Blumstein and Richard Larson in 1969 analyzed the disjointed nature of
the criminal justice system, remarking that the independence of agencies
inhibited the effective deployment of interdependent policies, and that
criminal justice organizations failed to get feedback about the downstream
95
effects of those policies on other agencies.

FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 140 (1991).
89.
For my own elaboration on the subject, see Ball, A False Idea, supranote 25, at 27; Ball, supra note
69, at 1061-62; Ball, supranote 35, at 988; Ball, Why State Prisons?, supranote 25, at 77-82.

90.

Kenneth L. Avio, The Economics ofPrisons, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 143, 143-44 (1998).

Robert W. Gillespie, AllocatingResources to Prison Space: An Economic Approach Incor91.
porating Efficiency andEquity 1-6 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Commerce & Bus. Admin., Working Paper

No. 977, 1983).
J. Fred Giertz & Peter F. Nardulli, Prison Overcrowding, 46 PUB. CHOICE 71, 71 (1985).
92.
Id. at 75-77. For my own treatment, which unintentionally duplicates theirs, see Ball, supra
93.
note 69, at 1072-75. For a similar idea, see Chris Fox & Kevin Albertson, Could Economics Solve the

Prison Crisis?, 57 PROB. J. 263, 276-77 (2010).
Peter F. Nardulli, The Misalignment of Penal Responsibilities and State Prison Crises:
94.
Costs, Consequences, and CorrectiveActions, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 365, 368 (1984).
Alfred Blumstein & Richard Larson, Models of a Total Criminal Justice System, 17
95.
OPERATIONS RES. 199, 199-200 (1969).
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In 1993, Charles Logan wrote an article entitled Criminal Justice
Performance Measuresfor Prisons, but he focused on processes, not outcomes, and did so from a retributive perspective.96 He paid little attention
to the decentralization and organizational incentives problems, whereby,
say, poor rehabilitation by prisons might result in increased workloads for
police. Logan's approach is also typical of the other works cited here, including my own, in that it assumes that there are no differences-or no
differences that can be measured-among particular institutions' custodial
rehabilitation programs.9 7 The main gains are from early prevention and
diversion. This Article, however, assumes that there are better and worse
prisons and programs and thus, that prisons should be differentiated.
Much of the rest of the economics literature's focus is on "factors that
affect the supply of criminal activities"-that is, what incentives and policies tend to make people more or less likely to engage in criminal activity
in the first place. 9 8 This is also true of the most influential analyses in law
and economics. To cite perhaps the most influential example, Richard Posner's treatment of the law and economics of criminal law is all about the
supply of crime and the ways in which criminals might respond to the relative costs of gainful and illicit employment, based on the risks and rewards of each. 99 In so doing, Posner built upon Gary Becker's seminal
1968 article, Crime and Punishment:an Economic Approach, which itself
is also primarily about the economics of criminal activity. 00 Both Becker
and Posner treat the system as a passive respondent to homo economicus,
rather than something that, through treatment, could actively alter criminal
tendencies one way or another. Incapacitation is taken as the primary
means by which crime can be controlled, subject to the supply elasticity
of other criminals (i.e., the extent to which new criminals enter the market
to replace those sent to prison).10' In general, this approach is an example
of what Thomas Bernard and Robin Engel have criticized as an overly

96.
Charles H. Logan, CriminalJustice Performance Measuresfor Prisons, in PERFORMANCE
MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19, 19-21 (1993) (focusing "more on the satisfaction
of certain standards, values, and constraints than on the production of particular consequences").
97.
My analysis has previously focused on prisons versus local dispositions like jails and probation. See, e.g., Ball, Why State Prisons?, supra note 25, at 76. 1 argued that unless prisons were
demonstrably superior, they should not be subsidized. Id. at 87-88. 1 did not distinguish among prisons, however, and for the purposes of the analysis presented, was agnostic about their capacity to
rehabilitate. Id. at 88.
98.
Richard B. Freeman, The Economics of Crime, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS
3529, 3541 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); see, e.g., Samuel Cameron, The Economics
of Crime Deterrence:A Survey of Theory and Evidence, 41 KYKLOS 301, 301 (1988).
99.
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,

1205-15 (1985).
100.
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
169 (1968). Frank Easterbrook also uses the prevention/deterrence model in his argument that criminal
procedures are merely price mechanisms in a plea-bargaining market. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal
Procedureas a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 289-90 (1983).
101.
For a law and economics analysis of how crime moves from jurisdiction to jurisdiction due
to enforcement and policy differences, see Doron Teichman, The Market for CriminalJustice: Feder-

alism, Crime Control, and JurisdictionalCompetition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1849-50 (2005).
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narrow theoretical approach to the criminal justice system: too much analysis is bounded by organizational silos, and too little takes on a broader,
system-wide, cross-agency perspective. 02
I propose that reformers should combine cost-benefit analysis that
identifies promising programs with organizational incentives to adopt
them, all within the framework of value creation: improving public safety
outcomes per dollar spent.
IV. CREATING VALUE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

What are the ways in which we might restructure the criminal justice
system-or particular parts of the system-in order to create value? In
Section A, I discuss some practical and theoretical groundwork that must
first be laid. As stated in the introduction, this Article is not model legislation ready to be implemented-it is a map into relatively uncharted territory with only the core defining features sketched out. In Section B, I
focus on particular applications in sentencing that could fit into a performance-based system. In Section C, I outline the advantages of such a system.
A. Measurement Issues, Theoretical and Practical
If the health experience is any indication, the initial move to begin to
categorize similar cases (the criminal equivalent of DRGs) and improve
quality will be a long, iterative process that involves some theoretical work
and a lot of on-the-ground work. In fact, criminal justice might not even
be ready for outcome-based measurements-health care first went through
a series of procedural fixes (qualifications, training, accreditation, professionalization) from the mid-1850s to the present that parts of the criminal
justice system might still need.1 03 Measurements in medicine are proposed,
tested, adopted, refined, and sometimes replaced. The question is not
whether a given measurement works in theory, but in practice. Porter, for
example, has been criticized for glossing over the logistical problems of
defining and measuring health outcomes in the real world,1 04 but Medicare
Thomas J. Bernard & Robin Shepard Engel, Conceptualizing Criminal Justice Theory, 18
102.
JUST. Q. 1, 2-3 (2001).
STARR, supra note 23, at 22 ("Standardization of training and licensing became the means
103.
for realizing both the search for authority and control of the market."). Michele Deitch and Michael
Mushlin have long argued for some form of correctional oversight to promote and enforce best practices. See, e.g., Michele Deitch & Michael B. Mushlin, Op-ed, What's Going on in Our Prisons?,N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2016, at A19.
104.
See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Reform: Porter and Teisberg's Utopian Vision,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 10, 2006), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2006/10/10/health-reform-porterand-teisbergs-utopian-vision. There are other criticisms as well. Doctors do not see themselves as contributing to cost overruns. See Alvin Tran, Study: Doctors Look to Others to Play Biggest Role in
Curbing Health Costs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 23, 2013), http://khn.org/news/study-doctorslook-to-others-to-play-biggest-role-in-curbing-health-costs. Some doctors see data collection as interfering with medical treatment. Robert M. Wachter, Op-ed, How Measurement Fails Us, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2016, at SR5. The current data do not support the efficiency of pay-for-performance. Martin
Emmert et al., Economic Evaluation of Pay-for-Performancein Health Care:A Systematic Review,
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and commercial insurers recently did exactly that, agreeing to common
health outcome measurements. 05
The problems in health care have analogues in criminal justice, and I
will only identify them here, not solve them. In criminal justice, the notion
of quality may seem difficult to begin to get our heads around, even as
there is growing support for data collection and evidence-based practices.
Stakeholders will need to gather and figure out what quality treatment
means and how we will measure it.106 These definitions cannot be generated by academic fiat. A careful study of the history of health quality measurements should provide some insights into the political and organizational dynamics that underlay the gradual shift in health from fee-for-service to pay-for-performance. Space and time do not permit me to construct
a detailed history of these changes, but it should certainly be among the
top priorities of a criminal justice performance-based research agenda.
What follows are some problem areas to be addressed. Perhaps they
cannot be resolved at all. But the same has also been said of medicine, and
even if existing measures of health are subject to revision, they are widely
accepted enough to be driving policy (and preferable to a fee-for-service
alternative). They all revolve around a central question: which outcomes?
One initial observation is that outcomes should be measured across
the system, not in terms of the individual, media-generating case. There
will be failure in the system; that does not mean the system has failed.
People die of cancer at the best cancer hospitals; so too might we expect
some degree of criminal justice failure. This means shifting the focus to
success rates, not individual cases; to how the system is doing overall and
at what cost. The examination of sensational individual cases too often
results in "never again, no matter what the cost" policies. 0 7
The second observation is that different conditions and treatments
will need to be measured with different metrics. The healthcare economics
literature, for example, does not have an exclusive focus on a single measure of health but, instead, looks to multiple measures. Porter, for example,
divides health outcomes into three general categories: mortality, recovery,
13 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 755, 756 (2012). For an overview of some of the key questions that need to
be answered in order to actualize a pay-for-performance system, see Petersen et al., supranote 59, at

265.
105.
Bruce Japsen, Medicare, Commercial InsurersAgree on Uniform Health QualityMeasures,
FORBES (Feb. 16, 2016, 11:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2016/02/16/whitehouse-says-medicare-commercial-insurers-agree-on-health-quality-measures.
106.
Again, if healthcare reform is any indication, the attempt to start to measure and hold accountable certain members of the criminal justice system will be met with resistance from DAs, judges,
and others at the power centers of today's criminal justice system. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
107.
Matt Taibbi, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Shame of Three Strikes Laws, ROLLING
STONE (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/cruel-and-unusual-punishmentthe-shame-of-three-strikes-laws-20130327 (discussing the history of the sensational cases that led to
the passage of Three Strikes in California and reporting the results of polls that showed "[p]eople will
pay for justice, no matter how much it costs").
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and health.108 These might be mapped onto recidivism, modality of treatment, and desistance from crime.
Mortality is the most obvious measure in health; in criminal justice,
that measure is recidivism. A pessimist might rightly conclude that there
is no consensus on what constitutes recidivism.1 09 An optimist might look
at the same set of facts and conclude that a variety of measures could be
used. For example, metrics like arrest for any offense, re-arrest for the
same crime, and return to prison could all be used to measure recidivism.
Again, the minimum requirement is that measurements are agreed to and
that they lend themselves to apples-to-apples comparisons across jurisdictions. It is an open question as to which definition is preferable. Is it total
desistance from crime? A reduction in the number of offenses? A reduction in offenses by each person or an average reduction across populations
of similar offenders? A reduction in the severity of the types of crime
(moving from violent offenses to property offenses)? Reductions which
control for certain variables (aging out)? These choices might depend on
the type of offender or on which garners the most support from practitioners.
The next thing to consider is the modality of treatment through the
lens of efficacy and efficiency. Bentham's utilitarianism, for example, explicitly takes the prisoner's cost (hedonic and otherwise) of punishment
into account, meaning that, ceterisparibus, the least restrictive alternative
that yields the same result is the most welfare-promoting.' 1o This suggests
that, at least in some cases, the harms caused by the criminal justice system
outweigh any benefits. Net widening, in other words, is both resource intensive and ineffective, and pay-for-performance should help restrain it.
For cases which require some response, pay-for-performance would help
limit the size and scope of the intervention. Prison, for example, is expensive and imposes a variety of collateral harms on a prisoner's family (both
emotional harms on families and children, as well as economic harms due
to a variety of wealth-extracting contracts for telephones, commissary

108.
Porter, What Is Value, supra note 47, at 2479-80; see also id. app. I at 1-12 (going into
much greater detail about the value concept); id app. 2 at 1-14 (discussing issues with outcome measurement and how to categorize outcomes into a hierarchy).

109.
(2014).

Robert Weisberg, Meanings and Measures ofRecidivism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 799-800

110.
Michael Tonry observes that, in Bentham's view, "everyone's happiness-including that of
offenders-counts." Tonry, supra note 76, at 661; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 166 (Leslie B. Adams, Jr. 1986) (1789) ("But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be
admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.").
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money, etc.)."' Prison might also be criminogenic.11 2 If So, it is both inefficient and ineffective. But even assuming prison "works," its efficacy
might not be enough to outweigh its inefficiency: we might be able to do
as well with less. These are empirical questions already being studied. My
argument is simply that these questions are important and should be answered; I am not claiming to have the answers myself.
Porter also considers patient experience during the "process of recovery": a successful treatment that is shorter and less painful is more desirable than one that is longer and more painful.' 13 The same should be said of
punishment. We should seek to do the least amount necessary to get results, and we should explicitly consider suffering. Suffering should be
tested like any other factor; it should be a goal only insofar as it works. If
people can stop being criminals as effectively without suffering, then, unless suffering is desirable for its own sake, there is no point to it.114
Finally, where Porter suggests health as the ultimate measure, I would
substitute "desistance from crime" and other pro-social metrics. This
might look different for certain subpopulations. Metrics for homeless offenders might mean hospital days avoided or days without them being assaulted. Metrics for the mentally ill might involve medication uptake or
stability of housing. Metrics for drug-using offenders might vary by drug
(heroin users might have one set of metrics, meth users might have another, recidivist drunk-driving offenders might have still others). Again,
the value-creation framework states that any criminal justice intervention-including none-should make people better (or the same) for the
same amount of resources (or less). For the above populations, alternatives
to criminal justice involvement must be considered. There is much evidence to suggest that criminalizing the incidents of homelessness, mental
illness, and drug abuse is not nearly as effective or efficient as the noncriminal alternatives. A complete analysis, in other words, must consider
whether criminal justice is called for at all. We would not hospitalize
111.
For emotional harms, see Joseph Murray, The Effects of Imprisonment on Families and
Children of Prisoners, in THE EFFECTS OF IMPRISONMENT 442, 442-444 (Alison Liebling & Shadd
Maruna eds., 2005). For economic harms, see Daniel Wagner, Prison Bankers Cash in on Captive
Customers, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 30, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/09/30/15761/prison-bankers-cash-captive-customers ("Taken together, the costs imposed by [prison banking vendors], phone companies, prison store operators and corrections agencies
make it far more difficult for poor families to escape poverty so long as they have a loved one in the
system.").
112.
Cullen, Jonson & Nagin, supra note 30, at 51S (arguing that, for some offenders, prison
might have a criminogenic effect.).
113.
Porter, What Is Value, supra note 47, app. 2 at 4.
114.
In making this suggestion I take no position on the recent scholarship that explores the
effects of hedonic adaptation on the typical prison experience. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Retribution and the Experience ofPunishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1463, 1463-64 (2010). My criticism is not with the way suffering is measured, just with the assumption that suffering itself advances other penological goals such as deterrence, conveying a message of
disapproval, etc. Hedonic adaptation has some empirical basis; the idea that the rational-expectations
hypothesis applies to the justice-involved and that the suffering of prison is part of each prisoner's net
present value calculation has much less.
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someone who arrived at the Emergency Room with a hangnail. We would
tell them to go home. For at least some cases in criminal justice, the same
principle applies.
In addition to goal-based considerations about what outcomes to
measure, there are also program and policy implications. Outcomes should
control for exogenous factors. A macroeconomic downturn resulting in
higher overall unemployment will affect ex-offender unemployment, as
might sector-specific unemployment (such as that for unskilled labor).
Outcomes must also consider the full spectrum of treatment-not just interventions given in prison, but interventions in community supervisionsubject to the principle of parsimony. These variables should be scalar and
avoid the presumption of perfection-measuring better or worse, not success or failure. Binary measures will, by and large, measure failure: justiceinvolved individuals have below-average educational and economic endowments.1 15 We might therefore consider time in the community before
returns to custody as the measurement, not complete desistance from crime
(assuming that a return to custody is a true measure of criminal activity,
not simply an artifact of detection-which is also a confounding variable
in medicine).' 16 In other words, merely lumping in all returns to custody
as failures of equal degree fails to account for the differences between
those who stay out of trouble one day and those who stay out of trouble
much longer.
It is unlikely that there will be a single metric for every case, but it is
nevertheless important to remind ourselves that public safety should be the
organizing principle. Our theories of punishment involve incapacitation,
deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation, but these justifications need to
be tied to their effects on public safety and measured using common definitions in common data formats. Proponents of particular theories should
have falsifiable tests to determine why and how their theories (and the
mechanisms that apply to them) work, then measure and test those hypotheses. Within the concept of value creation, we will avoid both cost cutting
for its own sake as well as stated claims about efficacy that do not consider
efficiency.
Is "public safety value creation" too vague to be useful? Consider that
the focus on improving health outcomes is now embedded within the
healthcare policy community. There is substantial agreement that costs
and quality must be considered, and the discussion explicitly references
these goals, even as particular measurements of these goals and the means

115.

Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration& SocialInequality, 139 DAEDALUS 8, 8-10

(2010).
For an example ofjust such an approach, see Peter Schmidt & Ann Dryden Witte, Predict116.
ing Criminal Recidivism Using 'Split Population'Survival Time Models, 40 J. ECONOMETRICS 141,

141, 144, 151-55 (1989).
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to achieve them are disputed.' 17 The same is not true now of criminal justice. We seldom consider costs of individual interventions even as we bemoan the costs in aggregate. We almost never operationalize the idea that
prison treatment programs might meaningfully affect public safety outcomes. At least agreeing that our criminal justice system should be as effective as possible for the money we spend on it is an important step. This
step must include asking whether a criminal justice response creates as
much value as treating the problem non-criminally or even doing nothing.
Most of the work will not take place at the level of abstraction that "public
safety value creation" implies. It will instead involve meetings with stakeholders, policymakers, and consumers and will involve much painstaking,
granular work. But having public safety outcomes as a guiding principle
will tie together the many strands of policy and theoretical work currently
taking place. The alternative is to throw up our hands, avoid the difficult
work, and accept a system that few would or could defend as just, effective, or economical.
B. Value CreatingPolicies
In this Section, I will sketch out what policies might arise from a public safety value creation framework. A few caveats before the discussion
continues. First, this is a framework, not a particular endorsement of any
one metric or program; it is important to be open to new data and new
studies. The principle of measuring, analyzing, and incentivizing outcome-oriented programs is a procedure, a formula which isolates the variables but does not necessarily solve for X Second, I assume both that it is
possible to know what works and also possible that something will workor at least that something will not work as badly as other things or be as
bad but cheaper. That is, our system can at least be made more efficient,
even if not more effective.
There are also certain conditions that I assume would be built into the
system.'
In an outcome-based system, localities would be prevented
from shifting crime and criminals to other jurisdictions-the "one-way bus
ticket" model of crime control. 9 also assume that there would be some
kind of validated risk-needs assessment tool used, subject to some conditions I will discuss infra. Both sending and receiving parties would have
incentives to measure risk: receiving institutions would not want to take
on a harder case-with higher costs and higher risk of poor outcomesthan they were promised, and sending institutions would want to ensure
that a prisoner's criminogenic needs were met. This would solve the
cream-skimming problem so often seen in the private prison context,

117.
Reinhardt, supra note 104 (criticizing the idea that medical conditions are easy to identify,
discrete, and easy to put into "a standard, finite life cycle").
118.
The following discussion draws on a prior article. See Ball, supra note 69, at 1061-63.
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where the average cost of a prisoner is equated with the marginal cost of
that prisoner.
A pay-for-performance criminal justice system would first begin with
financial and budgetary reforms that would give decision makers some incentives to save money and promote effectiveness. To the extent that localities were given block grants to approach crime in the manner of their
choosing, these grants would have to be subject to income adjustment,
giving more resources to poorer areas and those with higher crime.1 20 The
system would need to tailor sentences to the risk factors a given offender
presented. It would make the entire menu of sentencing options look a lot
like probation does now, with some attempt to link offender characteristics
to penological conditions. Finally, pay-for-performance might also include indeterminate sentencing, whereby offenders were released as soon
as, but not until, they were "better." Within a pay-for-performance framework, however, both prisoners and parole boards would have specific indicia of readiness to return-whether a prisoner addressed his or her underlying diagnosis-rather than generic estimates of threats to society. I
will now discuss each in turn.
Budgets and Data. Under pay-for-performance, budgets would have
to be revamped along performance-oriented lines. I have previously proposed that states no longer fund prison, per se, but that they fund on the
basis of rates of reported violent crime.121 This is a potential restructuring
that would enable greater local freedom of choice in how offenders are
treated, but it is not the only way to encourage pay-for-performance. Federal funds could be disbursed with the requirement that states adopt outcome measurement or data collection.122 States could then base funding
streams to localities on certain baseline standards. Depending on the funding approach used, jurisdictions could conceivably experiment with different approaches to incarceration. Some might invest in mass lockups to
incapacitate-subject to Eighth Amendment limitations. Others might pay
to make people better. Still others might decide that non-criminal responses are called for. This too would provide valuable feedback on the
efficacy of various approaches-approaches which, it should be noted,
currently take place at the intra-state level but which are opaque to voters
3
and officials alike. 12
As for data, the relatively uncontroversial issues that would need to
be implemented to make pay-for-performance viable are, in most cases,
120.
121.

Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1073.
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Darryl Brown has also suggested that the federal government fund cost-benefit studies.
Brown, supra note 74, at 353. Though the federal government has less of a financial impact with
criminal justice than it does in medicine-Medicaid and Medicare are significant enough by themselves to generate change while JAG grants are not. See Zack Cooper et al., The PriceAin't Right?
Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 21815, 2015) (criticizing studies that rely only on Medicare data while noting that
Medicare covers twenty percent of total health care spending).
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issues that need to be addressed for the system to be effectively managed.
This means collecting data in standard formats, data that includes a sufficiently long time horizon that is also linked to offender behavior in other
jurisdictions. This is not a new idea, and it is one where having the idea is
a small part of the job. Saying that the idea of data collection is uncontroversial does not mean its implementation would be; deciding what to
measure and how to measure it is where most of the work would take
place. Implementation would involve effecting institutional and cultural
changes, getting buy-in from practitioners, and hashing out what those
standard measurements and formats would be. Once data is collected, organizations must use it to drive practices and policies. Change needs to be
ongoing and iterative. Those who subsidize these institutions can tie budgets to best practices, incentivizing the propagation, diffusion, and experimentation needed. Finally, data needs not only to be collected, it needs to
be analyzed and shared. A judge now, for example, really only sees the
results of her decisions when they fail and an offender returns to court.
Judges should, instead, be educated about how their populations performed in aggregate, looking at success and failure rates, survival times,
prosocial indicators, and the like for all of those they deal with, not just
the individuals who return to court for an infraction. They should, moreover, be encouraged to look not just at successes, but whether their successes came with the minimum effective dose of resources. More is not
always better-and, indeed, can sometimes be worse.
Tailoring. The next issue the system would deal with is tailoring.
What is a DRG for criminal justice? In order to measure the outcomes
generated by the intervention-as opposed to the selection effects of a
given population-we must control for variations in the initial condition
of offenders. That is, if remuneration is based upon doing a good job, we
have to be able to distinguish between results that stem from a given population being better than another and a given treatment being better than
another. How do we control for differences between cases and among populations? Consider the following individual examples. The crime of arrest
might understate the risk a given individual poses-as, for example, a traffic charge for an organized crime kingpin. The crime of arrest might overstate the risk an individual poses-as, for example, a battered wife killing
her abusive husband. This is certainly among the thorniest parts of actuarialism, as making decisions on risk alone involves non-actuarial decisions about what behavior should be modeled (and how). It is hardly an
answer to say that risk assessment tools might at least do a more accurate
job than the clinical, gut-level assessment of judges and prosecutors. The
larger question, though, of what constitutes a "similar" offense and a "similar" offender is vexing and will probably never be conclusively resolved.1 24
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The problem with standardizing diagnoses, an obvious problem for
criminal justice, is not without its analog in medicine. Witness the New
York Times Magazine column "Diagnosis," which presents symptoms and
asks doctors to figure out the cause (or causes).1 2 5 There are biological
markers for most diseases, but some, like prostate cancer, might actually
turn out to be several different diseases.1 2 6 Co-morbidity also makes diagnoses difficult: those who suffer from two or more diseases need to be
treated differently, have different survival rates, and the like.1 27 Co-mor-

bidity is a readily apparent problem in criminal law, given how many of
the justice-involved have mental health or addiction problems.1 2 8 The issue
of optimal research trial size poses problems in medicine: larger sizes are
more statistically significant, but larger groups are also less tailored, resulting in medical protocols that are demonstrably ineffective for certain
subpopulations on the basis of gender or race.129 The healthcare approach,
then, outlines some typical hazards without necessarily pointing out easy
solutions, but reformers who, say, want to address offenders with co-morbid drug and mental health problems can look to the medical literature for
ideas and approaches.
Some of the discussion about distinguishing and tailoring in criminal
justice has already taken place in the offense/offender literature1 3 0 and suggests that we could combine criminal history and offender characteristics
at sentencing (though even criminal histories can be problematic on disparate impact grounds, as well as on accuracy and completeness). One
125.
See Lisa Sanders, Diagnosis,N.Y. TIMES MAG., http://www.nytimes.com/column/diagnosis. "Dr. Lisa Sanders recreates hard-to-solve medical cases" in this column of the magazine. Id.
126.
See Charlie Cooper, Prostate Cancer Could Actually Be Five Different Diseases, Say Scientists, INDEPENDENT (July 30, 2015, 00:16), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-andfamilies/health-news/prostate-cancer-could-actually-be-five-different-diseases-say-scientists-

10424973.html. Other than DUI there are not many biological markers for criminal law. Criminology's main foray into biological markers was phrenology, which is a continuing stain on the discipline.

See Paul Erickson, The Anthropology ofCharles Caldwell, MD., 72 Isis 252,253-56 (1981) (detailing
the career of an American phrenologist who used biological differences in head shape to support white
supremacist views); Reginald Horsman, Scientific Racism and the American Indian in the Mid-Nine-

teenth Century, 27 AM. Q. 152, 155 (1975) (discussing Caldwell and "scientific" appeals to the racial
inferiority of indigenous people); Nicole Rafter, The Murderous Dutch Fiddler: Criminology, History
and the Problem ofPhrenology, 9 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 65, 68 (2005) (arguing that criminologists should come to terms with phrenology's role in the development of criminology).
127.
For criticism of Porter's ideas on these grounds, see Gail R. Wilensky, Health Reform:
Thinking Big, but Ignoring Big Obstacles, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 16, 2006), http://healthaf-

fairs.org/blog/2006/10/16/health-reform-thinking-big-but-ignoring-big-obstacles/

(noting

that

"[p]atients have a nasty habit of having more than one thing wrong with them" and observing that
"multiple chronic conditions account for a disproportionate share" of Medicare spending).
128.
"At midyear 2005 more than half of all prison and jail inmates had a mental health problem .. . ." DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. "In 2002 more than two-thirds ofjail inmates were found to be dependent on
or to abuse alcohol or drugs . . . ." JENNIFER C. KARBERG & DORIS J. JAMES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE, ABUSE, AND TREATMENT OF JAIL
INMATES, 2002, at 1 (2005), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sdatji02.pdf.
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Nicholas J. Schork, Time for One-Person Trials, 520 NATURE 609, 609-10 (2015).
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See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, DistinguishingOffense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 287 (2005).
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place to start would be with regular risk-needs assessments (RNAs) as a
non-exclusive foundation for criminal justice programming, with several
caveats. RNAs need to have open algorithms and data so that the means
by which risk scores are calculated can be examined and independently
verified. Defendants should be allowed to challenge the methodologies in
court.' 3 RNAs should be normed to subpopulations to ensure that there is

no disparate impact on the basis of race or other suspect classifications.1 32
They should also be re-validated on local populations every couple of
years. In short, the move towards evidence-based practices requires actual
evidence-evidence that is subject to robust investigation, testing, and
standards of proof. RNAs have to actually be accurate; it is not simply
enough to put a number on risk and take it on faith. One would expect that
as data collection and outcome measurement improve, risk-needs assessment tools would also improve. The problems with risk-needs assessments, however, are dwarfed by the problems with gut decisions of judges
and DAs, which are even less transparent and accountable-and more subject to bias, explicit or implicit-than RNAs.133
Tailoring should not stop with the diagnosis. It also, of course, should
include treatment. This is where the criminal justice system as a whole
should start to look a lot more like probation and diversion. Some people
are inpatients, some are outpatients, some are nonpatients. Currently we
do have diversion to probation and treatment, but we also just send people
to "prison"-not different kinds of prisons (those decisions are made by
prison officials during classification) or different kinds of programs (those
are also done by the prison system). Tailoring prison terms at sentencing
currently just means "more" or "less." Prison is expensive. We should be
considering what we get for that money. It does not make sense to say
"you are a criminal, you get prison" the same way it would not make sense
for a doctor to say "you are sick, get medical help." Doctors diagnose patients with particular illnesses and prescribe particular treatments, including, sometimes, realizing that the situation will resolve itself. This should
be the goal of the criminal justice system-we should at least scrutinize
fee-for-service subsidies of prison, the most expensive treatment we use.
Tailoring would be a radical change-albeit one that was common during
the Williams v. New York34 era.
There are questions of how much dis-

131.
See Martinson, supranote 10, at 50.
132.
ProPublica reported that a proprietary risk assessment tool used in Florida underestimated
the risk posed by white members of the pretrial population and overestimated the risk posed by African-American members. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PRO PUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. For a similar argument in the sentencing context, see Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific RationalizationofDiscrimination,66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805-08 (2014).
133.
For a discussion of implicit bias and its impact on the law generally, see IMPLICIT RACIAL
BIAS ACROSS THE LAW I (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).

134.

337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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cretion a judge should have to find facts (subject to the underlying sentencing statutes and whether they, in turn, implicate Apprendi v. New Jerseyl36 and its progeny). 137 There are also issues about whether long sentences would ever generate the kind of feedback a judge would needpresumably judges would die or retire before the end of certain extremely
long sentences. But surely our currently broken system, which simply enables long sentences with no questions asked, is worse. Not asking questions does not mean such sentences are more effective or parsimonious; it
simply means we have no way to know whether they are effective or parsimonious.
Which prisons? The value framework could obviously fit into contracts with private prisons, encouraging a focus not just on cost per prisoner but paying for treatment of an offender's criminogenic needs. Jurisdictions could track and pay for outcomes, adjusting for the risk profile of
those who went in. The alternative embeds undesirable outcomes. A private prison contract that focuses only on price, for example, creates incentives for private prisons to "cream skim" only the most low-cost prisoners,
meaning those who are younger, physically healthier, and less mentally ill.
A value-creation framework would reduce the reimbursement price of
those prisoners, making sure that the outcome is measured in terms of how
people changed in prison, not just how they were when they went in. The
value framework could also provide incentives to maximize pro-social
outcomes, such as educational attainment in prison,' 38 or longitudinal outcomes such as employment and family relationships. Without some outcome measurement, contracts that pay a simple per-prisoner-per-day
amount create a potential incentive not to treat prisoners in hopes of ensuring a future revenue stream from recidivism. 139 Others have suggested
different pay-for-performance models, including a prison re-admission
40
penalty similar to those used in hospitals.1
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530 U.S. 466 (2000).

See id. at 490 ("[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
137.
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,313-14 (2004) (extending the doctrine to state sentencing guidelines).
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30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 101, 109-10 (2016).
Kenneth L. Avio, Remuneration Regimes for Private Prisons, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
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35,45 (1993); see also Michael G. Anderson, IfYou've Got the Money, I've Got the Time: The Benefits
ofIncentive Contracts with PrivatePrisons, 34 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 43, 85-88 (2015-2016) (suggesting payments based on drug and mental health treatment, as well as educational, vocational, and life
skills attainment); Anita Mukherjee, Impacts of Private Prison Contracting on Inmate Time Served

and Recidivism 9-10 (Aug. 10, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2523238 (evaluating empirical evidence
that contractual incentives incentivize private prisons to prolong stays via disciplinary write-ups).
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140.
(Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-hospitals-could-help-cut-prison-recidivism.
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Beyond the private prison option, the state could also treat stateowned and -administered prisons in a similar manner. State prisons could
specialize in particular populations, charging differential rates to localities
based on prisoners' underlying needs and on the treatments used. Currently, the system does not generally differentiate among prisons within
the system. But why not make one prison for domestic abusers, another
for addiction-driven behavior, and the like? Programming in prison can
vary: perhaps some will specialize in restorative justice,141 others with animal-based rehabilitation.1 4 2 Prisons can also differ on the basis of location, size, guard training, and theory. Perhaps prisons in the United States
can look internationally for other examples-Scandinavian prisons approach prisons and prisoners in dramatically different ways. 143 Variety in
theory and practice is also a return to the historical origin of state prisons,
when wardens had great leeway to pursue different methods.
Each prison could focus on needs, and those needs could be measured, treated, and the treatment assessed in terms of how well it worked
and at what cost. Prisons could subsequently move toward best practices,
nudged, in part, by the demands of the localities paying for prison beds.
No longer would we treat all prisons and all prisoners the same. Systems
would, instead, have some idea of what kind of prison and what kinds of
programs would be in operation once someone got there.
Discharge. Sentence lengths could be limited at the time they are imposed and potentially extended before release-that is, systems could return to indeterminate sentencing (those sentences terminating in parole release). The problem with indeterminate sentences as they are practiced in
some states like California is that the ultimate length of the sentence is
unlimited (e.g., twenty-five years to life).144 There is no incentive for parole boards to release prisoners; their only incentive is to avoid the spectacular failure, not to promote the quiet success.145 Other states have maximum limits on indeterminate sentences (e.g., four to eight years, where
release is possible after four years but must be done by year eight).146 A
return to indeterminate sentencing would be a return to the medical model
of imprisonment with a few improvements, notably that there was some

141.

See generally HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Howard Zehr
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understanding of what needs an offender had to address to be eligible for
release (e.g., go to prison and work on your vocational skills or anger management).
Indeterminate sentences in a system that internalized costs and benefits would generate pressure to release safer prisoners and avoid the problem of life sentences "with the possibility of parole, hold the possibility of
parole." 47 Other parts of the system would be clamoring to use the money
spent on incarceration to promote higher value interventions. Funds not
spent on discretionary years of an indeterminate sentence could be redistributed. For example, local jurisdictions might pay prisons for a certain
amount of time for a given condition (X years for a domestic abuser), with
the potential for earlier release (and cost savings to the carceral institution)
but a delayed performance payment based on survival time without recidivism. States could reimburse localities for a given amount of prison time
that amounts to a valuation of just deserts, and localities could pay for
additional prison time to either vindicate local retributive values or to promote treatment-and, of course, they would be able to shop around for
prison beds at particular institutions that did a good job. Another option
would be to localize parole boards. Individuals from a given community
would decide when a prisoner was ready to come home, knowing that
prison savings could go to lower taxes or to prevention programs. This
would more accurately balance social costs and benefits.
Indeterminate sentencing was criticized in the mid-1970s for a variety of reasons. I will not address one of the criticisms-that it did not promote uniformity of punishment-since one of the main advantages to indeterminate sentencing is the very fact that punishment can be tailored.
Some of the non-uniformity criticisms were, at their core, about racial disparities in who was released and who was denied. Using risk-needs and
having an outcome-based approach would make release decisions and
their effects on racial subgroups less opaque. If risk assessments amounted
to a policy, rather than the clinical assessment of an individual employee,
they could actually provide those suffering disparate impact with a
stronger claim to sue the agency for violations of constitutional rights under § 1983.148 Parole officials would no longer have unfettered (and unguided) discretion; they would actually know what they were looking for
in terms of criminogenic needs to be addressed before release. Prison capitation fees paid by locals could solve for the problem of indefinite retention-there would be pressure to let prisoners out in order to free up funds
that could be put to use elsewhere. At the very least, it is not as though
determinate sentences have been good for prison population reduction, nor
See Ball, supra note 144, at 968-69.
147.
148.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978) ("[A] local government may
not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as
an entity is responsible under § 1983.").
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have they proven to be particularly good at reducing recidivism, promoting equity and fairness, or reducing racial disparities.
It is certainly possible that a poorly-administered, poorly-supervised
parole board could impose indefinite detention on the basis of dangerousness. Our present system already has this problem when it comes to sex
offenders (arguably worse, since the nominally "civil" nature of the incarceration means that there are no guarantees about the right to counsel and
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof). 149 The current system
provides very few legal checks on permanent incapacitation on civil
grounds, and pay-for-performance would do nothing to change the legal
requirements. Where it would make a difference is in imposing parsimony.
Our current system demands no proof of indefinite incapacitation in terms
of efficacy or efficiency: it is a blank check. Making the system prove that
it is doing something minimally costly and maximally effective would
make indefinite detention more difficult.

The point here is that implementation could involve a variety of
choices after the sentencing moment in court. It is one thing to have an
imprisonment policy and assume what goes on there is beneficial; it is another thing to incentivize the kind of treatment that the committing jurisdiction wants. No longer would an arbitrary, ex ante, one size fits all term
of years be the sentence, with "whatever happens, happens" as the prescription for those responsible for the prisoner. It would be much more
particular, with specific prescriptions given, not simply "get some drugs
or get some surgery in one of several hospitals," but "go to this clinic and
treat your diabetes with insulin" or "get arthroscopic surgery on your knee
from this doctor."
There is nothing intrinsic about our current system of imprisonment.
There is much that might seem speculative about the pay-for-performance
approach, but, of course, our system as it stands is huge, expensive, and a
disgrace. Mass incarceration is the experiment; trying to unwind it is not.
Historically, these proposals are much closer to the sentiments that prevailed in the mid-19th and mid-20th centuries.1 5 0 In the mid-19th century,
it was common to pick particular institutions at the time of sentencing,
these institutions were often paid per prisoner, and the institutions had particular philosophies of rehabilitation. Wardens also wanted to release prisoners on an indeterminate schedule with the idea that they could keep prisoners until they were cured. These treatments, however, were often
grounded in deeply compromised social science, whether that of Cesare

149.
See W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re Winship,
Stigma, and the Civil-CriminalDistinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 128-32, 179-80 (2011) (summarizing the procedural protections provided in civil commitment proceedings for sex offenders).
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Lombroso's physical indicia of the "born criminal"' 5 ' or the horrific testicular mutilations of Dr. Leo Stanley at San Quentin.1 5 2 These are real
concerns; we do not know the blind spots we have except in retrospect.
Perhaps future generations will look with horror on contemporary criminology. But even if we are blind to better treatments, we should not blind
ourselves to the idea of treatment in general. Put another way, the "nothing
works" philosophy is misnamed. It should be called "nothing works-except prison" because it implicitly assumes that prison is worth doing even
if nothing else is. Prison may arguably have something going for it in terms
of efficacy-though the magnitude and even the direction of the effects
are disputed' 53-but there is tremendous evidence that it is inefficient.
Criticisms of the rehabilitative approach, then, are much like the criticisms more generally leveled at actuarialism. I am not suggesting that evidence-based practices are immune to some of the harms attributed to
them, most notably disparate impacts on people of color, but it can hardly
be claimed that our current system does not have ruinous effects on people
of color. The causes under our current system are simply harder to discern
with any exactitude, which means everyone and no one is to blame. That,
to me, is not a virtue.154 Algorithms can be audited; policies can be improved. Intuition can be neither audited nor improved.
The current system is both overdetermined and too discretionary. It
is overdetermined in the sense that a given set of years is typically given
for an individual offense, including via mandatory minimums. It is too
discretionary in the sense that charging decisions are beyond review. The
alternative of evidence-based indeterminate sentences would keep discretion but provide some limits, and it would ensure that there is discretion
on the back end of sentencing as well.
C. Advantages of a Value Orientation
There are several potential advantages that might result from a valueoriented system.
The first is to generate some momentum towards a creation of a penological state of the art. Measuring outcomes and rewarding value creation will create incentives for their widespread implementation. Put another way, why are there no standard criminological treatments? It could
See generally MARY GIBSON, BORN TO CRIME: CESARE LOMBROSO AND THE ORIGINS OF
151.
BIOLOGICAL CRIMINALITY (2002).
See Ethan Blue, The Strange Career of Leo Stanley: Remaking Manhood and Medicine at
152.

San Quentin State Penitentiary, 1913-1951, 78 PAC. HIST. REV. 210, 211 (2009).
For a review of the evidence generally, see Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Ef153.
fectiveness of CorrectionalRehabilitation:A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L. & Soc.
Sc. 297 (2007).
See Jennifer L. Skeem, John Monahan & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Gender, Risk Assess154.
ment, and Sanctioning: The Cost of Treating Women Like Men 27-28 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory

Research Paper No. 10, Jan. 18, 2016), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2718460
(noting that adjustments to risk assessments can also exacerbate disparate impact).
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be that there is insufficient research or that local populations are different,
but it is also the case that demonstrably ineffective programs (such as
scared straight) have not yet been fully eradicated.' 55 Again, very little discussion in the legal academy differentiates among alternative conditions
of custody and programming in prison. The closest widespread practice on
the ground that even approximates this is probation, where judges put conditions on probationers in an attempt to cure their problems. Even then
some judges think "more is better" without using the risk-needs-responsiveness principle-which might mean more is ineffectivel 5-or going
beyond what is effective to what is efficient, given that public safety resources, like all other resources, are scarce and need to be deployed wisely.
One notable exception is pretrial practices in jurisdictions such as the federal system and New Jersey, which require judges to attach conditions of
pretrial release using the least restrictive means possible. 157
Tying funding to value creation will incentivize both innovation and
diffusion. Part of the reason that change comes so slowly to criminal justice in general and prisons in particular is that there is no incentive to
change. Prisons are not penalized for doing a bad job. Another problem is
loss avoidance-the hedonic (and economic) losses of incarceration on
society, prisoners, and their families are not counted, just the speculative
(and non-falsifiable) worry about the next sensational case of a parolee on
a crime spree. Accounting for criminal justice costs is certainly doable, as
WSIPP and others have demonstrated, and one can readily think of damages that arise simply from arrest-namely, for those who cannot make
bail, the economic losses from being in jail until the time of trial, as well
as the increased likelihood of being sentenced to a harsher penalty.' 5 1 Prisons are a major cost center in state government and, as such, should be
targeted. 5

9

If budgetary incentives are to be used, one size will not fit all. Paying
for improvements in outcome might be seen as punishing agencies and
institutions that already do things the right way, whereas paying for a certain standard of performance will be impossible for the lower-performing
agencies and institutions to meet. High-performing agencies, then, might
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ject to the least restrictive further condition"), invalidatedby United States v. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d

350, 361-62 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). For New Jersey, see N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2A: 162-17(b)(2)

(West 2017)

("The non-monetary condition or conditions of a pretrial release ordered by the court pursuant to this
paragraph shall be the least restrictive condition, or combination of conditions .... ).
158.
CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER,
INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES 4 (2013).
159.
See Gershowitz, supra note 70, at 53.
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be rewarded for meeting a certain standard, and lower-performing agencies might be rewarded based on annual improvements until they meet a
certain minimum standard, as low-performing hospitals currently are under Medicare's Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program.' 6 Quality
control might even need to start where medicine did, not with outcomes,
but with training, education, and professional standards. The main lesson,
though, is that quality improvement is a continual process, not a "set it and
forget it" switch.
V. CRITICISMS OF THE APPROACH

There are a number of criticisms that can be leveled at the pay-forperformance approach. I will discuss five. First, that it ignores important
issues: the dignitary interests of people in prison and the retributive interests in punishment, neither of which can be priced or quantified. Second,
that it cannot be operationalized since we do not know what works in
prison rehabilitation. Third, that the medical approach might expand the
scope of the criminal justice system (net widening). Fourth, that it might
lead to bargain basement incarceration ("tough 'n' cheap" in Hadar Aviram's phrasing 1). Fifth, that it punishes the disadvantaged for their social
deficits. Before getting into these objections, it is important to emphasize
that the pay-for-performance approach is not intended to be exclusive of
all others. Mass incarceration has a number of things wrong with it. It is
inhumane, arbitrary, and racist, to be sure. But it is also expensive and
ineffective. There is no reason not to investigate these shortcomings in
addition to or alongside others.
Non-pecuniary interests. A first criticism is that not all interests can
be addressed via the value-creation framework, whether it is the dignitary
interest of prisoners or the public's interest in retribution. Discussions
about how to deploy social resources are, in many ways, discussions about
social priorities. As a society, we are what we fund. There is no reason that
we cannot say both that prisons violate dignity and that they do so in a way
that wastes resources, including human potential. There is also no reason
we cannot say that retributive interests might be met in a system that makes
us safer in a more effective and efficient way.
Starting with the dignity point, I would query whether it promotes
human dignity to warehouse people and do nothing for them (particularly
given how little opportunity many of them had to participate meaningfully
in society) or to spend money on prisons and not on schools or other generative endeavors. Moreover, the idea that prisoners can only be warehoused forecloses any redemption. Rehabilitation humanizes the offender

160.
Linking Quality to Payment, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/linking-quality-to-payment.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
161.
See AVIRAM, supra note 68, at 164.
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and has, as its starting point, the idea that she is worth saving and redeemable. Mercy is, after all, a part of retribution (albeit one seldom emphasized).
As for retribution, I will not belabor the criticisms of retributivism
here,1 62 but will only suggest that a value orientation is compatible with
notions of desert and redemption. It is, of course, difficult to summarize
the wide variety of retributive theories, and I will not attempt to do so here.
At its most basic, retributivism can be characterized as sounding in desert,
with punishment involving the imposition of suffering on the offender proportional to the crime she committed. 63 Pay-for-performance does not target offender suffering, but it is not incompatible with it either. For sentences involving mixed theories of retribution and rehabilitation, an outcome-orientation could simply apply to the rehabilitative part of the sentence.164 To the extent that the retributive theory is a limiting one, the parsimony imposed on punishments under the scheme dovetails nicely with
the idea that punishment should not exceed the crime. Expressive theories
of punishment, such as those espoused by Joel Feinberg' 65 and Jean Hampton,166 argue that punishment serves to express society's outrage and send
a message to the offender. To the extent we want punishnient to make
someone learn a lesson, outcomes are a superior method of demonstrating
that the lesson has, in fact, been learned. A change in behavior is superior
to a mere theory that an offender will (or must) have learned her lesson
because she went to prison; it is, instead, a way of demonstrating that she
actually learned it. These changes also provide better evidence of the
"meaning of punishment[]" than claims that are always asserted-without
proof-that the legislature, judge, or public meant the message or that it
was ever received as such by the convicted.167 Finally, theories that sound

162.

For an overview, see Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, PuttingDesert

in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77, 82 (2013); see also Mark R. Fondacaro & Megan J. O'Toole, American Punitiveness and Mass Incarceration: Psychological Perspectives on Retributive and ConsequentialistResponses to Crime, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 477, 503 (2015). For a criticism of how "limiting retributivism" has failed to provide any meaningful limits in an era of mass incarceration, see

Robert Weisberg, Reality-ChallengedPhilosophiesofPunishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1227-28
(2012). For a study suggesting that white people's notion of the proper level of punishment depends
in part on how black and brown they perceive prison to be, suggesting that retribution depends on
whether it is "them" or "us" we are talking about, see Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt,
Racial Disparitiesin IncarcerationIncreaseAcceptance ofPunitive Policies, 25 PSYCHOL. SC. 1949,

1949-51 (2014). For a discussion of CBA and retributivism, see Brown, supra note 74, at 335.
163.

See Mirko Bagoric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24 MELB. U. L.

REv. 124, 127 (2000).
164.

at 938.
165.
166.

For a discussion of what I have called "split purposes" sentencing, see Ball, supra note 144,

Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function ofPunishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965).
Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39

UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1659 (1992).
167.

See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593,

639 (1996) (discussing the "message of condemnation" involved in various forms of criminal sanctions).

2017]

PA Y-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN PRISON

49 1

in moral failing or poor choice-making would also be consonant with treatment regimes that seek to identify and correct these failings.
Nothing works. A second criticism is perhaps the most obvious one:
that nothing works, and that there is no evidence that one approach to incarceration and sentencing has better results than another. I have assumed
that there is more than "nothing" that is promising, but I also would argue
that even if there is no good evidence about effective programming, pace
WSIPP, it could be that we have simply not yet found the evidence or
found the program, not that such a discovery is impossible. In medicine,
too, diagnoses and treatments change and improve all the time. There are,
of course, some legitimate concerns about throwing one's lot with science
when it comes to criminal law. The experience of phrenology, eugenics,
and race-based theories of criminality demonstrate the fallibility of the scientific state of the art when viewed by later generations.' 68 We have very
real evidence of the ways in which science has been used to mistreat people, particularly those who are the most powerless in society.' 69 Here
again, it will be crucial to have transparency about what is being done and
why and to include a robust system of monitoring and public comment as
we proceed.
At the same time, there is some reason to be skeptical that nothing
will be shown to work in the penological context. Is quality in prison really
harder than in medicine? Is it more difficult to research how to treat a violent person than it is to treat cancer or to improve survival rates of premature babies? Is it impossible or just not been done-or even really tried?
Even if it were true that nothing works, not all equally ineffective
programs cost the same. Some might be cheaper. Moreover, even if nothing works in terms of making people better, surely some things work at
making them worse. Solitary confinement exacerbates problems with
mental health; 170 it is also extremely expensive. 7' Even if it were true that
being housed in a general prison population did not make someone "better," it certainly does not damage someone nearly as much as solitary confinement.

168.
For a general discussion skeptical of the ability of science to correct itself, see John P. A.
Ioannidis, Why Science Is Not Necessarily Self-Correcting, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SC. 645, 645-46

(2012).
169.
See Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 8
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 21-22 (1978) (relaying the history of a United States government experiment
on syphilis that deliberately withheld treatment from black male subjects, more than a hundred of

whom died).
Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and "Supermax" Confinement,
170.
49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 130 (2003).
171.
See Carrie Johnson & Bill Chappell, Solitary Confinement Costs $78K Per Inmate and
Should Be Curbed, Critics Say, NPR (Feb. 25, 2014, 9:44 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2014/02/25/282672593/solitary-confinement-costs-78k-per-inmate-and-should-be-curbed-critics-say (estimating the cost of federal solitary confinement beds at three times the cost of a general
population bed).
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Net widening. There is a fear that a focus on rehabilitation, particularly using a medical model, could somehow expand the size and scope of
the carceral state or social control more generally.172 These fears are certainly worth addressing, given the most recent decades' explosion of penal
control. But net widening is a function of a lack of accountability: the net
can only widen in a system where criminal justice is subsidized and claims
about public safety are asserted without proof. In a system where efficacy
and efficiency must be demonstrated, and funding is tied to that demonstration, an unjustifiable widening of the net will be much more difficult,
not easier. Not every solution to a problem will be carceral-just as in
medicine, not every malady requires hospitalization (or even, as with viruses, any real medical response at all). Diagnosis does not always require
treatment, nor, certainly, does it require the most intrusive treatment. Some
criminal problems will require "inpatient" solutions, some "outpatient" solutions, and some "non-patient" solutions. The key is forcing these interventions to be justified in terms of results. Programs implemented on the
basis of fiscal responsibility have often resulted in a shrinkage of the criminal justice system-not just re-entry, but "non-entry."l 73
It is, of course, true that not everyone gets better in the criminal justice system, particularly those with mental illnesses. 174 It is the ineffectiveness and expense ofjail and prison as a response to mental illness that have
provided the impetus for non-entry, problems more easily uncovered when
there is a systematic commitment to looking at outcomes. 175
Net widening is objectionable, in part, because it is not worth the
money and does not actually work. These are the very criteria on which
172.
For a discussion of net widening in the mental health context, see Jeffrey L. Geller et al.,
Involuntary Outpatient Treatment as "DeinstitutionalizedCoercion": The Net-Widening Concerns,
29 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 551, 551-52, 554 (2006).
173.
See Eric Kurhi, How to Keep Menially Ill Out ofJail Is Focus ofSanta ClaraCounty Panel,
MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016, 8:16 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/03/1 1/how-to-keepmentally-ill-out-of-jail-is-focus-of-santa-clara-county-panel
(quoting County Supervisor Cindy
Chavez as asking "[W]hat does a non-entry center look like?").
174.
See TORREY ET AL., supra note 7, at 1.
175.
See Michael Ollove, New Efforts to Keep the Mentally Ill Out ofJail, STATELINE (May 19,
2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/5/19/new-efforts-tokeep-the-mentally-ill-out-of-jail (reporting, inter alia, that programs to keep the mentally ill out ofjail
in Miami-Dade County cut thousands from the jail population and resulted in the closure of a jail).
The same is true for homeless people who are swept up in the system. Graves, Yu: Palantir, UCSF
Partnerwith Santa Clara County on Homelessness Breakthrough, MERCURY NEWS (June 28, 2016,
9:02 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/06/28/graves-yu-palantir-ucsf-partner-with-santaclara-county-on-homelessness-breakthrough (reporting on a social impact bond that targeted homeless
people who used many county resources for supportive housing, saving money and improving health
outcomes). For an analysis of risk-based pretrial that results in lower costs and lowerjail populations,
see Jane Wiseman & Stephen Goldsmith, FairnessIs FiscallyResponsible, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (July
6, 2016), http://www.pretrial.org/faimess-fiscally-responsible. One could imagine that low-level drug
offenders-say, those primarily arrested for possession offenses-might be addicted and thus incurable by being jailed. This hypothetical seems eminently likely, but it is not fatal to a pay-for-performance approach. A focus on an effective and parsimonious use of resources would foreground the
idea that incarcerating this group of people incurs a loss of money, a loss of time, and significant
hardship to the "offender" while advancing no end. Any justification remaining would have to come
from retributive concerns, which again are not affected by this framework.
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programs would be penalized under pay-for-performance. In short, it is
much harder to justify net widening in terms of costs, benefits, and efficacy than it is on other theories such as retribution. The same is true for
onerous terms of probation or heavy collateral consequences. Only when
the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the net are hidden can the net get
wider.
Tough 'n' cheap. Pay-for-performance can easily handle concerns
that systems will cut costs by worsening conditions of confinement. The
key, again, is that value creation requires not just cost-savings, but improved outcomes. Cutting meal services, for example, is likely to make
prisons more dangerous,176 just as cutting rehabilitative services both undermines discipline and diminishes prospects for successful re-entry.177 In
a pay-for-performance scheme, these dangers would be foregrounded. The
external harms they would impose would be resisted by other "downstream" agents in the system-not just public-interest lawyers, but agents
of the state who would have to devote more of their resources to cleaning
up the mess. Ultimately, the value-creation approach requires that systemic resources be considered, not just local budgets. The value argument
does not replace rights-based arguments, but neither does it contradict
them. It supplements them. Appealing to economic efficiency is a way of
expanding the constituency supporting the unwinding of mass incarceration. It might even be more effective. The Eighth Amendment limit to
prison conditions leaves much to be desired in terms of speed; it was only
several years after California stipulated that it was violating the Eighth
Amendment that the Supreme Court finally forced it to address the causes
of the violation in Plata.17 8 A value focus might provide quicker feedback
and would give other actors within the system financial incentives to address problems.
Punishingthe have-nots. A final objection is that criminals with different social backgrounds will be punished disproportionately: that diagnoses that take into account social deficits will just end up punishing the
poor. If there are deficits, why work on them only in prison? With this
objection, I agree. This is why efficacy and efficiency in treatment goes
only so far and why, ultimately, the wider-ranging reorganization of criminal justice funding will have to include prevention. Criminal justice funding reform will have to encompass social welfare programs that are not

176.
Alysia Santo & Lisa laboni, What 's in a PrisonMeal?, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 7, 2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/07/what-s-in-a-prison-meal (observing that cutbacks in
meals have led to increased violence); see also Maria Godoy, Romen Noodles Are Now the Prison
Currency of Choice, NPR (Aug. 26, 2016, 12:47 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/08/26/491236253/ramen-noodles-are-now-the-prison-currency-of-choice.
177.
See Logan, supra note 96, at 28-30 ("Idleness and boredom can be seen as wrong in themselves, from a work ethic standpoint, or as so fundamentally related to mischief as to be undesirable
for that reason.").

178.

Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 507 (2011) ("After this action commenced in 2001, the State

conceded that deficiencies in prison medical care violated prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights.").
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traditionally considered public safety programs but which might, nevertheless, prevent criminal activity. Most people would surely rather pay a
few thousand dollars to subsidize poor children's day care than pay tens
of thousands to subsidize elderly prisoners' healthcare-yet our system,
through neglect and underinvestment, means those forgotten children of
yesterday become the geriatric prisoners of tomorrow. We should have a
system that incentivizes front-end investments and penalizes the misallocation of resources. We should not allocate social welfare resources only
after crime and criminals have been generated. This is the argument that
must be addressed in future research.
Still, it must be noted that our current focus on incapacitation of millions of people offers no way out. Our existing system is full of poor people and people of color-those most disadvantaged by society. At least in
a pay-for-performance system there are incentives to treat offenders, incentives for offenders themselves to get treatment, and incentives to release people when they are ready. Prison subsidies do none of that.1 79
CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to lay out a vision for where criminal justice might go. It has not been intended to be overly conclusive, nor is the
social science necessarily definitive. Instead, I have sought to introduce a
goal-oriented framework into which the latest research and best practices
might fit in a way that promotes the dissemination and adoption of those
best practices. If it does no more than complement the existing work being
done on criminal justice CBA, it will have done enough.
Throughout the Article, I have focused only on the ways in which
existing treatment could be made more effective. Healthcare economics
has also pointed out another valuable lesson: prevention is much more effective and efficient than treatment. Future research should explore the
prevention model and draw heavily on work being done in criminal justice
cost-benefit analysis by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy,
the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, and others.180 The real gains in efficacy
and efficiency will only come when we realize that crime prevention outside the criminal justice system is less intrusive and more effective than
post facto treatments. Because this approach would require, at a minimum,
greater reorganization of government to allow for greater fungibility of

179.
Regulatory capture by service providers could also potentially be an issue. The treatment
industry is big business-called by some the "treatment industrial complex"-and if there were a
greater uptake of diversion instead of prison, there could be the potential that treatment providers
might lobby and skew the distribution of sentencing alternatives. To this I will only say that prison
guards and the prison industry may have already effectively captured the state's interest in incarceration, and that some countervailing interests might serve to rescue the state from its current captors.
Moreover, the value model assumes that data will be collected on effectiveness and treatment dollars
will go only to those providers and programs that demonstrate efficacy and efficiency. This should
serve to ensure that parties who get more traffic are getting it because they do a good job.
180.
See supra Part III.
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resources-including not just criminal justice, but programs such as housing, education, and income supplements-I will leave it for another time.
The ultimate goal of this project is to outline a research agenda that might
be useful for others to use as they seek to improve the administration of
criminal justice. I know I do not have all the answers; I simply hope to
have identified some of the important questions.
As I have stated in prior articles, there are many different ways to
structure and fund criminal justice systems, and many different ways have
in fact been employed in the United States, from purely local criminal justice, to unified corrections systems, and other systems in between.' 8 In
this Article, I have proposed another option for us to consider alongside
those alternatives. It is worth remembering that the system that has developed is historically contingent, not inevitable or constitutionally required.
Moving forward, it is also clear that academic and theoretical writing
are not enough to unwind the carceral state. Policymakers and practitioners will have to engage with the system at the process level, working with
those in the system to get their perspective, their detailed knowledge about
policies and processes, to get them to buy in, and maybe even to restructure
their own contracts and performance incentives.
There is a natural tendency to dismiss some or all of the preceding
analysis as utopian, though perhaps not as utopian as the quote from Samuel Butler's novel with which I began the Article. Indeed, utopianism is a
criticism leveled at Porter's work: it cannot work in real life, costing is
difficult, there is no state of the art, diagnoses are difficult, etc.182
I would certainly not claim that restructuring the criminal justice system along the lines I have suggested would be easy, but it would at least
take seriously the idea of public safety and make it more than a rhetorical
device to be invoked every time new ground is broken on an unproven,
inefficient prison construction project. In the end, there is nothing to be
lost by trying to re-imagine our present system. Making change happen is
always difficult, but making our present system better-given the very low
bar set-is certainly worth the attempt.

181.

See KRAUTH, supranote 26, at 2.

182.

See Ball, supranote 69, at 1081-82.

CONTROLLING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
COLORADO AS A CASE STUDY
GABRIEL J. CHINt
ABSTRACT

Criminal justice reformers have recognized that many in the criminal
justice system have the power to incur expenses that will be paid by someone else; a city police officer can make an arrest, for example, that will
result in jail expenses paid for by the county, a county prosecutor can
charge a crime which will result in a prison sentence paid for by the state.
There is another, largely unexamined means by which actors in the criminal justice system can externalize cost: states have donated law enforcement authority to the federal government, and vice versa. Using the example of Colorado, this Article maps out the ways in which Colorado shares
arrest and prosecutorial power. The United States, in turn, makes it possible for Colorado law enforcement officers to make arrests for federal
crimes, and Colorado prosecutors to prosecute them. Because charging authority (and therefore spending authority) has been diffused, it will be
more difficult for decision makers in one jurisdiction to establish binding
criminal justice policy, even in its own courts.
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INTRODUCTION

Contemplation of justice reinvestment requires appreciation of the
diffusion of authority in the system. A growing body of scholarship recognizes the consequences of the lack of centralization of authority in the
system, and the lack of financial accountability.' A police officer making
t Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair & Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School
of Law.
1.
W. David Ball and others have authored recent important works. See W. David Ball, Defunding State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1060,1063-64 (2014); W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on
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an arrest, a prosecutor charging a case, and a judge imposing a sentence
spends tax dollars which are often or usually paid for by a wholly separate
government agency or branch. 2 Put another way, the system gives no suggestion to police, prosecutors, and judges that their decisions should be
made with awareness of the costs. If the responsible leaders of governments paying these costs had a choice, they might often conclude, for example, that a ten-year sentence plus hiring a police officer would be a better use of resources than a forty-year sentence, or that mental health or
drug addiction treatment for a particular offender was more likely to promote public safety than a prison sentence. But in many instances, the prosecutor's options are criminal charges or nothing, a judge's options are
prison or nothing, resulting in counter-productive or suboptimal results at
great expense.
This Article addresses some of the structural difficulties jurisdictions
will face in trying to rein in their criminal justice systems. The central observation is this: just as there can be no fire without an ignition source,
oxygen, and combustible material, there can be no criminal conviction
without someone willing and able to investigate crime and present it to a
prosecutor, someone willing and authorized to prosecute it, and a court.
Our system widely diffuses authority to investigate arrest and chargethere are many peace officers and many prosecutors who have broad discretion about the cases they should pursue. 3 The system does not widely
disseminate judicial authority; a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent
or Colorado State Patrol officer with a drug felony can pursue the case
only in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado or the state
District Court for the appropriate county. 4 Yet, state and federal criminal
courts have perhaps the least discretion of any actor in the system about
charging; unlike police and prosecutors, they have almost no authority to
reject cases properly brought before them.s Accordingly, each of the many
law enforcement and prosecutorial entities in the criminal justice system

the State's Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties' IncarcerationRates-

And Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. L. REV. 987, 1004 (2012); see also, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, ConsolidatingLocal CriminalJustice: Should Prosecutors Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV.

677, 678-79 (2016) ("Put briefly, prosecutors do not have to internalize the costs of their sentencing

&

decisions because they do not have to run and pay for the prisons and jails. That responsibility falls to
the wardens who run the prisons and the sheriffs who run the jails."); Michael Polakowski & Michael
Gottfredson, The Use of Prisons as a Commons Problem: An Exploratory Study, 33 J. RES. CRIME
DELINQ. 70, 74 (1996) (examining common pool use of prison space and promoting the allocation of
prison space based on a jurisdiction's crime rate). Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins coined the
phrase the "correctional free lunch." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF
IMPRISONMENT 140 (1991). The economics literature also addresses the issues. See, e.g., Kenneth L.

Avvio, The Economics ofPrisons, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 143, 143 (1998).
2.

See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 678-79.

3.

Id. at 677.

4.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed. . . ."); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16.
5.
See notes 53-54, infra, and accompanying text.
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can attempt to implement its own criminal justice policy, seeking to persuade like-minded others to help carry it out. Because the criminal justice
system now widely disseminates investigating and charging power, to
make it possible to impose a unified criminal justice strategy will require
significant structural changes.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL

POWERS OF STATE OFFICERS

One structural challenge in controlling the criminal justice system
legislatively comes from Supreme Court cases. Supreme Court cases
sometimes say that particular criminal justice actions are permitted only
when founded on a statute meeting particular constitutional criteria, for
6
example, the wiretap case of Berger v. New York. More often though, the
Court declares that certain conduct by state officers is lawful even without
an authorizing statute.7 That is, the Court reads the Constitution, essentially, as granting a set of specific powers to police which are reasonable
even if unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction empowering and paying
the police. Thus, in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court upheld the practice
of stop and frisk 9 apparently without considering whether the Ohio legislature believed it to be legitimate or desirable.' 0
It is not merely that the Court grants police the power to commit acts
not authorized by state law. In Virginia v. Moore," the Court held the
Fourth Amendment deemed reasonable even actions prohibited by state
law.12 Specifically, "warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that
while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state
restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections.',1 3

.

6. 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967) ("[W]e have concluded that the statute is deficient on its face . .
7.
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968); id. at 31-32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
9.
The Court's holding was as follows:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced
in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
Id. at 30-31 (majority opinion).
10. Id. at 31-32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
I1.
553 U.S. 164 (2008).
12. Id. at 178.
13.
Id at 176. The Court reasoned that the protection of the Fourth Amendment should not vary
jurisdiction by jurisdiction, an odd and, in my view, unpersuasive reason standing alone in that officers
generally work in one jurisdiction, and the criminal law of each jurisdiction varies from state to state
and between the states and the United States. Accordingly, a well-trained officer is going to have to
know the specifics of that jurisdiction's criminal offenses and procedures.
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Of course, state legislatures and courts can pass their own laws and
rules regulating the criminal justice system and its actors.1 4 But here, too,
federal law imposes limits. To a significant degree, states and localities
can be subjected to federal statutory requirements." And while the principle of Printz v. United Statesl6 provides that states and their employees
cannot be "commandeered" to carry out federal legislation,1 7 there is some
authority that Congress can permit state employees to engage in conduct.is
A provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INS) invites government officials-not necessarily limited to law enforcement officers-to
exchange immigration information with the INS:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a
Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit,
or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending
to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual.19
Many localities have policies restricting or prohibiting their officers
from investigating immigration matters;20 one of them, the City of New
York, sued to have the policy declared unconstitutional. 2' The Second Circuit held that the United States had the power to insist that state and local
employees disobey the instructions of their employers: "states do not retain under the Tenth Amendment an untrammeled right to forbid all voluntary cooperation by state or local officials with particular federal programs." 22 Federal displacement of state authority over its employees in a
regime when the federal government cannot direct and control state employees directly creates employees who, on this issue, can act unilaterally
and be answerable to no one.23 Another example of federal displacement
of state authority is the Law Enforcement Officer's Safety Act, allowing
14.

See id.; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (recognizing "supervisory au-

thority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts"); People v. Renander, 151 P.3d
657, 660 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting court's "supervisory authority to protect the integrity of the judicial process").

15.
See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985).
16.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
17. Id. at 928, 935.
18.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012).
19.
Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1644 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or
local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending
to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.").
20.
See Ingrid v. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV.

245, 256-57 (2016).
21. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999).
22. Id. at 35. But see Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding LAPD rule restricting immigration investigations).
23.
The home rule provisions of Colorado's constitution also may impose some limits on state
regulation of peace officers. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Colo. Lodge No. 27 v. City & Cty. of

Denver, 926 P.2d 582, 584-585 (Colo. 1996).
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specified state and local police to carry firearms nationally, without regard
to state law, or their own department's policies.24
II. BROAD DIFFUSION OF STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

Colorado law makes many categories of persons peace officers, with
powers to arrest,25 apply for, and execute warrants26 or orders to produce
records, 27 and sign a summons and complaint. 28 Not surprisingly, "peace

officers" include police officers of a municipal police department, 29 sheriffs and deputy sheriffs, 30 town marshals and deputy marshals, 31 reserve
32
police deputy sheriffs, deputy marshals, Officers of the Colorado State
33
Patrol, and agents of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation. 34 But the fifty
or so categories listed in the Colorado Revised Statutes also include, for
example, the Commissioner of Agriculture35 and members of the Public
Utilities Commission.36
District attorneys are the principal prosecutors in the state,37 and they
may get investigative support and case referrals from the police and sheriffs in their counties. However, they do not need to rely on other agencies.
They may employ investigators who are peace officers.3 8 Indeed, district
attorneys, including deputy, assistant, and special assistant district attorneys, are themselves peace officers. 39 Similarly, while the attorney general
has more constrained criminal jurisdiction, attorney general investigators

are peace officers,4 0 as are the Attorney General and deputies and assistants involved in criminal enforcement or who are so designated. 4 1

24.
18 U.S.C. § 926B(a) (2012).
25.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-102 (2016).
Id. § 16-3-305(5).
26.
27.
Id. § 16-3-301.1(5)(a).
28.
Id. § 16-2-104.
Id. § 16-2.5-105.
29.
30.
Id. § 16-2.5-103(1).
31.
Id. § 16-2.5-108.
32.
Id. § 16-2.5-110(l)(b).
33.
Id. § 16-2.5-114.
34. Id.§ 16-2.5-113.
35.
Id § 16-2.5-118.
36.
Id § 16-2.5-143.
37.
People ex rel. Losavio v. Gentry, 606 P.2d 57, 62 (Colo. 1980).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2.5-133 ("A district attorney chief investigator and a district attor38.
ney investigator are peace officers whose authority shall include the enforcement of all laws of the
state of Colorado and who may be certified by the P.O.S.T. board.").
39.
Id. § 16-2.5-132 ("A district attorney, an assistant district attorney, a chief deputy district
attorney, a deputy district attorney, a special deputy district attorney, and a special prosecutor are peace
officers whose authority shall include the enforcement of all laws of the state of Colorado and who
may be certified by the P.O.S.T. board.").
40.
Id § 16-2.5-129 ("An attorney general criminal investigator is a peace officer whose authority shall include the enforcement of all laws of the state of Colorado and who shall be certified by
the P.O.S.T. board.").
41.
Id. § 16-2.5-128 ("The attorney general, chief deputy attorney general, solicitor general,
assistant solicitors general, deputy attorneys general, assistant attorneys general of criminal enforcement, and certain other assistant attorneys general and employees of the department of law who are
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There has been litigation about the authority of peace officers who
are off duty and with regard to those working in a limited geographical
jurisdiction. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that peace officers may
42
make arrests off duty. However, conviction of a suspect for resisting arrest based on an off-duty arrest may require evidence that the arrest was
authorized by the employing agency.43
The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that peace officers may
investigate throughout the state if they are working on crimes that may
have taken place in their jurisdiction.4 However, in People v. Wolf,45 the
Court held that officers could generally only make arrests within their jurisdiction, yet declined to impose an exclusionary sanction because the arrest was made based on probable cause.46 Justice Quinn dissented, insisting that a geographical restriction "help[s] to preserve the political autonomy of municipal and county subdivisions of government by limiting the
extraterritorial authority of municipal police officers to the carefully defined exigencies therein described." 47 The Court later stated "that in many
situations citizens of a particular community may best be served by the
requirement that local officers familiar with local neighborhoods accompany peace officers from other jurisdictions seeking to arrest a defendant
allegedly present in the community."

48

The legislature at least partially

disagreed, subsequently enacting a statute allowing peace officers to make
arrests for crimes taking place in their presence anywhere in the state.49

designated by the attorney general are peace officers whose authority shall include the enforcement of

all laws of the state of Colorado and who may be certified by the P.O.S.T. board.").
42.
People v. Rael, 597 P.2d 584, 586 (Colo. 1979) (permitting off-duty arrests by holding
"[a]uthority for performance of the duty, service or function is not limited by the person's status as an
On-duty peace officer").

43.
People in Interest of J.J.C., 854 P.2d 801, 802 (Colo. 1993) (en banc); see also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-3-109 (allowing off-duty arrests).
44.
People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 200 (Colo. 1984), abrogatedon other grounds by People v.
Begay, 325 P.3d 1026 (Colo. 2014). Similarly, the attorney general may investigate in situations where
prosecution is limited to a district attorney. People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20, 23 n.10 (Colo. 1984) ("We
agree with the Attomey General that statutory investigative powers can exist independent of prosecutorial powers.").

45.

635 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).

46.
Id. at 217 ("Since the arrest in this case did not offend against constitutional restraints on
unreasonable seizures, we decline to impose the exclusionary rule as a remedy for the statutory viola-

tion. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). Nonetheless, we do not approve of the actions of the Denver police which were in violation of the statutes
governing their authority to arrest. Law enforcement officers should not make excursions into another
jurisdiction to ferret out crime without first securing approval of the law enforcement authorities in
that jurisdiction, or to make an arrest when they are not in fresh pursuit.").

47.
48.
49.

Wolf 635 P.2d at 218 (Quinn, J., dissenting).
People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152, 155 (Colo. 1983).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-110(2) (2016) ("A peace officer shall have the authority to act in

any situation in which a felony or misdemeanor has been or is being committed in such officer's presence, and such authority shall exist regardless of whether such officer is in the jurisdiction of the law
enforcement agency that employs such officer or in some other jurisdiction within the state of Colorado or whether such officer was acting within the scope of such officer's duties when he or she observed the commission of the crime, when such officer has been authorized by such agency to so act.").
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Discretion is a key aspect of peace officer authority. Law enforcement officers are given power to make arrests or file charges, but they are
not generally required to do so.50 Similarly, in cases recognizing both the
right to pursue or not pursue particular charges,5 ' the Court has recognized

"the prosecutorial discretion vested in the district attorney by separation
of powers principles." 52 However, courts enjoy no such discretion.53 Colorado law provides that a sentencing judge "shall" impose a sentence as

provided by law following a conviction.54
III. SHARED STATE AND FEDERAL POWERS

A. Colorado Donation ofPowers to the United States

Several provisions of Colorado law grant law enforcement powers to
federal law enforcement officers. Of course, federal agents can act under
federal authority in the course of their jobs with no requirement of state

permission.

Nevertheless, the state has invited federal agents to enforce

Colorado law in several provisions.

56

First, Colorado law provides that specified federal law enforcement
officers are Colorado peace officers, including agents and officers of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE); U.S. Marshals Service; Federal Protective

50.
Gregory Howard Williams, Police Discretion: A Comparative Perspective, 64 IND. L.J.
873, 894 (1989) ("Operational statutes with mandatory enforcement language are presently in decline
and are being replaced by provisions much like those found in [COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-102

(1986)] . . . ."); see also People v. Triantos, 55 P.3d 131, 135 (Colo, 2002) ("[T]he statute grants
arresting officers discretion to release or not, but nothing indicates the arrest cannot be a full custodial
arrest, and the release after a search incident thereto.").

51.

People v. Dist. Court, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (Colo. 1974) ("The statute relating to deferred pros-

ecution, above cited, provides that prosecution is deferred upon order of the court 'with the consent of
the defendant and the prosecution.' The prosecutor's consent is a matter of prosecutorial discretion
just as is the choice of several possible charges to press or the decision to move for the dismissal of a
criminal charge." (citations omitted)).

52. People v. Storlie, 327 P.3d 243, 246 (Colo. 2014); see also People v. Weiss, 133 P.3d 1180,
1189 (Colo. 2006) ("Prosecutorial discretion to bring or not bring charges is extraordinarily wide.").
53.
Annotation, Power ofCourt to Enter Nolle Prosequi or Dismiss Prosecution,69 A.L.R. 240
(1930) ("[T]he court has no power, in the absence of statute, to dismiss a prosecution or to enter a
nolle prosequi to a good indictment, over the protest or objection of the prosecuting attorney." (citing

People v. Zobel, 130 P. 837, 838 (Colo. 1913) (further citations omitted))).
54.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(6) ("In imposing a sentence to incarceration, the court shall
impose a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges . . . unless it concludes that extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present, are based on evidence in the record of the
sentencing hearing and the presentence report, and support a different sentence which better serves the
purposes of this code with respect to sentencing, as set forth in Section 18-1-102.5. If the court finds
such extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, it may impose a sentence which is lesser
or greater than the presumptive range; except that in no case shall the term of sentence be greater than
twice the maximum nor less than one-half the minimum term authorized in the presumptive range for
the punishment of the offense."); see also, e.g., Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916) (explaining that "the right to relieve from the punishment fixed by law and ascertained according to the
methods by it provided, belongs to the executive department" not courts).
55.
Forrest v. Jack, 294 U.S. 158, 162 (1935) (stating that a federal regulator "acts under federal
authority and . . . may not be trammeled, controlled, or prevented by state laws").

56.

See COLO. REV. STAT.

§§

16-2.5-147(1), 16-2.5-151,16-3-110.
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Service; Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Agents;57 and Secret Service.5 In addition, apparently even if not a peace
officer under the above sections, "[a] federal law enforcement officer who,
pursuant to federal statutes and the policy of the agency by which the officer is employed, is authorized to use deadly physical force in the performance of his or her duties" can use force and make arrests based on a crime
committed in the officer's presence.59 The Tenth Circuit upheld a conviction under the Assimilative Crimes Act for violating a Colorado statute
prohibiting hindering a peace officer.60 The Court explained that "whatever his status under federal law, Commander Lundy, along with his fellow Federal Protective Service officers, is clearly and expressly treated as
a 'peace officer' for purposes of Colorado law." 61
Colorado law also provides for broad appointment of special deputy
district attorneys. 62 The function of this appointment is to allow other state
and federal prosecutors to prosecute Colorado crimes on their own, without requiring the time of the regular district attorney's staff. These specials
are unpaid, and
[s]uch special deputies shall only be appointed from among those persons holding office as attorney general, deputy attorney general, assistant attorney general, or special assistant attorney general of the state
of Colorado, or as district attorney, assistant district attorney, chief
deputy district attorney, or deputy district attorney of another judicial
district, or as United States attorney or assistant United States attorney
for the district of Colorado, or as city attorney or assistant city attorney
of a city and county in this state, or an attorney employed by the Colorado district attorneys' council and actively licensed to practice law
in the state of Colorado. 63

57.
Id. § 16-2.5-147(1) ("A special agent of the federal bureau of investigation or the United
States bureau of alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives, a deputy or special deputy United States
marshal, or an officer of the federal protective service of the United States department of homeland
security immigration and customs enforcement, in any jurisdiction within the state of Colorado, is a
peace officer whose authority is limited as provided in this section. The special agent, deputy or special
deputy, or officer is authorized to act in the following circumstances: (a) The special agent, deputy or
special deputy, or officer is: (I) Responding to a nonfederal felony or misdemeanor that has been
committed in the presence of the special agent, deputy or special deputy, or officer; (II) Responding
to an emergency situation in which the special agent, deputy or special deputy, or officer has probable
cause to believe that a nonfederal felony or misdemeanor involving injury or threat of injury to a
person or property has been, or is being, committed and immediate action is required to prevent escape,
serious bodily injury, or destruction of property; (III) Rendering assistance at the request of a Colorado
peace officer; or (IV) Effecting an arrest or providing assistance as part of a bona fide task force or
joint investigation with Colorado peace officers; and (b) The agent, deputy or special deputy, or officer
acts in accordance with the rules and regulations of his or her employing agency.").

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. § 16-2.5-151.
Id. § 16-3-110.
United States v. Baldwin, 745 F.3d 1027, 1035 (10th Cir. 2014).
Id.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-201(1)(c).

63.
Id. This statute legislatively overruled People ex rel. Brown v. DistrictCourt, 585 P.2d 593
(Colo. 1978), which held that an assistant attorney general could not also be appointed as a special
assistant district attorney.
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Special deputy district attorneys serve at the pleasure of the district
attorney and, therefore, presumably could be closely supervised if such is
the desire of the agency. On the other hand, the door could also be opened
to an essentially wholesale delegation of authority to other lawyers, in64
cluding Assistant U.S. Attorneys. One could imagine that if a district attorney delegated authority to a member of another respected prosecutorial
institution, close monitoring of the cases pursued would not be a high priority. After all, the prosecutions would come at no expense to the district
attorney, and in the absence of disproportionately poor results or negative
publicity, there might seem little point.
Presumably, no Colorado law enforcement official has the authority
to supervise, instruct, or discipline the peace officers who are federal employees. 65 They may act, as may all Colorado peace officers, in their dis-66

cretion.

B. FederalDonation ofAuthority to Colorado
Federal law also grants substantial state authority to state and local
officials. In terms of arrest authority, it was once thought that the right of
67
state officers to make an arrest for a federal crime turned on state law.
More recently the Court has held that even for arrests for state crimes, state
law does not determine the validity of an arrest.68 The Tenth Circuit has
recognized the general rule that "[t]he federal constitution allows a state
law enforcement officer to make an arrest for any crime, including federal
immigration offenses." 69 This is true if Colorado law fails to authorize or
even prohibits such arrests for federal crimes.7 0 In addition, state officers
§ 20-1-201(1)(c).

64.

COLO. REV. STAT.

65.
66.
67.

Cf Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 54 (1890).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2.5-101(1).
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589-90 (1948) ("[I]n [the] absence of an applicable

federal statute the law of the state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its valid-

ity."); Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172, 173 (2d Cir. 1928) ("Assuming, however, that the trooper
stopped the car for the violation of a local ordinance, and either saw the liquors or was told of them
by the defendant, we have yet to determine whether his seizure of them was lawful. This, as we view
it, is a question only of state law, unless we have recourse to some common law of federal criminal
procedure, if any there be. We think that the state law authorized what he did, and find it unnecessary
to consider the alternative." (citations omitted)); I ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES § 4:6, Westlaw (database updated June 2016) (cataloging older authorities looking to
state law).
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) ("We conclude that warrantless arrests for
68.
crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and
that while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the
Fourth Amendment's protections.").

United States v. Argueta-Mejia, 615 F. App'x 485, 488 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing United
69.
States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also United States v.
Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999); cf George Bach, State Law to the Contrary?
Examining PotentialLimits on the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement to Enforce Federal

Immigration Law, 22 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 67, 67 (2012).
United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1346 (10th Cir. 2009) ("In light of Moore, whether
70.
APD had authority under Colorado law to arrest Mr. Turner is irrelevant. Moore makes clear that if
officers have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed in their presence, they may
arrest and search incident to that arrest without violating the Fourth Amendment, even if such police
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may actually be given the status of federal law enforcement officers, rather
than acting in their state capacities.7 Thus, they gain any specific powers
or rights beyond arrest that might be applicable to particular federal officers. Federal law also provides that attorneys who are not federal prosecutors may be made Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys to participate in or pur72
sue federal cases.
It is frequently the case that state officers make arrests that wind up
being prosecuted in federal court.7 3 By the same token, federal arrests often result in Colorado prosecutions. 74 There is nothing inherently wrong
with handing off arrests to a different level of government. In particular
cases, sound reasons might militate in favor of prosecution by one jurisdiction rather than another; the state may have expertise and experience
with respect to certain types of crimes, or preferable treatment or sentencing options.
Yet, this practice represents a grant of power to law enforcement;
state and local police can "shop" cases to prosecutors willing to take them.
If the local district attorney finds a case or category of cases unacceptable
or to be a low priority, perhaps it can go to a U.S. Attorney to be prosecuted
in federal court (and vice versa). It could even be prosecuted in state court
by a special deputy district attorney who is a member of the U.S. Attorney's Office or another state office. In principle, this means that Colorado
(and the United States) could not remove their police and prosecutors from

action is not authorized by state law. In other words, state law does not determine the reasonableness
of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We recently applied Moore in United States v. Gonzales,

535 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2008), which is directly on point here. In that case, we held that police
officers' traffic stop of the defendant, outside of their jurisdiction and in violation of Colorado law,
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.").

71.

United States v. Cook, 794 F.2d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining that "the two state

police officers were deputized as Special Deputy United States Marshals" and thus were properly
permitted to see otherwise confidential federal grand jury materials).
72.
Victoria L. Killion, Comment, No Pointsfor the Assist? A Closer Look at the Role ofSpecial
Assistant United States Attorneys in the Cooperative Model of Federal Prosecutions, 82 TEMP. L.
REv. 789, 792-93 (2009); see also Susan Hoyt, Daniel P. Rubinstein Appointed DistrictAttorneyfor
21st Judicial District, COLO. BAR ASS'N LEGAL CONNECTION (Oct. 7, 2015), http://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2015/10/daniel-p-rubinstein-appointed-district-attorney-for-21st-judicial-district (noting
that "[flrom 2005 to 2011, [District Attorney Daniel P. Rubenstein] was cross-designated as a Special
Assistant U.S. Attorney where he targeted cartels and organized crime").

73.

See United States v. Novitsky, 58 F. App'x 432,433-34 (10th Cir. 2003) (allowing an arrest

by a state officer for possession of a firearm by person with a felony conviction to be tried in federal

court); Moreland v. United States, 347 F.2d 376, 377 (10th Cir. 1965) (allowing an arrest by a state
officer for robbery ofU.S. property); United States v. Argueta-Mejia, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1219 (D.
Colo. 2014) (allowing a state officer to arrest an individual for reentry after deportation), aff'd, 615 F.

App'x 485 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Paetsch, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1210-11 (D. Colo. 2012)
(allowing an arrest by state officers for bank robbery), aff'd, 782 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2015).
74. United States v. Galindo, 543 F. App'x 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2013) ("The evidence at trial
established that Officer Skelton has worked with the DEA Task Force since 2007, has been formally
deputized by the DEA, and carries DEA credentials ... investigations that are managed and controlled
by the DEA nevertheless are frequently charged in state court."); People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865, 871

(Colo. 1985) (allowing ATF agents arrest of a murder suspect), rev'd, 479 U.S. 564 (1987); People v.
Ridley, 872 P.2d 1377, 1378 (Colo. App. 1994) (discussing a DEA investigation leading to state court
drug prosecution).
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particular fields of prosecution simply by decriminalizing the conduct. Police and prosecutors might be able pursue such cases while wearing their
other hats, just as, say New York police assisted in the enforcement of
alcohol prohibition after the repeal of state prohibition.75 In addition, police and prosecutors can avoid Colorado (or United States) procedural and
evidentiary rules by pursuing the case in the other jurisdiction.
State and federal authorities often work together. There are several
ongoing joint state-federal task forces, including the Joint Terrorism Task
Force,n the Southern Colorado Drug Task Force, and a BATFE task

75.

Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 315 (1927) ("[F]acts of which we take judicial

notice . . . . make it clear that the state troopers believed that they were required by law to aid in
enforcing the National Prohibition Act, and that they made this arrest, search, and seizure, in the performance of that supposed duty, solely for the purpose of aiding in the federal prosecution.").

76.

United States v. Mosko, 654 F. Supp. 402, 405-06 (D. Colo. 1987) ("The defendants also

argue that the pen register evidence should be suppressed because the applications and court orders
failed to comply with Colorado case law holding that pen registers are a search within the meaning of
the Colorado Constitution and therefore require a search warrant supported by probable cause. People

v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 139-40 (Colo. 1983). This court has previously held that state law on this
point is irrelevant to a federal investigation and prosecution. United States v. Grabow, 621 F. Supp.

787, 794 (D. Colo. 1985)."), affd sub nom. United States v. Pinelli, 890 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1989);
see also, e.g., Butterwood v. United States, 365 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1966) ("[The McNabb-Mallory Rule] was promulgated in pursuance of the federal court's supervisory power over federal prosecutions. It is not a Constitutional prohibition. It applies only to federal officials and an arrest under
federal law. It has no application to an arrest made under state law. Here, appellant was arrested by
state police and incarcerated by the state for suspicion of having violated a state law." (citation omit-

ted)); cf Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 306 (2009) (noting that McNabb-Mallory Rule remains
in effect).

77.

United States v. Ford, 550 F.3d 975, 977 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[Colorado's Joint Terrorism

Task Force] is a law enforcement task force comprised of the FBI and other federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies that investigate crimes involving international and domestic terrorism.");
see also Tung Yin, Joint Terrorism Task Forces as a Window into the Security vs. Civil Liberties
Debate, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) ("Other counterterrorism investigations involve cooperative ventures between state and federal forces, typically through a Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF). In a typical JTTF arrangement, the local police department assigns a number of its officers to
work on the task force with federal agents. Although the local officers remain paid by their local
department, they are considered federal agents for most purposes, including the United States' respondeat superior liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for their tortious conduct. As of 2011,
over one hundred American cities are participating in JTTFs.").

78.

See United States v. Jones, 69 F. App'x 401, 402 (10th Cir. 2003) (involving an appeal

involving a case brought by Southern Colorado Drug Task Force). There is also a Rocky Mountain
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING

AREA, http://www.rmhidta.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2017); see also 21 U.S.C.

§

1706(a)(2) (2006)

(repealed 2010) ("The purpose of the [HIDTA] Program is to reduce drug trafficking and drug production in the United States by [] facilitating cooperation among Federal, State, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies to share information and implement coordinated enforcement activities.").
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force; 79 others appear to come and go.80 There is also state-federal cooperation on an ad hoc basis.81 These entities, which are neither wholly state
nor wholly federal, also create room for officers to pursue their own policies with some independence from their employing jurisdiction. Thus, for
example, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held that state
officers had no obligation to comply with Colorado law requiring the return of medical marijuana seized pursuant to a Colorado search warrant
because the officers were part of a federal task force and could rely on
federal law. 82
CONCLUSION

To be sure, the United States, Colorado, and their officials have
means of carrying out criminal justice policies. If officers or prosecutors
of one jurisdiction abused their borrowed authority, their designations

79.
The Pueblo Police website notes that "[flour detectives are assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration Southern Colorado Drug Task Force, 2 detectives are assigned to the Bureau of
Alcohol Tobacco Firearms Explosives (BATFE) Gun Task Force and I detective [is] assigned to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force." See PuebloPolice: Narcotics/Vice Section, CITY OF PUEBLO COLORADO, http://www.pueblo.us/430/Narcotics-Vice-Section (last visited

Apr. 14, 2017).
80.
See United States v. Zapata, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167 (D. Colo. 2003) ("Vail Police
Department continued coordinated efforts with federal agents in an investigation and sting of a suspected cocaine ring in Eagle County, Colorado. The multi-jurisdictional investigators composed a drug

task force."); see also United States v. Grabow, 621 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D. Colo. 1985) (referring to
"a Denver Police Department detective assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration Task

Force"); People v. O'Hara, 240 P.3d 283, 284 (Colo. App. 2010) ("This case arises from a joint law
enforcement task force operation based in Grand Junction, Colorado. The operation's purpose was to

target major illegal drug dealers in the area."), aff'd, 271 P.3d 503 (Colo. 2012).
81. See People v. Arapu, 283 P.3d 680, 681 (Colo. 2012) ("Federal Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") agents sought to contact Arapu, suspecting he was in the country illegally. In
accordance with their standard protocol, ICE requested assistance from local law enforcement, in this
case, the Aspen Police Department."); see also People v. Montoya, 517 P.2d 401, 401 (Colo. 1973)
("The marijuana was seized after federal agents and local policemen had broken into defendant's home

on September 27, 1972, under an Arrest warrant."); People v. Genrich, 928 P.2d 799, 801 (Colo. App.
1996) ("Defendant's convictions arose out of three different incidents in which pipe bombs exploded
and injured one victim and killed two other victims. After a lengthy and extensive investigation that
included various suspects, law enforcement officers focused on defendant and he was ultimately
charged. The investigating officers included both local police officers and agents of the Federal Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF).").
82.
In so holding, the court concluded the following:
Regarding the first element, Nord initially disputes that the Respondents were acting as
federal agents because, among other things, they confiscated Nord's property pursuant to
a state court issued warrant. However, Respondents were either federal employees
(Cortinovis) or deputized DEA agents (Hoefner, Lovin, Kelliher, Murphy, and Reece) who
worked full time for a DEA-sponsored task force supervised by DEA personnel. Courts
have consistently treated local law enforcement agents deputized as federal agents and acting as part of a federal task force as federal agents. See United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d

1212, 1214 (10th Cir. 1998) (local police detective deputized to participate in federal narcotics investigation is a federal officer within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B));
United States v. Torres, 862 F.2d 1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); Amoakohene v.
Bobko, 792 F. Supp. 605, 607 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (arrestee prohibited from bringing § 1983
suit against DEA task-force members, including deputized local law enforcement officers,
because task-force members were acting as federal agents, not state actors, even though
they arrested him on municipal charges).

People v. Nord, 377 F. Supp. 2d 945, 949 (D. Colo. 2005).

2017]

CONTROLLING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

509

could be revoked, or the legislature could decide to change the law, for
example, to modify or eliminate the Special Assistant U.S. Attorney program. In addition, through institutions like Criminal Justice Coordinating
Councils, jurisdictions attempt to monitor the system as a whole. 83 Nevertheless, diffusion of police and prosecutorial authority make the problem
of monitoring and controlling the criminal justice system much more difficult.

83.
See Adams County Crim. Just. CoordinatingCouncil - CJCC, ADAMS COUNTY COLO.,
(last visited Apr. 14, 2017)
https://www.adcogov.org/criminal-justice-coordinating-council-cjcc
("The Adams County Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC), serves as the designated independent advisory body within the jurisdiction to address systemic criminal justice, juvenile justice and
victim services issues informed by evidence-based practices and guided by evidence-based decision-making."); see also ROBERT C. CUSHMAN, NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING A CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COMMITTEE 2-3

(2002), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/017232.pdf.

FROM SYMPOSIUM TO ACTION: FIVE WAYS FOR LAW
SCHOOLS TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN STUDENTS AND
MARGINALIZED COMMUNITIES
ALEXI FREEMANt

Justice Reinvestment: The Solution to Mass Incarceration?brought

organizers, public defenders, prosecutors, community and policy advocates, social workers, and more to our law school space. Together, we
learned how organized grassroots communities have become outraged at
the massive influx of resources going towards the criminal justice system-from prisons, to parole systems, to prosecution offices, to police
departments-instead of being invested in institutions and structures that
can bring stability and opportunity to communities. Early childhood education, safe and affordable housing, long-term employment, and highquality public schools, for example, go unfunded or underfunded, leaving
communities to struggle and suffer. Failure to invest in these critical areas also leads to more involvement in the criminal justice system, making
communities less safe and perpetuating generational cycles of poverty,
injustice, and inequity.
Justice reinvestment-the idea of resizing and reprioritizing the
criminal justice system and redistributing funds-has become an urgent
demand of marginalized communities. Law schools, institutions whose
resources and expertise could support such efforts and make a real impact, are often largely disconnected from communities and this campaign. Unfortunately, this is not a surprise to many. Law schools can
often be too far removed from the real concerns of people on the ground.
We become immersed in our studies and our scholarship, transfixed by
all things "law." Even with the growth of clinics and experiential learning opportunities, which tend to provide an outlet to contribute to community needs, if we are not extremely intentional, we can easily bypass
the moral obligation we have to listen to and learn from communities.
Indeed, when we do venture out of our siloed legal world, we typically
parachute in to share our expertise and provide direction to others.
This symposium reminded us that we must do more to bridge the
gap that exists between law students and the outside world. More specifically, we must find ways to connect our students to the marginalized
communities who are demanding their voices be heard. Law students and
t Alexi Freeman, JD Harvard Law School, is Associate Professor of the Practice and Director of Extemships and Public Interest Initiatives, at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
Thanks to students Katie Steefel and Kate Sanford for their efforts in putting together an incredibly
robust social justice focused symposium and for valuing reflection as scholarship.
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lawyers have a role to play in campaigns like the fight for justice reinvestment, but we have to do a far better job of preparing future lawyers
for what such a fight entails.
There are many ways to transform law schools over the long term
so that the lines between law school and community begin to blur. We
need to engage in the in-depth analysis and study that is needed to transform legal education so it can become a structure that supports marginalized communities and teaches students how to support communities as
lawyers. But, there are also small steps that we can take that will begin to
pave the way for such a transformation, while simultaneously connecting
students to communities, their concerns, and their campaigns.
Here are five steps law schools can take right now:
1. Expand the types of required readingfor students, and align
more of the curriculum with social movements.
Cases, statutes, and law review articles all have a place, but they
cannot teach students everything there is to know about the law, let alone
social change work. Too often, we fail to provide the sociopolitical context that is needed to understand complex crises and inequities and, thus,
our students leave us with a lens that is far too discrete and singular. As
students read a case, they also need to read about the corresponding social movement. As students study statutory language, they need to study
the campaign that led to the enactment of the law. We have the ability to
contextualize many, if not most, legal issues alongside historic and current movements-now, we rarely ask students to study any. This is true
in the context of justice reinvestment as well. Numerous studies and reports exist that focus on justice reinvestment from a range of perspectives. Youth testimonials on their experiences with lack of investment in
their education and overinvestment in the militarization of their schools
and criminalization of their behaviors exists. Videos, news articles,
books, blog posts, and more documenting grassroots movements to fight
for justice reform exist. We must integrate these sorts of studies into our
curriculum.
2. Expand who is deemed qualified to teach and supervise our
students, and create opportunities for students to pursue systems change work.
Law schools typically train students to think like lawyers; hence,
lawyers typically think only like lawyers. Because of what we fail to do,
many have no idea how to comprehend even tackling an issue like justice
reinvestment. Organizers, youth leaders, policy advocates, social workers, communications specialists, and lobbyists, among others, play integral roles in fighting for systemic social change. Our students, however,
get little to no exposure to such experts in the classroom or in the field.
We need to change this so we can better replicate their future realities
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and expand their appreciation for other necessary perspectives. We need
to allow students to pursue field placements with non-lawyers, and we
need to allow non-lawyers to teach classes within our building as well. It
is not enough to simply allow our students to enroll in courses at their
own free will in other graduate programs. We have to integrate such
voices into our existing curriculum, legitimizing those voices and valuing
them as part of the toolkit that is necessary for any lawyer seeking to
engage in systemic reform. Consider who is more qualified to teach our
students the lay of the land of justice reinvestment in Colorado and provide opportunities to impact systemic reform than Ricardo Martinez,
longtime grassroots organizer and co-founder of Padres y J6venes
Unidos, or Christie Donner, executive director of the Colorado Criminal
Justice Reform Coalition? We simply must allow such opportunities to
exist.
3. Share our physical space.
By physically opening our doors to members of the non-legal community, we can begin to break down barriers between lawyers and nonlawyers. Inviting others to join our space demonstrates to our students
and to non-lawyers that we believe what happens in our buildings should
be accessible to those beyond our walls, and that we welcome other
voices and perspectives. Law schools can regularly host and promote
conferences, trainings, workshops, and other events dedicated to social
change and social movements, regardless of whether they include lawyers. For example, we now know the justice reinvestment community in
Colorado. What if we regularly hosted meetings among the players at the
law school, providing them with a space to work together and gain the
benefits of law school support? Opportunities for our students would
likely result and we would play a small role in fostering social change
locally.
4. Introduce concepts of coalition building and collaboration.
The competitive nature of legal education has been widely documented. We also know that traditional litigation tactics-the tactics many
law students are regularly exposed to-are, by their nature, adversarial.
And, we know that with the exception of some experiential learning opportunities, students do not typically work in teams in law school. The
problem? Broad-sweeping social change-social change like what a justice reinvestment campaign aims to do and can do-essentially requires
working collaboratively with others, both fellow lawyers and nonlawyers. If we care at all about achieving social change and preparing
our students to be able to impact such work, we must do a better job of
offering opportunities that expose students to how to use their legal skills
in a collaborative manner, and begin to allow them to study and practice
the art of effectively working with others.
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5. Establish movement lawyering clinics.
How can a lawyer play a role in a local, state, or national movement
like justice reinvestment? What value does the legal lens bring to movement work? How can a lawyer navigate relationships between lawyers
and grassroots communities? Most law students have no idea how to
answer any of these questions, as few have been given the opportunity to
explore them. Law schools can offer robust, in-house clinics that provide
support to organized communities so students can experience first-hand
what lawyering in partnership with movements really looks like. Law
school clinics offer intensive and intentional instruction to the benefit of
our students. Movement lawyering demands the same level of attention.
Imagine the learning experiences that could result from a movement
lawyering clinic taught in partnership by some of the lawyers and grassroots organizers that attended the symposium and are actively collaborating to pursue state legislative justice reinvestment reform. All of a sudden, movement lawyering would no longer be a term that few and far
lawyers understand. We would have the opportunity to truly immerse
students in a real life campaign and in the concept of the practice.
If we are serious about bridging the gap between law schools and
communities, we can start with a robust, thoughtful symposium that integrates movements and the law, but this cannot be where we end. Lawyers
can absolutely play a role in campaigns like justice reinvestment, but
only if we as legal institutions do better. If we fail to expand our students' training and exposure, we not only fail them, but we also fail the
grassroots communities that can benefit from our support. To support the
social change we seek, we must change too. Just five steps begin to move
us from symposium to action. What are we waiting for?

REPAIRING HARM FROM RACIAL INJUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE AND THE
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
ZACHARY NORRISt

ABSTRACT

Structural racism and racial injustice result in deep, long-standing,
and widespread harm to communities, particularly to people of color and
low-income people. To address and remedy these harms, countries and institutions have attempted to create processes for intervention and accountability; however, these efforts have often been limited or unsuccessful.
This Article examines two specific efforts: the Justice Reinvestment Initiative in the United States and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
South Africa. By probing the historical circumstances surrounding the creation of each process and their implementation, the Article analyzes why
neither effort achieved their stated aims. That analysis reveals that the failure of these two initiatives stems from a lack of community engagement,
narrow conceptions of harm and violence, and the dominance of institutional interests. The Article concludes with examples of campaigns and
initiatives that have effectively addressed racial and economic injustices,
and the factors that played a role in the success of those efforts.
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INTRODUCTION

Both the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) in the United States
and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC or the Commission)
in South Africa demonstrate how institutional interests can subvert processes aimed at remedying harm from past racial injustice, while also
pointing toward what success may require. The goal of this Article is to
explore the promises and limitations of two very distinct processes that
share similar aims, the JRI (United States, 2002-present) and the Commission (South Africa, 1995-2003). While distinct, the desire to ameliorate the impacts of past racial injustice by investing in communities
harmed shaped each process's creation. Despite praise, neither process
succeeded in accomplishing the aims that catalyzed their creation. They
failed to do so because (1) neither process effectively engaged community
members' core interests; (2) both processes adopted narrow conceptions
of harm and violence; and (3) both processes came to be dominated by the
interests of established powerful institutions.
Given ongoing fissures along racial lines in the United States, it befits
us to learn from these policies to move towards the development of more
successful racial justice and healing processes that could assist in ending
structural racism. Justice-oriented policy work could be more successful
in accomplishing these aims by investing in communities utilizing a participatory democracy process, challenging fear-based narratives directed
toward people of color, and expanding conceptions of violence and peace
toward a broader conception of human rights.
This Article will first examine the historical context of racial injustice
in South Africa and the United States, identifying commonalities between
Apartheid, slavery, and Jim Crow laws. It will build upon that historical
analysis by investigating the development of the Commission in South Africa and the JRI in the United States, identifying how both were implemented and the causes for their failures. The Article will offer recommendations for how to challenge the neoliberal consensus and structural inequities by analyzing government efforts to serve the public, people-powered
movements to challenge neoliberalism, the impact of narrowly defining

1.

See NAOMI

KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 194-97,

203, 205-06, 210-12 (2007); see also JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., ENDING MASS INCARCERATION:
CHARTING

A NEW JUSTICE REINVESTMENT

3 (2013), http://www.justicestrategies.net/sites/de-

fault/files/publications/Charting%20a%20New%2OJustice%2OReinvestment.pdf
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safety, and the importance of acknowledging structural violence instead of
punishing people of color. It will conclude with examples of campaigns
and initiatives that effectively challenge the status quo and racial and economic injustices in South Africa and the United States.
I. SOUTH AFRICA HISTORICAL CONTEXT: COLONIAL RULE AND
APARTHEID

South Africa formed out of the exploitation and marginalization of
an indigenous Black majority by a White settler minority. 2 The Dutch East
India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC) initially set
up a settlement for sailors to rest in route to the Dutch Caribbean in present-day Cape Town in 1652.3 Although slavery in the Cape region, the
expansion of European territory through colonization, and economic exploitation of Black South Africans occurred for hundreds of years, it was
not until the twentieth century that a formalized system of racial segregation and social control occurred in South Africa.4 The Apartheid Era in
South Africa (1948-1994) reflected a continuation of prior discriminatory
laws that existed since the beginning of Dutch rule and throughout the period of British colonialism. Similar to the ways Jim Crow discrimination
impacted Black people in the United States, Apartheid is best understood
as both a political and an economic system of exploitation.6 It benefitted a
small White elite because the Black majority was prevented from owning
land and forced to provide labor for less than a living wage.7 South Africa's transition from de jure segregation to de facto segregation also came
about because of decades of organizing, advocacy, and social movements,
both inside South Africa and internationally. The end of Apartheid did
not occur until 1994 as part of a larger project of national liberation that
began years earlier.9
Ordinary people in South Africa developed a Freedom Charter
through a deeply democratic and participatory process.' 0 In 1955, nearly
forty years before the end of Apartheid, the African National Congress
sent fifty thousand volunteers across the country to collect the "freedom
demands" of the people of South Africa." These demands were collected,
2.
See KLEIN, supra note 1, at 196.
3.
ALAN MOUNTAIN, THE FIRST PEOPLE OF THE CAPE: A LOOK AT THEIR HISTORY AND THE
IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON THE CAPE'S INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 47-48 (2003).
4.
See A History of Apartheid in South Africa, S. AFR. HIST. ONLINE, http://www.sahis-

tory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa (last updated June 17, 2016).
5.

See ROGER B. BECK, THE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA, 87-110 (2d ed. 2014).

6.

See KLEIN, supranote 1.

7.

See Helena Rigotto, Apartheidin Statistics, INFOGR.AM, https://infogr.am/apartheid-in-sta-

tistics (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
8.

at 1-4
rica.pdf.
9.
10.
11.

See LESTER R. KURTZ, THE ANTI-APARTHEID STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1912-1992),

(2010), https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/kurtz-southafSee BECK, supranote 5, at 164-67.
See KLEIN, supranote 1, at 195.
Id.
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voted upon, and enshrined in the Freedom Charter in Kliptown, South Af12
rica, on June 26, 1955. The Freedom Charter was central to the organizing strategy and envisioning of a new South Africa.1 3 It reflected a broad
economic mandate including (1) "Land to ... landless people," (2) "Living
wages and shorter hours of work," (3) "Free and compulsory education,"
and (4), perhaps most fundamentally, the decree that the former Apartheid
state would redistribute land and resources of the country back to the society as whole. 14 Although written in 1955 during the Cold War Era, the
South African Freedom Charter's best chance for actualization came
nearly four decades later as Nelson Mandela became President in 1994.15
When the process for a transition to a constitutional democracy in
South Africa began, the questions the nation faced included not only which
people would be held responsible for human rights violations during the
Apartheid era and how, but also the extent to which the mandates set forth
in the Freedom Charter would be realized.1 6 The ideals contained in the
Freedom Charter are socialist in their orientation and reflect a broader conception of human rights.1 7 Regrettably, the Freedom Charter's best chance
for actualization materialized at a time when leaders like Margaret
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were solidifyiig a global neoliberal capitalist
consensus. 18
Perhaps unsurprisingly, when looking at aims that animated the Freedom Charter, the gains it generated have been largely in the sphere of democratic control of the government. While the importance of moving from
a colonial regime to a formal, participatory democracy cannot be underestimated, neither should the ongoing inequity and deprivation faced by the
vast majority of South Africans today. ' According to the measure of its
Gini coefficient (a measure of income inequality), South Africa remains
12.
13.

Id.
See id

14.
Id. at 195-97 ("What the Freedom Charter asserted was the baseline consensus in the liberation movement that freedom would not come merely when blacks took control of the state but when
the wealth of the land that had been illegitimately confiscated was reclaimed and redistributed to the
society as a whole.").

15.

See id at 198, 200.

16.
See id. at 197-98. South Africa's transition from Apartheid to a constitutional democracy
occurred in the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and after
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's famous remarks: "There Is No Alternative" to capitalism.
TINA: There Is No Alternative, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tina-thereno-altemative.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). This historical context is vital to a thorough understanding of the success and failures of South Africa's political transition and of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
17.
Hugh MacLean, Capitalism, Socialism and the Freedom Charter, II S. AFR. LABOUR

BULL. 8, 8-14 (1986).
18.
See BECK, supra note 5, at 184, 190; Vijay Prashad, Remembering Mandela, VIKALP:
PEOPLE'S PERSP. FOR CHANGE (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.vikalp.ind.in/2013/12/remembering-mandela-vijay-prashad.html ("In this context, Mandela's government had to operate. He did not take
power in 1962, when he began his prison term, nor in 2000, when the Latin American breakthrough
provided some openings for an alternative. His government took power in the 1990s, the high point of

US primacy and of neo-liberal policy making.").
19.

See KLEIN, supra note 1, at 198.
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one of the most unequal nations in the world today.20 Furthermore, rates
of disproportionate police brutality against Black South Africans remain
consistent; reports of police brutality in South Africa have soared by
313%.21 In this way, there are similarities in the gains of both the South
African national liberation struggle and the Civil Rights Movement in
terms of increased access to legislative and political democratic processes
alongside ongoing structural disadvantages, inequality, and criminalization.
II. U.S. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: SLAVERY AND JIM CROW SEGREGATION

Upon its founding as a settler colonial state, the United States established itself as a slaveholding nation.22 The subhuman status of Black people was written into American laws, and the economic system of enslavement was maintained through acts of individual and organized violence. 23
Examples of this include the various means used to terrorize enslaved
Black people-from lashings to sexual assault, the policing of the Black
body is foundational to sociopolitical cultural formation in the United
States.24 Even after the legal abolishment of slavery by the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment post-1865, the separate and unequal status of
Black persons and other people of color were still maintained through violent acts, such as the lynching of thousands of Black men, women, and
children, from the Civil War until World War 11.25 Unjust laws-such as
the Black Codes and written and unwritten Jim Crow segregation-and
political disenfranchisement were maintained through legalized and extrajudicial killings, incarceration, and forced labor for a hundred-year period.26
The mid-twentieth century Black freedom struggle's deployment of
mass civil disobedience through boycotts and protests proved to be critically necessary to undermining some of the most explicit forms of state-

20.
STATISTICS S. AFR., REPORT No. 03-10-06, POVERTY TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN
EXAMINATION
OF ABSOLUTE POVERTY BETWEEN 2006 AND 2011, at 13 (2014),

https://beta2.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-06/Report-03-10-06March2014.pdf.
21.
See David Smith, South Africa Reports of Police Brutality More than Tripled in the Last
AM),
https://www.theguard(Aug.
22,
2013,
11:1.2
Decade,
GUARDIAN
ian.com/world/2013/aug/22/south-africa-police-brutality-increase.
22.
See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF
RACIAL TERROR 3 (2d ed. 2015), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/lynching-in-america-second-edition-summary.pdf ("In America, there is a legacy of racial inequality shaped by the enslavement of

millions of black people.").
See generally RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 8-9
23.
(2000) (broadly describing the history of Blacks in the United States to make an argument for reparations).

24.
25.
26.
separation
habit, and

See id. at 3-4, 7-8, 49-50, 53-54.
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supranote 22.
See id. at 9-10 ("By 1890, the term 'Jim Crow' was used to describe the 'subordination and
of black people in the South, much of it codified and much of it still enforced by custom,
violence."').
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sanctioned racial discrimination in the United States.27 The Civil Rights
Movement's gains included the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act28
and the end of de jure (according to law) segregation, and segregation
through law and policy of public and private facilities. 29 However, what is
often described as the Civil Rights Movement was also part of a larger
movement for human rights and freedom. 30 For example, the 1963 March
on Washington was named the "March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom." 3 1 Martin Luther King, reflecting on social change following the passage of civil rights statutes, expressed his economic concerns for the future
in a speech given just weeks before his assassination on April 4, 1968:
You are going beyond purely civil rights to questions of human rights.
That is distinct.

. .

. Now our struggle is for genuine equality, which

means economic equality. For we know, that it isn't enough to integrate lunch counters. What does it profit a man to be able to eat at an
integrated lunch counter if he doesn't have enough money to buy a
hamburger? 32

The Civil Rights Movement succeeded in ending de jure segregation,
but a long history of racism and oppression continued to manifest in the
form of de facto (according to fact) segregation: informal segregation, perpetuated through social norms.33 After the Post-World War II economic
boom began to wane and the country's manufacturing base declined, conservative politicians started to sell the idea that welfare programs actually
contributed to crime and poverty, shifting the function of the state from
support to control.34 By the 1970s, the "War on Poverty" had been replaced
by the "War on Drugs" and the "War on Crime," planting the seeds of
what would become the largest national prison building boom in human
history.

27.
See Duke Univ. & The SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Comm.) Legacy Project,
Stories: The Story of SNCC, ONE PERSON ONE VOTE, http://onevotesncc.org/stories/story-sncc (last
visited Mar. 18, 2017) (providing a historical timeline of the Black Freedom Struggle and the non-

violent civil disobedience tactics employed heavily by SNCC).
28.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
29.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
30.

See THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER KING,

(providing analysis about the Civil Rights
Movement's call for economic justice and human rights).
31.
March on Washingtonfor Jobs and Freedom, NAT'L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/articles/march-on-washington.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
32. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Bishop Charles Mason Temple to Striking Sanitation
Workers in Memphis, Tennessee (Mar. 18, 1968) (transcript available at http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/primarydocuments/680318-000.pdf).
JR., AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 1 (2007)

33.

Cf

RICHARD

ROTHSTEIN,

MODERN

SEGREGATION

1-2,

4-5

(Mar.

6,

2014),

http://www.epi.org/files/2014/MODERN-SEGREGATION.pdf (researching the contemporary manifestations of education and residential segregation).
34.

See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF

COLORBLINDNESS 45-50, 52 (Cornel West & Michelle Alexander eds., rev. ed. 2012).
35.
See id at 39, 45, 47, 49, 55.
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While legalized segregation is thankfully a relic of the past, de facto
segregation and organized state violence against Black people and other
people of color persists.36 The disproportionate incarceration of Black and
Brown people and the murder of Black people every twenty-eight hours
by law enforcement or vigilantes serve as stark reminders of this reality. 37
Jim Crow laws and the mass incarceration of Black and Brown people
reflect an evolution of slavery toward subtler forms of discrimination rather than a departure from it.38 Still, there never has been a Truth and Reconciliation process in this country.
III.

SOUTH AFRICA: THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Anti-Apartheid activists and leaders like Desmond Tutu saw the TRC
as a central lever in the shift from an Apartheid state defined by legalized
segregation, economic exploitation, and colonialism, toward national heal39
ing, democracy, and increased opportunity through transitional justice.
In accordance with the Interim South African Constitution, the TRC Act
was formulated to (1) elucidate what violence was committed during the
Apartheid regime, (2) offer conditional amnesty to perpetrators of abuses,
and (3) secure reparations for victims.

40

The Commission has been touted

as extremely successful and as a major exemplar for transitional justice
processes.4' It is important, however, when analyzing policy programs
such as the TRC to ask questions such as "who is making the assessment?"
and "whose interests and values do they represent?"
The TRC focused on reinvesting resources into communities and
lessening the impacts of past racism and colonialism. 4 2 Unfortunately,
Cf 20 FactsAbout U.S. Inequality That Everyone Should Know, STAN. CTR. ON POVERTY
36.
& INEQ. (2011), http://inequality.stanford.edu/publications/20-facts-about-us-inequality-everyoneshould-know (highlighting various statistical economic, educational, and penal disproportionalities
among minority populations in the United States from the 1980s to the early 2000s).
37.
ARLENE EISEN, OPERATION GHETTO STORM: 2012 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS OF 313 BLACK PEOPLE BY POLICE, SECURITY GUARDS AND VIGILANTES 3
(rev.
ed.
2014),
http://www.operationghettostorm.org/up-

loads/1/9/1/l/19110795/newall_14_11_04.pdf.
38.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 2 ("As a criminal, you have scarcely more rights, and
arguably less respect, than a black man living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow. We have not
ended racial caste in America; we have merely redesigned it.").
See Rebecca Saunders, Lost in Translation:Expressions ofHuman Suffering, the Language
39.
of Human Rights, and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 9 SUR - INT'L J. ON

HUM. RTS. 51, 51, 55 (2008).
Tshepo Madlingozi, 20 Years of TRC - Taking Stock of the South African Truth and Rec40.

&

onciliation Commission 20 Years Later: No Truth, No Reconciliation and No Justice, KHULUMANI
SUPPORT GROUP 7 (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.khulumani.net/truth-memory/item/l151-tshepomadlingozi-20-years-of-trc-taking-stock-of-the-south-african-truth-and-reconciliation-commission20-years-later-no-truth-no-reconciliation-and-no-justice.htmi (providing access to a manuscript written by Tshepo Mdlingozi via SlideShare, which was presented at the Third International Colloquium
of the Insttuto Humanitas at Unisinos in Brazil 2016).
Id The author is referencing page one of the manuscript.
41.
But cf Desmond Tutu, Tutu: "Unfinished Business" of the TRC s Healing, MAIL
42.
GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2014, 00:00), http://mg.co.za/article/2014-04-24-unfinished-business-of-the-trchealing (outlining the intent of the TRC but then describing the proposed "wealth tax" for the transfer
of resources to reinvest in the country as "stillborn").
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global leaders with influence in institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank rendered the TRC less effective
partly because the African National Congress (ANC) undertook it in the
sociopolitical context of neoliberal capitalism, a context largely contrary
to the ANC's immediate agenda. 4 3 According to Ian Haney L6pez, neoliberalism's basic formula is brutally simple: fear people of color, resent the
government, and trust the market.4 4 As L6pez describes, the neoliberal
consensus pushes toward an understanding that the -logic of the market
must be held as sacrosanct; we are forced to have faith in the good intent
of the market.45
There was intense and immediate pressure on South Africa's postApartheid leadership to determine the features of the new democracy. 46
The newly-in-power ANC-historically a Black-led, anti-apartheid political organization-was forced to encourage investments from other nations. 4 7 With millions of formerly disenfranchised people now expecting
state support and resources denied to them for decades, the new democracy's policies gravitated toward the hope that an influx of capital would
spur a redistribution of wealth and overall economic growth.4 8 The failures
of Truth and Reconciliation can only be understood in the larger context
of South Africa emerging as a new nation in the post-Soviet Union collapse, as leaders like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan and institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank cemented the global neoliberal
capitalism as the only economic pathway to development.49
Various attempts to start or even speak about repairing harm and inequity in South Africa were met with a negative response exerted through
the political influence of global capital markets and capitalist elites.5 0 This
also impacted the reception of recommendations made by the Commission, including the decision on whether to pay for reparations and who
43.
KLEIN, supra note 1, at 205-06, 216 ("There was a flurry of public investment-more than
a hundred thousand homes were built for the poor, and millions were hooked up to water, electricity
and phone lines. But, in a familiar story, weighed down by debt and under international pressure to
privatize these services, the government soon began raising prices.").
44.
Heather McGhee & Ian Haney L6pez, We Must Talk About Race to Fix Economic Inequality, DEMOS (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.demos.org/blog/3/12/16/we-must-talk-about-race-fix-economic-inequality.

45.
46.
47.

See id
See KLEIN, supra note 1, at 197, 200, 203, 206, 215.
Chris Webb, Selling South Africa: Poverty, Politics and the 2010 FIFA World Cup, GLOBAL

RES. (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.globalresearch.ca/selling-south-africa-poverty-politics-and-the2010-fifa-world-cup/18303 ("During this period, the pressures of both domestic and foreign capital
forced the emergent African National Congress (ANC) government to follow the economic paradigms
of the past and encourage foreign investment.").
48.

See GILLIAN HART, RETHINKING THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRISIS: NATIONALISM, POPULISM,

HEGEMONY 6-10 (2014).
49.
See Prashad, supra note 18 (discussing the social and political context of the global economy at the time that the ANC came into power).
50.
KLEIN, supranote 1, at 207 ("Every time a top party official said something that hinted that
the ominous Freedom Charter might still become policy, the market responded with a shock, sending
the rand into free fall.").
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would pay for reparations.5 1 The Commission recommended the creation
of a one-time, one-percent tax on corporate wealth to fund reparations recipients identified through the Commission. 52 The Commission believed
that given the way corporations reaped enormous profits under the Apartheid regime, they should bear some responsibility for repairing the harm
done to victims. 5 3 But South African President Thabo Mbeki rejected the
proposal "fearing that it would send an antibusiness message to the market." 54 Neoliberalism leans toward less democratic participation rather
than more.5 5

The economic system especially excludes the people who are most
impacted by systemic violence. Throughout the transition process, Thabo
Mbeki generally framed decisions on the structure of the economy as technocratic and administrative procedural issues rather than as questions fundamental to the realization of the Freedom Charter.56 Unlike the Freedom
Charter, which was developed through an open and participatory process,
the economic decisions made by Mbeki happened behind closed doors and
without the input of many of the people who risked their lives through
57
anti-Apartheid activism to bring a new South Africa into being. As described by Saunders in the article Lost in Translation,the TRC's focus on
"spiritual and symbolic forms of reparation[s] . . . has . . . abetted the
ANC's embrace of neoliberal economics."5 s
IV. UNITED STATES: THE JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE

Though the JRI is a far more modest project than the Commission
was, there are notable similarities in terms of its animating creation and
also its failures. Susan B. Tucker and Eric Cadora at Open Society Institute
originally conceptualized the idea of justice reinvestment as one tool to
shift the ongoing dynamic of structural racism and racialized criminalization in the United States today. 59 The concept was created "as a public
safety mechanism to downsize prison populations and budgets and re-al-

51.
52.
53.

Id. at 210-13.
Id. at 210.
Id.

.

Id. at 211 ("In the end, the government put forward a fraction of what had been requested,
54.
taking the money out of its own budget .... ).
55.
See HART, supranote 48, at 6 ("'Neoliberalism' - understood as a class project and manifestation of global economic forces, as well as a rationality of rule . .
See Saunders, supranote 39, at 61-62.
56.
57.
Ronnie Kasrils, How the ANC's FaustianPact Sold Out South Africa's Poorest, GUARDIAN
(June 24, 2013, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/24/anc-faustianpact-mandela-fatal-error ("An ANC-Communist party leadership eager to assume political office . .. has bequeathed an economy so tied in to the neoliberal global formula and market fundamentalism that there is very little room to alleviate the plight of most of our people.").
58.
Saunders, supra note 39, at 63.
59.
Susan B. Tucker & Eric Cadora, Justice Reinvestment, in 3 IDEAS FOR AN OPEN SOC'Y 2,
2-3 (Nov. 2003), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ideasreinvestment.pdf.

524

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:3

locate savings to leverage other public and private resources for reinvestment in minority communities disproportionately harmed by the system
and culture of harsh punishment." 60
While justice reinvestment was not defined specifically in historical
terms, its authors describe its moral and ethical component in the following manner: due to the historical harm and neglect communities of color
and poor communities have faced, it is the duty of policy makers and political officials to initiate socioeconomic investments that serve to empower and restitute marginalized people. 61 Although not created through a
democratic process, justice reinvestment reflected popular grassroots campaigns articulated throughout the 1990s and early 2000s calling for investment in communities rather than incarceration. 62 These "Books Not Bars"
and "Jobs Not Jails" campaigns found a cogent theoretical articulation in
63
justice reinvestment.
The most popular and widespread attempt to move justice reinvestment from theory into practice has been the JRI.6 4 Led by the Council of
State Governments and supported by Pew Charitable Trusts, 65 the JRI is
moving forward in twenty-seven states66 and has resulted in the passage of
legislation in seventeen states.67 The function of the JRI includes assistance to states in criminal justice data collecting and analysis, policy identification, and program implementation, with the goal of curbing crime
rates and managing crime in a more economical manner. 68 Written by ten
researchers, analysts, and advocates dedicated to ending mass incarceration, the article Ending Mass Incarceration:Chartinga New Justice Reinvestment details some of the failures of the JRI.69 The authors conclude
that the JRI may potentially reinforce mass incarceration as a component
of the legal system rather than end it. 70

60.
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
61.
See id at 5.
62.
See Jakada Imani, Californias Turning Tide on Youth Prisons, HUFFINGTON POST (May
25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jakada-imani/californias-turning-tide-b_808744.html.
63.
See Jobs Not Jails in Alameda County, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., http://ellabakercenter.org/our-work/jobs-not-jails-in-alameda-county (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (showing campaign
histories of both "[B]ooks [N]ot [B]ars" and "Jobs Not Jails").
64.
See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 1.
65.
NANCY LAVIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE STATE
ASSESSMENT
REPORT
1-2,
6
(2014),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/22211/41 2994-Justice-Reinvestment-Initiative-State-Assessment-Report.PDF.
66.
Justice Reinvestment Initiative, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.bja.gov/programs/justicereinvestment/index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
67.
Crime & Justice Institute: Justice Reinvestment, COMMUNITY RESOURCES FOR JUST.,
http://www.crj.org/cji/pages/justice-reinvestment (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
68.
LAVIGNE ET AL., supranote 65, at 3-4.
69.
See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 1.

70.

Id
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Similar to some of the failures of the Commission, the JRI has not
resulted in direct reinvestment in communities.7 Furthermore, it has not
made a significant impact in shifting the punishment economy's architecture.72 Instead, the JRI has moved resources from corrections spending to
other law enforcement agencies.73 According to L6pez, the general trend
in neoliberal economic thought is that the government is to be fearedwith the exception of law enforcement for the maintenance of "law and
order." 74 What started as an initiative to move resources into low-income
communities of color has resulted instead in the reinvestment of resources
into police departments.75 This is not just because all government beyond
law enforcement is viewed with suspicion in the popular imagination, but
also because in this imagination the people-especially people of colorare to be feared.76 The JRI has not engaged ordinary citizens; it has been
predominantly driven by elected officials and bureaucrats.7 7 Moreover,
JRI did not engage the grassroots organizations and constituencies it represents in helping to set the direction of the initiative.
Pew Charitable Trust and the Council of State Governments framed
JRI technocratically; it has focused on reducing incarceration rates and recidivism, but not direct reinvestment.79 The JRI has come to signify any
and all justice reforms that are largely focused on decreasing rates, and not
the communities most impacted and marginalized by incarceration.so
V. CHALLENGING THE NEOLIBERAL CONSENSUS: RACIALIZED FEAR
VERSUS STRUCTURAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Both JRI and the TRC demonstrate that powerful institutional actors
will gravitate toward proposals that serve their own interests, thereby reinforcing the status quo. Shifting away from the status quo and neoliberal
consensus requires (1) shifting from overall resentment toward the government to demonstrating the impact of a government that meaningfully
Id. at 10 ("Increased funding for 'intensive community supervision' (i.e., closer control and
71.
scrutiny) can result in higher rates of return to prison by widening the net of social control. Even
investment in rehabilitation services, such as drug treatment, can backfire if services are inappropriate
for the individual or sub-par since relapse (which is common among recovering addicts) can result in
revocation to prison.").

72.

Id.

Id. ("For example, JRI in Pennsylvania in 2012 made no attempt to advance a goal of com73.
munity reinvestment, and instead promoted redirecting the highest proportion of anticipated savings
to local law enforcement authorities, even though the state's overall crime rate had dropped 14 percent.").
See IAN HANEY LdPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: How CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE
74.
REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 22, 26 (2014).
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
75.
See McGhee & L6pez, supra note 44.
76.
See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
77.

78.

See id at 8.

Id. at 7 ("[T]he terms of JRI reform today are expressed in the language of crime control
79.
and law enforcement, rehabilitation and treatment, recidivism reduction, and expanded, often tougher,
parole and probation supervision.").

80.

Id at 9-10.
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serves its people; (2) shifting from the blaming and shaming of people of
color to a broader understanding of accountability; and (3) expanding current definitions of violence and moving toward a new vision of safety.
A. What Are the Impacts of Government When It Is in Service of the Public Good?
Because government institutional actors can tend toward reinforcing
their own interests rather than the interests of those most marginalized,
distrust of the government is common in many communities of color and
poor communities.8' It is important, however, to note the ways that government can induce positive change when policy interests reflect and amplify the interest of the community. When government creates clear and
simple policies with positive benefits to communities, those programs
draw widespread support (e.g., social security). 82
The following are examples of attempts to restructure the incentives
of the justice system using political channels:
* The Brennan Center for Justice has advocated for a "Reverse Mass
Incarceration" Act, which would reward states that both decrease crime
and incarceration, as states like California, New York, and Mississippi
have already done.83
* In California, voters passed a mandate that directed the state to
move dollars from incarceration toward investment in the state's education
system. Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, recategorized certain low-level felonies as misdemeanors and redirected the savings from that change into programs to limit dropouts and school truancy,
victims' services, drug abuse, mental health, and other programs to keep
people out of the justice system.84
* After hundreds of citizens rallied outside of former Governor of
New York David Paterson's office in Albany demanding drug law reform

81.
See SHAYLA C. NUNNALLY, TRUST IN BLACK AMERICA: RACE, DISCRIMINATION, AND
POLITICS 9-11 (2012) (exploring the long-fraught relationship between Black Americans and the U.S.
Government).
82.
ELISA A. WALKER, VIRGINIA P. RENO & THOMAS N. BETHELL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS.,
AMERICANS MAKE HARD CHOICES ON SOCIAL SECURITY: A SURVEY WITH TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS 1
(2014),
https://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/AmericansMakeHardChoicesonSocial_Security.pdf (noting in a survey of over 2,000 U.S. citizens aged twenty-one and over 81% of
respondents "say they don't mind paying for Social Security because they value . .
the security and
stability it provides to millions of... Americans").
83.
LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & INIMAI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE REVERSE
MASS INCARCERATION ACT 1 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/TheReverseMassIncarcerationAct%20.pdf.

84.

Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 47 (West).
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in 2009,85 the Rockefeller Drug LawS 86 were overturned and reformed.8 7

The 2009 reforms included both the elimination of mandatory minimum
sentences for drug offenses and the restoration of a judge's ability to send
an individual to a drug treatment program, rather than prison.88
It is not by accident that many of the most successful and transformative proposals have been driven by ordinary people, from the reform of
the Rockefeller Drug Laws in New York to the passage of Proposition 47
in California.
B. Who Is Participatingin the Neoliberal Consensus? How Do We
Change It?
Under this most recent era of neoliberalism in the United States and
elsewhere, resources and political and economic power have become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the few at the expense of the many.
Decisions like Citizens Unitedv. FEC8 9 and the overturning of the Voting
Rights Act 9 0 are the hallmarks solidifying a new age of corporate controlof our democracy. People-led social movements demanding widespread
policy and cultural change, such as Black Lives Matter,9 1have been on the
rise in the last five years and are pressing for change in the streets and
within the halls of power. 9 2 In the cases of South Africa and the United
States, investigating their respective political histories leads to the conclusion that the people must not demobilize, even when their champion is in
office. Both Barack Obama and Nelson Mandela were thought to be harbingers of change and, unfortunately, many aspects of structural inequality
and
discrimination
remain
in
both
nations.9 3
85.
Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal '70s Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/nyregion/26rockefeller.html.

86.
See Brian Mann, The Drug Laws That Changed How We Punish, NPR (Feb. 14, 2013, 3:04
AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/14/171822608/the-drug-laws-that-changed-how-we-punish
(discussing a series of drug statutes introduced by former New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller in 1973
that created harsh sentences for both drug selling and possession, for example, a mandatory 15-to-life
sentence for the possession of four ounces of drugs such as cocaine, marijuana, morphine, and heroin).
87.
NYCLU: Historic Reforms of New York's Draconian Drug Sentencing Scheme Imminent,
N.Y. C.L. UNION (Mar. 31, 2009), https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/nyclu-historic-reformsnew-yorks-draconian-drug-sentencing-scheme-imminent.

88.
89.
90.

Id.
558 U.S. 310, 333-34 (2010).
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).

91.
About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/about (last visited Feb. 8, 2017) (describing Black Lives Matter as a chapter-based national
organization and grassroots movement "working for a world where Black lives are no longer systematically and intentionally targeted for demise").

92.

Jelani

Cobb,

The Matter of Black Lives,

NEW YORKER

(Mar.

14,

2016),

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/where-is-black-lives-matter-headed.
93.
See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 1, at 206 ("In 2005, only 4 percent of the companies listed on
the [Johannesburg Stock Engage] were owned or controlled by blacks."); On Views ofRace and Inequality, Black and Whites Are Worlds Apart, PEW RES. CTR. (June 27, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/06/27/on-views-of-race-and-inequality-blacks-and-whites-are-worlds-apart
("According to a new Pew Research Center analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2014 the
median adjusted income for households headed by blacks was $43,300, and for whites it was

$71,300.").
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To accomplish change, people must be able to understand the government bureaucracies that shape the world they live in. This will give them
the foundational tools to shift the levers of power toward less harm and
greater access, ultimately acting as agents in designing new systems that
reflect their own interests. In organizing for social justice, changing people's own conceptions of the self has historically been understood as a first
critical step in the larger process of social transformation. 94 As people
share with one another, they fight the isolation and shame that can come
with being a victim of violence inflicted by the state or anyone else. Community spaces and conversations are necessary for effective organizing;
by defining themselves for themselves, victims of Apartheid, state violence, or incarceration become active participation in healing themselves
and their communities.95
C. What Is Violence? What Is Safety?
Narrow understandings of violence (as only tangible harm) and of
justice (as between and upon individuals) fail to grapple with the more allencompassing aspects of institutional violence. Expressing racism is now
regarded as interpersonal and individualized; laws have only abolished explicitly racist practices and not the structural violence embedded in factors
such as access to physical space, housing policies, and educational quality.96 Narrow conceptions of justice limit the possibilities and the reach of
restorative justice solutions. In our current legal system, only some individuals can get a modicum of justice, and sentencing precedents (e.g.,
mandatory minimums) limit the power of mitigating circumstances and
community input in deciding how justice should be undertaken. 97 On the
contrary, however, there are organizations and collectives working outside
of the legal system to promote accountability and community decisionmaking. 98 In addition, narrow conceptions of safety also constrain the potential of policy initiatives. In the case of the JRI, its policy focus on crime
rates and recidivism automatically assumes that a decrease in rates will
coincide with an increase of safety. Rather than identifying problems in
the binary of "crime" and "absence of crime," a more robust conception

94.
See Marshall Ganz, Public Narrative, CollectiveAction, and Power, in THE WORLD BANK,
ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH PUBLIC OPINION: FROM INERTIA TO PUBLIC ACTION 289, 301 (Sina

Odugbemi & Taeku Lee eds., 2011).
95.
See id. at 295.
96.
See Jeff Nesbit, Institutional Racism Is Our Way of Life, U.S. NEWS (May 6, 2015, 1:16
PM),

http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/at-the-edge/2015/05/06/institutional-racism-is-our-way-

of-life.
97.
What the Experts Say, FAMM, http://famm.org/sentencing-101/what-experts-say/seemore-experts (last visited Mar. 19, 2017) ("Mandatory minimum sentences have been studied extensively and have been shown to be ineffective in preventing crime. They have been effective in distorting the sentencing process. They discriminate against minorities in their application, and they have
been shown to waste the taxpayers' money.").
98.
See, e.g., Danielle Sered, Common Justice, VERA INST. JUST., https://www.vera.org/centers/common-justice (last visited Mar. 19, 2017); The Harm FreeZone, SPIRITHOUSE, http://www.spirithouse-nc.org/collective-sun-ii (last visited Mar. 19, 2017) (describing programing for communitybased accountability and restorative justice practices).
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of accountability is needed. First, conceptions of accountability must include captains of industry, corporate entities, and other socioeconomic actors, and second, we must move beyond carceral-minded quantifiers of
safety (e.g. decreased recidivism) and into the realm ofjustice alternatives.
D. Who Is to Blame? PunishingPeople of Color Versus Acknowledging
Structural Violence
In order to advance the particular kind of transformative change envisioned by justice reinvestment or the Commission, the issue of who is at
fault must be addressed. This should not be a simple question. In fact, the
more robust the conception of blame, fault, and accountability, the more
likely it is to give rise to a robust conception of human rights.
Slavery existed in the United States and during its colonial history for
246 years. 99 As Randall Robinson describes in The Debt, the legacy of
slavery has continued through policies such as the Black Codes, Jim Crow
Segregation, and the policies that drive mass incarceration.100 People and
institutions actively developed these policies and practices and benefit*
handsomely from them. 0 1 Those people and institutions drive home the
idea that these policies are the deliberate continuation of slavery, and,
therefore, it is entirely possible to assign fault and responsibility. For example, the namesakes of Brown University, Nicholas and Joseph Brown,
achieved wealth in part by manufacturing and selling slave ships and investing in the transatlantic slave trade.1 02 However, holding institutions
accountable when harms are done to marginalized groups such as lowincome communities of color remains the exception.
Justice requires asking who is responsible for the harm, no matter
how powerful those persons may be, and then developing mechanisms so
that all of those persons might make amends. We must develop new forms
of accountability to create the conditions for former slaves to have viable
opportunity within a nation that held them captive since its founding. Otherwise, changes in legal relationship may occur, but more fundamental
changes in terms of social and economic relationships do not.
Instead, we continue to see those most marginalized from political
and economic power in continued difficult no-win situations, often mirroring those of formerly enslaved people, of being funneled into the justice
system while they seek employment. For example, Shanesha Taylor, a

99.

100.
101.

ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 1.

Id. at 101-02, 210-11, 225.
Id. at230.

102.
See BROWN UNIV. STEERING COMM. ON SLAVERY & JUSTICE, SLAVERY AND JUSTICE 1214,
15-17,
http://www.brown.edu/Research/SlaveryJustice/documents/SlaveryAndJustice.pdf
(providing a detailed examination of the relationship between the establishment of Brown University
and the transatlantic slave trade).
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mother of two, left her children in the car while she went to a job interview. 1 03 She was sentenced to eighteen months of probation for child neglect. 104 Her sentence might have been longer but for public outcry.1 0 5 This

is but one example of a larger trend where poor families of color are more
likely to be involved in the justice system and to suffer worsening economic conditions as a result.106 The findings of Who Pays: The True Cost
of Mass Incarcerationon Families illustrates the experiences of low-income families of color trapped in a punishing economy:
* People impacted by incarceration "are saddled with copious fees,
fines, and debt" while suffering through diminished economic opportunities that affect families for generations.107
* Women and families bear the brunt of these costs, and yet, they
"are the primary resource for housing, employment, and health needs of
their formerly incarcerated loved ones, filling the gaps left by . . . [a lack
of] reentry services.,,to
* Incarceration damages families and prevents stability, causing lifelong health impacts and perpetuating cycles of trauma and poverty that
keep families and communities from thriving.10 9
The Department of Justice Pattern or Practice Investigation of the
Ferguson, Missouri, Police Department provides an example of what this
punishing economy looks like on the municipal level."l 0 According to that
report, eighty-eight percent of instances of police use of force were against
Black people, and of the 21,000 residents of Ferguson, 16,000 people had
outstanding arrest warrants."' The report documented evidence that "Ferguson's law enforcement practices are shaped by the City's focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs."' 12 As a result, single missed court
payments were resulting in jail time, and one woman who once illegally

103.
Sarah Jarvis, Shanesha Taylor Sentenced to 18 Years Probation, ARIZ. CENT. (May 15,
2015, 9:16 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/scottsdale/2015/05/15/shanesha-taylor-

sentenced-friday-abrk/27365949.
104. Id.
105. Id
106.
SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL, CHRIS SCHWEIDLER, ALICIA WALTERS & AZADEH ZOHRABI,
WHO PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF INCARCERATION ON FAMILIES 12-18 (2015), http://whopaysre-

port.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Who-Pays-FINAL.pdf.
107.
Id at 7.
Id. at 9.
108.
109.
Id.
110.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 52-54 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opalpress-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/fergusonpolicedepartmentreport.pdf.

111.
112.

Id at 6, 55, 62.
Id. at 2.
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parked her car ended up paying over $1,000 in fines and spent six days in
jail.1 13
The blame inflicted on poor people of color, who are attempting to
make ends meet and survive through these circumstances, must be challenged. People of color are regarded as deserving of punishment to a degree that White Americans often are not. For instance, the "public health
concern" response to the present-day New England heroin epidemic-in
which users are predominantly White-is drastically different from the
harsh punishments served out when heroin users were disproportionately
Black.1 14
Societal examples of racialized blame include the "super predator"" 5
and "welfare queen""'6 stereotypes, in contrast to recognizing the culpability of institutions and systems. Fearing and criminalizing people of
color does not allow for a critical examination of the underlying reasons
for the cycles of generational poverty, limited access to social services,
and high unemployment in these communities.1 7 This must be done both
explicitly, through slogans like "Black Lives Matter," and implicitly,
through campaigns like "Books Not Bars" to close the California Youth
Authority prisons. 1 8 From 2003 to 2012, the Ella Baker Center for Human
Rights, the Youth Justice Coalition, the W. Haywood Burns Institute, the
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, the National Youth Law Center, and the Youth Law
Center, among others, worked to reform California's state-run youth
prison system."'9 Prior to this campaign, the perception of youth inside the
California Youth Prison system was that they were the "worst of the

113.
Report,

Mark Berman & Wesley Lowery, The 12 Key Highlightsfrom the DOJ'sScathing Ferguson
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
4,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-na-

tion/wp/2015/03/04/the-12-key-highlights-from-the-dojs-scathing-ferguson-report.
114.
Andrew Cohen, How White UsersMade Heroin a Public-HealthProblem, ATLANTIC (Aug.
12, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/crack-heroin-and-race/401015.

115.

Hillary Clinton, First Lady of the U.S., Address at Keene State College (Jan. 28, 1996)

(video of this speech is available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4582435/full-speech-keenestate).
116.
LOPEZ, supra note 74, at 58 ("On the stump, Reagan repeatedly invoked a story of a 'Chicago welfare queen' with 'eighty names, thirty addresses, [and] twelve Social Security cards [who] is
collecting veteran's benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands . . . .' (alteration in original)).
117.
See generally Kristin L. Perkins & Robert J. Sampson, Compounded Deprivation in the
Transition to Adulthood: The Intersection of Racial and Economic Inequality Among Chicagoans,

1995-2013, 1 RSF: RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 35, 35 (2015) (describing a case study of the
layered effects of historical inequality on Black communities in Chicago).
118.
Books Not Bars was a campaign led by the Ella Baker Center and youth advocates to close
the abusive California Youth Authority prisons. See Books Not Bars Basics, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR
HUM. RTS., http://ellabakercenter.org/books-not-bars/books-not-bars-basics (last visited Mar. 19,

2017) [hereinafter Basics].
119.
See id; BARRY KRISBERG, REFORMING THE CALIFORNIA DIVISION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE:
LESSONS LEARNED 18 (2014), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/docs/ReformingtheDivisionof JuvenileFacilities-Final.pdf.
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worst" and that they were the "super predators."l 20 Families were regarded
as uncaring or worse.121 Over an eight-year campaign, youth who were
formerly involved in the youth prison system became outspoken advocates
against a system with seventy-five percent recidivism rates and over
$100,000 per-year-per-youth price tag. Their mothers and grandmothers
were steadfast in their determination to close the youth prison system, and
through that process they challenged the conception that they didn't care
about their loved ones.122 As a result, economic arguments about the need
to close youth prisons that once fell on deaf ears were eventually well received.1 23 By challenging the dehumanizing depictions of incarcerated
youth and their families, this campaign opened the eyes of legislators to
the need for and possibility of real reform.124 Additionally, through documentary films, public education, and earned media, the campaign raised
the visibility of rehabilitative programs in other states.125 The success of
these programs demonstrated that there was a better way to treat youth
involved in the justice system. By challenging the dehumanization of families and positioning the site of rehabilitation and accountability within
families, communities, and local programs rather than remote youth prisons, the campaign succeeded in closing five youth prisons' 2 6 and helping
reduce the youth prisons population by over eighty percent. 127 The state
saw no increase in youth crime as a result. 128 Organizations and campaigns
such as "Close California Youth Prisons" are working to shift the conception of who is to blame to a more institutionalized framework, away from
the scapegoating of youth and families.129

120.
See Witness, System Failure: Violence, Abuse and Neglect in the California Youth Authority, HUB (Apr. 9, 2008), http://hub.witness.org/en/SystemFailure (exploring the experience of incarcerated young people in California youth prisons).
121.
KRISBERG, supra note 120, at 14.
122.
See Imani, supra note 62.
123.
Id.
124.
BARRY KRISBERG, LINH VUONG, CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & SUSAN MARCHIONNA, A NEW
ERA IN CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE: DOWNSIZING THE STATE YOUTH CORRECTIONS SYSTEM 2
(2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bccj/New Era.pdf; Yirmeyah Beckles, At Books Not Bars
Event, Family Members and the Formerly IncarceratedShare Their Stories, OAKLAND N. (Aug. 13,
2012, 4:12 PM), https://oaklandnorth.net/2012/08/13/at-books-not-bars-event-family-members-andthe-formerly-incarcerated-share-their-stories.
125.
E g., C. LENORE ANDERSON, DANIEL MACALLAIR & CELINA RAMIREZ, BOOKS NOT BARS
& CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY WAREHOUSES: FAILING
KIDS, FAMILIES & PUBLIC SAFETY 13 (2005).
126.
KRISBERG, supranote 120, at 2; see also Basics, supra note 119.
127.
KRISBERG, VUONG, HARTNEY & MARCHIONNA, supra note 124, at 17; Katy McCarthy,
Ella Baker Has a New Boss; Meet Problem-Solver Zach Norris, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Oct. 3,
2013), http://jjie.org/2013/10/03/ella-baker-has-a-new-boss-meet-problem-solver-zack-norris;
Basics, supra note 119.
128.
KRISBERG, supra note 120, at 2-3; KRISBERG, VUONG, HARTNEY & MARCHIONNA, supra
note 124, at 8.
129.
Beckles, supranote 124.
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VI. EXAMPLES & CAMPAIGNS WORKING TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO

Some campaigns have indeed challenged the scapegoating of people
of color, sought a broader conception of safety, and engaged people as
protagonists.1 3 0 Successful campaigns include the following examples:
* The City of Chicago paid $5.5 million in restitution to fifty-seven
people (almost exclusively Black men) tortured by the Chicago Police Department in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.' The passage of the reparations ordinance came after years of hearings, investigations, and collaborations between entities such as the People's Law Office, Amnesty
International USA, and We Charge Genocide."3
* The Justice Reinvestment Coalition of Alameda County is a community-driven alliance of organizations working to decrease incarceration
and our reliance on policing in Alameda County and advocating for an
increase in funding for socioeconomic resources for communities.' 33 The
Coalition's successful 2015 and 2016 "50% for Jobs Not Jails" campaigns
resulted in millions of dollars to support new community services funds
instead of continued investment in the sheriff and probation departments. 134 These victories created five community funds-employment,
education, case management, pre-trial, and For Us By Us. The For Us By
Us fund alone provided $1 million in funding for organizations staffed,
managed, and operated by formerly incarcerated and systems-impacted individuals.' 35 Most recently, the coalition also won a "Jobs 4 Freedom"
campaign to secure a re-entry hiring program that will provide 1,400
county jobs and offer support to formerly incarcerated individuals.' 3 6
* Equal Education (EE) is a community organization in South Africa
fighting for greater access and improved quality of schools for poor and
working class South African communities.' 37 Originally organized due to
130.
See, e.g, Sam Jayaraman & Zachary Norris, What Does It Mean to Be Safe?, ELLA BAKER
CTR., (July 18, 2016), https://medium.com/@ellabakercenter/what-does-it-mean-to-be-safe2403bc91 d906#.v8sl8o649.
131. Merrit Kennedy, DecadesLater, Victims of Chicago Police TorturePaidReparations,NPR:
THE
TWO-WAY
(Jan.
5,
2016,
3:47
PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/01/05/462040444/decades-later-victims-of-chicago-police-torture-paid-reparations.
132.

See CHI. TORTURE JUST. MEMORIALS, http://chicagotorture.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2017)

(providing a digital archive of information related to the Chicago Police tortures and reparations process).
133.

See JUST. REINVESTMENT COALITION OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, http://www.jrcac.org (last

visited Mar. 19, 2017) (detailing the campaigns and victories of the Justice Reinvestment Coalition).
134.
Sam Levin, Alameda County to Reduce Jail Funding, Prioritize Social Services, E. BAY
EXPRESS (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2015/03/24/alamedacounty-to-reduce-jail-funding-prioritize-social-services.
135.
Darris Young, Ella Baker Ctr. for Human Rights (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (discussing the framework and rationale for the For Us By Us fund).
136.
See Justice Reinvestment Coalition Wins 1,400 Jobs for Formerly IncarceratedPeople in
Alameda County, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (June 28, 2016), http://www.ellabakercen-

ter.org/in-the-news/justice-reinvestment-coalition-wins- 1400-jobs-for-formerly-incarcerated-peoplein.

137.

See EQUAL EDUC., https://equaleducation.org.za (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
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the need of a critical mass of parents, teachers, and students in the Khayelitsha township of Cape Town-and with high school students holding
leadership positions in the organization-EE has now gone on to become
a nationwide organization. 138 Some of the organization's policy victories
include the fixing of over 500 windows of the Luhlaza High School in
Khayelitsha in 2008 and halting the closing of over seventeen schools in
the Western Cape Province in 2012.139
* After an act of police violence in 2015, a coalition of grassroots
organizations in Minneapolis mobilized together and created a comprehensive "United Black Agenda" for racial and economic justice.,140 The
coalition called for justice-orientated policies such as a summer jobs program for youth of color, fair labor practices, and voting rights restoration,
and also explicitly stated that investment in community is necessary to effectively challenge state violence. 141 The coalition is using the agenda to
lobby in the state legislature for initiatives that target racial and socioeconomic inequalities in the state of Minnesota; 142 one of the coalition's recent state legislative victories included the passage of a paid sick days
bill. 143
* Restore Oakland, a collaboration between the Ella Baker Center
for Human Rights and Restaurants Opportunities Centers United, will provide community-based, restorative economics and justice space in East
Oakland.144 Envisioning community safety and justice in a new way, the
hub will include job-training programs, a restaurant that will provide living wage jobs for the community, restorative justice programming, and
health care and child care programs.145

138.

Id.

See id (providing information on Equal Education's campaigns and leadership structure).
139.
Equal Education is "a movement of learners, parents, teachers and community members working for
quality and equality in South African education, through analysis and activism." Our Movement,
EQUAL EDUC., https://equaleducation.org.za/our-movement/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
See Patrick Condon, 'United Black Legislative Agenda' Seeks $75 Million to Create Busi140.
nesses, STARTRIB. (Apr. 6, 2016, 9:41 PM), http://www.startribune.com/coalition-seeks-ambitious4
legislative-agenda-aimed-at-easing-racial-economic-disparities/37 814121.
(n.d.),
Agenda
Legislative
Black
United
from
the
Memorandum
141.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/OB2ilekXQNNGbWMyUWdfUEQyMzA/view.
142.
Id.
143.

(May 27,

Peter Callaghan, Minneapolis Approves 'Landmark' Paid Sick Leave Law, MINNPOST

2016),

https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2016/05/minneapolis-approves-land-

mark-paid-sick-leave-law; Peter Callaghan, Minneapolis Set to Become First City in Minnesota to
Require Paid Sick Leave, MINNPOST (May 6, 2016), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2016/05/minneapolis-set-become-first-city-minnesota-require-paid-sick-leave.
Luke Tsai, A Nonprofit Restaurant in East OaklandWill Aim to PrioritizePeopleover Prof144.
its, E. BAY EXPRESS: WHAT THE FORK (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/WhatTheFork/archives/2016/02/16/a-nonprofit-restaurant-in-east-oakland-will-aim-to-prioritize-peopleover-profits.
See Restore Oakland, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTs., http://ellabakercenter.org/restore145.
oakland (last visited Feb. 10, 2017) (detailing the development of the restorative justice and restorative
economics hub in East Oakland).
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CONCLUSION

Examining the JRI in the United States and the Commission in South
Africa demonstrates how institutional actors trend toward limiting conceptions of harm, safety, and accountability. These limitations reflect their
own conceptions of what governments are charged with doing in the
twenty-first century. Marginalized communities continue to suffer the impact of the shortcomings of government systems that trade in racialized
fear and shame, rather than accountability and reparations. Those interested in truly advancing racial equity and reducing inequality must continue to pursue strategies that successfully challenge the underlying logic,
racialized rhetoric, and assumptions of these punishing systems.
A process of Truth and Reinvestment addresses some of the gaps existing in both the JRI and the Commission. Truth means reckoning with
the reality of racial injustice in our country and talking about how we have
continuously prioritized and profited from shackles, walls, and jails in
communities of color-from slavery, to Jim Crow, to our current criminal
justice system. Reinvestment means rejecting these priorities and advancing real, long-term solutions that create opportunity for those who have
been most harmed.
Such a process would both allow us to acknowledge and wrestle with
the harms that have been systematically wrought on people of color in this
country and to channel resources into those communities. Without this initial reckoning, we cannot ensure that reinvestments are truly going to
those who have been most impacted by structural racism.
Race-neutral reinvestment policies that do not take into account the
targeting of people of color by the criminal justice system could end up
replicating the exact circumstances that have brought us to a moment
where people of color make up 60% of those imprisoned, Black and Latino
people are three times more likely to be searched during a traffic stop than
Whites, and more than 70% of students involved in school-related arrests
or referred to law enforcement are Black or Latino.
Ordinary people, particularly those who have been harmed by the
criminal justice system, must be engaged in the process of Truth and Reinvestment so that people impacted by systems of punishment drive the
solutions and creation of alternatives. Community participation will help
ensure that reinvestments are directed towards people of color and lowincome communities, instead of towards law-enforcement-driven solutions or top down, trickle down approaches. By connecting the truth of our
country's past to reinvestment in our future, we can effectively address
racial inequities and build a society where we prioritize growth, redemption, and support over punishment.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2015, the Colorado General Assembly passed the Community Law
Enforcement Action Reporting Act (CLEAR Act).' The CLEAR Act
requires the Division of Criminal Justice (DCJ) of the Colorado
Department of Public Safety to collect data from law enforcement
agencies, the Judicial Department, and the adult Parole Board; synthesize
the data by race, ethnicity, and gender at discretionary points throughout
the criminal justice process; and issue a report on its findings.2 In
December 2016, the DCJ presented a report analyzing the data from the
over 325,000 criminal justice system contacts in the 2015 calendar year to
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees of the Colorado General
Assembly. 3 According to the state demographer's office, in 2015,
Colorado's population was 5,443,608 and was comprised as follows:
White, 69.1%; Black, 4.2%; Hispanic, 22.2%; and Other, 4.6%.4 Men
made up 50.3% of the state population and women made up 49.7% of the

t Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank the
excellent staff of the Denver Law Review for inviting me to participate in their Justice Reinvestment
Symposium. I would also like to thank Professors Christopher Lasch, Lindsey Webb, Patience
Crowder, Catherine Smith, Nantiya Ruan for their support, encouragement, and trenchant comments.
I.
See COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-33.5-518 (2016).
2.
PEG FLICK, KIM ENGLISH & LAURENCE LUCERO, COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY,
SUMMARY: REPORT ON THE C.L.E.A.R. ACT: COMMUNITY LAw ENFORCEMENT ACTION REPORTING
ACT, at 8 (2016), http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ors/docs/reports/2016-SB15-185-Rpt.pdf.
3. Id.
4.
Id-
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population.' And, in the country that has the highest incarceration rate in
the world,' Colorado does its fair share to contribute to those high rates.'
As in virtually every other jurisdiction in the country, black people
were disproportionately represented at every measured discretion point in
the criminal justice process.' Although black people comprise just 4.2%
of Colorado's population, black people received 12.4% of the over
200,000 arrests and summonses issued by law enforcement agencies in
2015.9 The DCJ's study of 105,156 case filings in county, district, and
juvenile courts combined found that black people accounted for 10.5% of
court filings.'o In district court, black people accounted for 20.9% of the
cases sentenced, were more likely than the other race or ethnicity
categories to receive initial sentences of confinement, and were less likely
to receive probation or a deferred judgment for offenses, including drug
and violent offenses, even after controlling for concurrent cases or prior
criminal history." In those drug cases where black people did receive a
more lenient sentence, probation or a deferred judgment was revoked at
the rate of 40.3%. 12 And black people convicted of violent offenses were
more likely to be revoked than people of other races or ethnicities who had
been convicted of violent offenses. ' Black people who were sentenced to
prison time were far less likely to receive the benefit of discretionary
parole than incarcerated whites and Asian Americans.1 4
5.

Id.

6.

Criminal Justice Facts, SENT'G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-

justice-facts (last visited Mar. 14,2017). At 471 per 100,000 people, the United States has the highest
incarceration rate in the world. Criminal Justice Facts: State-by-State Data, SENT'G PROJECT,

http://www.sentencingproject.org/the-facts (last visited Mar. 14, 2017) (select "U.S. Total" from the
drop down bar provided for United States incarceration statistics). Over 2.2 million people are
currently held in our nation's jails and prisons. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Jeremy Travis

et al. eds., 2014) (reporting that in the United States in 2012, "[i]n absolute numbers, the prison and
jail population had grown to 2.23 million people, yielding a rate of incarceration that was by far the
highest in the world").
7.
Colorado's incarceration rate is 383 per 100,000 people. Criminal Justice Facts:
State-by-State Data, supra note 6 (select "CO" from the drop down bar provided for Colorado
incarceration statistics). By way of comparison, the average European rate of incarceration is 133.5

per 100,000; the rate for Canada is 188 per 100,000; the rate for Australia is 130 per 100,000; the rate
for New Zealand is 192 per 100,000, and the rate for Japan is 51 per 100,000. Michelle Ye Hee Lee,
Yes, U.S. Locks People up at a Higher Rate than Any Other Country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-locks-people-up-at-ahigher-rate-than-any-other-country.

8.

African Americans and Latinos make up a disproportionate share of those incarcerated.

SENTENCING

PROJECT,

FACT

SHEET:

TRENDS

IN

U.S.

CORRECTIONS

5

(2017),

http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf ("More than
60% of the people in prison today are people of color. Black men are nearly six times as likely to be
incarcerated as white men and Hispanic men are 2.3 times as likely. For black men in their thirties, I
in every 10 is in prison or jail on any given day.").
9.

FLICK ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.

10.
11.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.

12.

Id. at 10.

13.

Id.

14.

Id. at 11.
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The disparity reached into Colorado's juvenile courts as well. Black
youth, at just five percent of Colorado's youth population, account for a
wildly disproportionate sixteen percent of cases in juvenile court. " Like
their adult counterparts, system-involved black youth were more likely to
receive an initial sentence to the Division of Youth Corrections and were
less likely to receive a deferred judgment." Black youth who received
probation or a deferred judgment were more likely than their
similarly-charged white counterparts to be revoked for drug offenses and
other crimes and were least likely to be revoked for violent offenses.'"
But even in the face of numbers like these, many key criminal justice
system stakeholders cling to the idea that the criminal justice system is no
more than the sum of its individual defendant parts, each bearing personal
responsibility. For example, in May 2016, George Brauchler,-the District
Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial District, and the president of the
Colorado District Attorney's Council-gained prominence for
prosecuting the Aurora theater shooting trial and tweeting, "'Mass
incarceration' is a myth. Individuals with their own attorneys were
convicted and sentenced individually."" The response from the
Twitterverse was swift and damning. One person responded, "[P]lanets
too are myths. Gravity holds individual and singular rocks together."l 9
Another tweeted, "There's no such thing as 'genocide,' really. Every death
is unique." 20 To these two critics, mass incarceration is as solid a concept
as planets, and as obvious, targeted, and measurable as genocide. But
Brauchler disagreed. Brauchler explained that his tweet, if "inartful,"
aimed "to reject what I think this movement has become, and that is a
vehicle for people who are anti-police, anti-prosecutor, and anti[-]courts,
to shift the blame away from them and onto individual responsibility that
got those people in trouble in the first place." 21 He further explained, "I
am not in favor of locking up everybody for every little thing."22 Instead,
he said, "I am in favor of personal responsibility."2 3
Brauchler's tweet distills, to ninety-six characters, the narrative that
is most threatening to systemic criminal justice reform: rejection of the
idea that there is a shady, conspiratorial effort to over rely on incarceration
15.

Id.

16.
17.

Id.
Id.

18.

Corey Hutchins, Colorado DA George Brauchler Explains 'Mass Incarceration is a Myth'

Tweet, COLO. INDEP. (May 6, 2016), http://www.coloradoindependent.com/159201 (quoting George
(Apr.
29,
2016,
4:47
PM),
(@GeorgeBrauchler),
TWITTER
Brauchler
https://twitter.com/GeorgeBrauchler/status/726196183819907072).
19. Id. (quoting Matt Ferner (@matthewferner), TWITTER (Apr. 29, 2016, 8:28 PM),
https://twitter.com/matthewferner/status/726251858205925376).

20. Id. (quoting Jonathan M. Katz (@KatzOnEarth), TWITTER (Apr. 30, 2016, 8:17 AM),
https://twitter.com/KatzOnEarth/status/726430312343982080).
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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in favor of the idea that defendants are system-involved through their own
actions because the system safeguards innocence through ironclad
procedural and substantive due process protections. But this narrative is
the fable that enabling police procedurals like "Law and Order" and "The
First 48" peddle so that criminal justice system bystanders can believe the
system is fair.24 Application of narrative theory illuminates the familiar
structure. The steady state of public safety is troubled by the individual
criminal actions of the scofflaw defendant. The conflict is resolved by the
heroic actions of the police and prosecutors who investigate and try the
defendant so that the defendant is held accountable for his or her crime.
Finally, a new steady state, in which public safety is restored, is resumed.2 5
Understanding the troubling statistics that the DCJ reported to the
Colorado legislature as the result of thousands of individual cases is not
the problem; the problem is the narrative that explains the statistics that
describe these thousands of cases. Instead of being solely the result of
countless instances of personal responsibility, these cases often also result
from thousands of individual system failures, in case after case, in
courtroom after courtroom, and in county after county. This Article argues
that applications of narrative theory to criminal proceedings can help chart
a course to convert our criminal processing system into an actual criminal
justice system.
II. NARRATIVE THEORY IN ACTION

A. Narratives Behind the Myth of the Right to Counsel
Brauchler's tweet argued, "Individuals with their own attorneys were
convicted and sentenced individually." 26 But the issues surrounding the
vindication of the right to counsel are well-documented. While every state
attempts to comply with the mandate of Gideon v. Wainwright27 by
providing some type of indigent defense delivery system, 28 Colorado is

24.
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 59 (2012).

25.

The best examinations of narrative theory in law are ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME

BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 11-13 (2000), and MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE
LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE, at xviii (1995). Other articles applying storytelling and
lawyering theory to courtroom practice include the following: Ty Alper, Anthony G. Amsterdam,

Todd E. Edelman, Randy Hertz, Rachel Shapiro Janger, Jennifer McAllister-Nevins, Sonya
Rudenstine & Robin Walker-Sterling, Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the
First Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 CLINICAL L. REv. 1, 1-2, 4 (2005) (applying an interdisciplinary
set of legal practice criteria to analyze the defense's tactics in the stateside prosecution of the police

officers accused of using excessive force against motorist Rodney King); Richard K. Sherwin, Law
Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39, 41-42
(1994).
26.
Hutchins, supra note 18 (quoting George Brauchler (@GeorgeBrauchler), TWITTER (Apr.
29, 2016, 4:47 PM), https://twitter.com/GeorgeBrauchler/status/726196183819907072).
27.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
28.
Id. at 344.
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one of the few states with a statewide public defender system. 2 9 The
Colorado Public Defender's Office is widely regarded as one of the best
in the country.30 The Office employs 488 lawyers in twenty-one regional
trial offices around the state.31 The Colorado Public Defender Office's
active cases numbered more than "140,000 in 2013-2014, including
18,000 new cases from January 2014 to July 2015" in response to an
increased mandate to represent misdemeanor defendants.3 2 With a budget
of about $80 million a year, the Colorado Public Defender Office's budget
averages out to sixteen dollars per resident.33 By way of comparison,
Oregon spends the most at twenty-five dollars per resident, while
Mississippi spends the least, at just five dollars per resident.3 4 That $80
million pays for attorneys, investigators and investigation, support staff,
forensic tests, experts, and all the costs associated with the overhead of
running an office.3 5 But all these state systems operate in a context in
which the average state or local public defender has a caseload of 371
cases each year, and over seventy percent of state systems report that they
are hindered from doing their jobs by a lack of funding and low salaries.3 6
In contrast, Colorado state prosecutors have a budget of just over
$157 million, almost twice as much.37 And that $157 million does not
include the separate, million-dollar budgets for police, who act as the
investigatory arm for the state, and for the Department of Human Services,
which pays for forensic testing for the government.
But the fact is that in many municipal and juvenile court cases, it is
very common for defendants and respondents to proceed without counsel.
As relatively well-resourced as the Colorado Public Defender's Office is,
the strict income requirements it has to observe necessarily mean that
many accused defendants and respondents who want a lawyer, who make
too much to qualify for a public defender, but who do not make near

29.
LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007, at 1 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf
("Twenty-two states had a state public defender program that oversaw the operations, policies, and
practices.. . . In the remaining 27 states, public defender offices were county-based, administered at

a local level, and funded principally by the county or through a combination of county and states
funds.").

30.
Callie Jones, Public Defenders Vital to CriminalJustice System, J.-ADVOC. (Apr. 26, 2013,
8:06 AM), http://www.journal-advocate.com/ci_23107280.
Carol McKinley; Meet Colorado's Public Defender, COLO. INDEP. (Dec. 17, 2015),
31.
http://www.coloradoindependent.com/156704.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS
36.
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITrEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Race-and-

Justice-Shadow-Report-ICCPR.pdf.
McKinley, supra note 31.
37.
Id.
38.
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enough money to afford a private attorney, end up navigating their cases
without counsel.39
For example, in a recent juvenile case, a 15-year-old girl who was
charged with assault arrived for her trial date. 40 The allegations were that
she got into a fight with another girl who lived in her same apartment
building. The respondent arrived at court, which was held on a school day
during school hours, with her mother. When the case was called, the judge
asked if the government was ready for trial. The prosecutor announced
ready. The court turned to the young woman and asked if she was ready
for trial. She said that she was not because she had two witnesses, but they
were in school and their parents would not let them leave school to come
to court to testify. The judge asked her how she wanted to proceed. The
young woman said she wanted more time so that the two witnesses could
come testify that the complainant hit her first, and that she simply defended
herself The judge immediately got impatient. The court told the young
woman that she would not be able to get a continuance; that the case had
to be settled that day; and that she had to either go to trial or accept a plea.
The young woman looked at her mother for help; her mother did not know
what to do. The young woman told the judge she did not do anything
wrong. The judge insisted that the case had to be resolved that day. One
hour later, the girl and her mother were before the court again, this time
entering into a plea agreement that left the girl with a conviction for
assault. The girl and her mother left the courtroom in tears.
In another example in a different jurisdiction, a man charged with
disorderly conduct represented himself in a trial. Before the trial started,
the judge warned the man that he would be held to the same standard as
any attorney, and that he was at a disadvantage because he had no legal
training. The man said he understood, but he could not afford an attorney
and he did not do anything wrong. The trial started. It was difficult to
watch. The pro se defendant tried to give an opening statement, but was
admonished by the judge that he was discussing inadmissible or otherwise
tainted evidence. The defendant tried to object to the prosecutor's
questions on direct examination on the grounds that the witness was not
telling the truth, but was told that that was an incorrect ground for an
objection, and that he could ask questions on cross examination. Then the
defendant tried to ask questions on cross examination about how he was
actually able to hear what he testified to, and whether he actually observed
the defendant say the alleged offensive language, but was told that his
questions were beyond the scope of the direct, that he was arguing with
the witness, and that he was taking too much time with his questions.
Finally, the pro se defendant tried to give a closing argument, only to be
39.
For an outline of the statutory and fiscal criteria for state-funded counsel, see OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF COLO., APPOINTMENT OF STATE-FUNDED COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL CASES AND FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT 1-2 (2014). The fiscal eligibility standards and

guidelines are itemized specifically in Attachment A. Id. at Attachment A.
40.

The following are examples I observed when I have been in court with students.
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told that he was testifying and arguing evidence that had not been
previously introduced. The trial was over and the defendant was convicted
in a matter of minutes.
Several things were disheartening about this display. First, the
judge's participation in the fiction that the pro se defendant could comply
with the rules of procedure, evidence, and ethics without a single day of
legal training was dedicated. The judge was so frustrated with the
defendant's lack of legal training and failure to pick up in minutes what
most learn over years of practice that by the time the trial was over, the
judge was barking instructions with barely controlled annoyance verging
on anger. Second, the judge did this policing without prompting from the
prosecutor, who lodged not a single objection during the entire proceeding.
Far from protecting the defendant's rights, the judge instead positioned the
court as an ally of the prosecutor. Most importantly, throughout the
proceedings, the defendant was frustrated, humiliated, and angry. At the
close of the trial, there was no sense that the proceedings had been fair.
Of course, there is likely more to each of these stories. But they do
cast suspicion on Brauchler's tweet that mass incarceration is merely made
up of "[i]ndividuals with their own attorneys [who] were convicted and
sentenced individually." 4 1 The famous post-script to the Gideon case is
that, after he won his case in the United States Supreme Court, Gideon was
re-tried, this time represented by W. Fred Turner, the best criminal defense
attorney in the Panama City area.42 Turner won an acquittal after
successfully impeaching the government's star witness.43 The outcome of
the Gideon case illustrated its moral perfectly: defense attorneys make a
difference, and without them, no one else in the courtroom, neither
prosecutors nor judges, can be relied upon to protect defendants' rights.
Each of the examples above are possible pre-retrial cases, where the
accused ended up with a criminal record even though having a lawyer
might have made a critical difference in the outcome. As in the Gideon
case, well-resourced defense counsel is the best way to ensure a criminal
justice system instead of a criminal processing system. Indeed, the worst
criminal justice scandal in our country's history, in which two judges
received millions of dollars in kickbacks for each youth they sentenced to
a private juvenile detention facility in which the judges had a financial
stake, happened in a courtroom in which fifty-four percent of youth
litigants waived their right to defense counsel;44 before they set foot in the
courtroom, many of the youths and their parents were given a set of forms

41.

Hutchins, supra note 18 (quoting George Brauchler (@GeorgeBrauchler), TWITTER (Apr.

29, 2016, 4:47 PM), https://twitter.com/GeorgeBrauchler/status/726196183819907072).
42.

Bruce R. Jacob, Remembering Gideon's Laiwyers, CHAMPION, June 2012, at 16.

43.

Id.

44.
See JUVENILE LAW CTR., LESSONS FROM LUZERNE COUNTY: RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2011);
see also JUVENILE LAW CTR., LESSONS FROM LUZERNE COUNTY: PROMOTING FAIRNESS,
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, at i-ii (2010).
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to fill out and sign, and unknowingly waived their right to counsel, so there
was no defense attorney protecting their interests.
B. NarrativesBehind the Myth of the Truth-Based System
Brauchler's tweet revealed a second deceptive narrative that
perpetuates the criminal justice system. Brauchler explained that his tweet
was spotlighting the "individual responsibility that got those people in
trouble in the first place."45 His underlying assumption is that we have a
truth-based system in which only people who are guilty are arrested,
charged, convicted, and sentenced.
But this assumption is also a facade. By now, the growing number of
death row exonerees has been well-documented.4 6 Since 1972, more than
156 people have been exonerated from death row. 4 7 From 1973-1999,
there was an average of three exonerations each year; from 2000-2011,
there was an average of five exonerations each year.4 8 And these are only
the capital cases, which should, theoretically, represent the cases litigated
with the most care, since the defendant's very life was at stake. Beyond
the capital context, the National Registry of Exonerations, launched in
May 2012, has tracked over 1,600 exonerations nationwide.49 Of those
cases, thirteen percent of defendants pled guilty (209/1,600) and the rest
were convicted at trial, seventy-nine percent by juries (1,262/1,600) and
seven percent byjudges (114/1,600)." The National Research Council has
released meticulously documented reports assailing the reliability of all
manner of forensic evidence from bite marks, to bullet casings, to hair
samples." Similarly, the problems with eyewitness identification are
well-known.52 And the Center for Wrongful Conviction of Youth, with
Brendan Dassey's case, has brought new attention to the alarmingly high
rate of false confessions by young people interrogated by the police.53 in

45.
See Hutchins, supra note 18.
46.
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, 250 EXONERATED, Too MANY WRONGFULLY CONVICTED: AN
INNOCENCE PROJECT REPORT ON THE FIRST 250 DNA EXONERATIONS IN THE U.S. 2-51 (2010). For
a list of exonerations from death row from 1973-2017, see Innocence Database, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). For biographical
information on each exoneree, see Meet Our Exoneree Members, WITNESS TO INNOCENCE,
http://www.witnesstoinnocence.org/exonerees.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
47.
NAACP
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEP'T,
DEATH PENALTY
FACTSHEET
(2017),

http://www.naacp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Death-penalty-fact-sheet-I
48.

-

17-I.pdf.

See Innocence: List of Those Freed fom Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
49.
THE NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., THE FIRST 1,600
EXONERATIONS
1
(2015),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/1600_Exonerations.pdf.

50.

Id. at 2.

51.
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 127, 182 (2009).

52.

See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 885-89 (N.J. 2011).

53.

Crystin Immel & Rebecca Palmore, 'Making a Murderer' Shines Light on False Youth

Confessions,
CHI.
TONIGHT
(Jan.
19,
2016,
3:45
PM),
http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2016/01/19/making-murderer-shines-light-false-youth-confessions.
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fact, seventy-five percent of the exonerations resulted from something
other than DNA testing.54
Moreover, the high rate of exonerations for defendants who have
been sentenced to prison portends an even higher rate in the hundreds of
thousands of cases in which defendants have been sentenced to jail, house
arrest, or probation. As the risk of incarceration decreases, the risk of
wrongful conviction increases, because other factors, like repeated court
appearances that threaten hourly employment, weigh more heavily in the
plea agreement calculus than the truth of what happened.51
C. Narrativeas an Advocacy Tool
Narrative is the most subversive element that defense attorneys can
inject into a courtroom hearing. Using narrative is disruptive for several
reasons. First, narrative is an incredibly effective advocacy tool. It has long
been established that "[t]he attraction of narrative is that it corresponds
more closely to the manner in which the human mind makes sense of
experience than does the conventional, abstracted rhetoric of law." 6 We
make sense of the world through narrative. The books of the three great
monotheistic religions are written in parables. Children crave bedtime
stories-all the better if the story stars them. Each year we spend
thousands of hours and billions of dollars watching movies and television
shows that tell us stories.57 Against this backdrop it is hardly surprising
that research in cognitive science has shown that lawyers whose closing
arguments tell a story win jury trials against their legal adversaries who
just lay out "the facts of the case."" In other words, "[t]he story is not a
parlor trick used to draw attention away from the logic of law. It is part of
the logic itself." 59
Capitalizing on this hardwiring, structuring arguments as narratives
in intensely fact-bound determinations where the law is not contested may
help to create an atmosphere in the courtroom in which it is far more
difficult to treat the accused without compassion. A narrative that
"convey[s] the human context of stop and frisk" might be more persuasive
54.
55.

THE NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 49, at 2.
See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic

Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 77-78 (1995) ("A defendant and his or her defense lawyer may be
influenced by a host of systemic forces and individual pressures to agree to a particular plea bargain.").
56.
Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agony Between Legal Power and

Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989).
57.

See John Lynch, The Average America Watches So Much TVIt's Almost a Full-Time Job,

Bus. INSIDER (June 28, 2016,

4:57 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-tv-do-

americans-watch-2016-6. For the most recent data on Americans' expenditures on entertainment, see

Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Consumer Expenditures - 2015 (Aug.
30, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cesan.pdf.
58.
Drew Westen,
What Happened to Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
6,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/opinion/sunday/what-happened-to-obamas-passion.html.

59.

2011),

Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client's Story

Using the Charactersand Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero's Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767,

769 (2006).
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than an argument that bloodlessly weighs Fourth Amendment factors. 60 A
sentencing narrative that includes discussion of the brutal conditions of
confinement of the specific prison to which a defendant is likely to be sent
might give the sentencing judge pause before meting out a sentence at the
top of the sentencing range. 6 ' For example, juvenile attorneys at the D.C.
Public Defender Service wrote and filed a motion detailing the unsanitary
and harsh conditions at the local maximum security juvenile detention
center. 62 The detention center did not have air conditioning in the summer
or heat in the winter. 63 Youth were forced to wear underwear for more than
one day, and sometimes to share underwear.6 4 The detention center was
infested with cockroaches and rats. 6 5 In response, one juvenile court judge
openly refused to detain any more children there until its glaring problems
had been addressed.66
Second and more mechanically, telling a narrative is counter to most
courtroom procedures, which prioritize case processing and anticipate that
arguments will come in the form of lists to maximize court time. Take the
bail determination, for example. In most jurisdictions, the court has two
overarching concerns when deciding whether to grant bail: (1) whether the
defendant is a flight risk and (2) whether the defendant is a danger to the
community.6 1 Often the court has a list of factors that it can consider in
deciding whether to detain, grant bail to, or release the accused on his or
her own promise to return to court. 8 Most bail arguments last a matter of
seconds, and consist of a list: "Mr. Smith is forty-three years old, has no
prior record, lives in a home he owns, has a wife and two daughters, and
has been working as a roofer for the last ten years." But knitting those
factors into a narrative will convey to the court that Mr. Smith's life is
more than the sum of the factors on the list, and that Mr. Smith is more
than the allegations against him. It will also be more vindicating to Mr.
Smith as he listens to his lawyer fight for him. In short, use of narrative is
the best way to turn a client into a three-dimensional person who is more
than his case number and the allegations against him.

60.

Nicole Smith Futrell, Vulnerable, Not Voiceless: Outsider Narrative in Advocacy Against

DiscriminatoryPolicing, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1617 (2015).
61.

Lindsey Webb, Slave Narrativesand the Sentencing Court 17-18 (Univ. Denv. Sturm Coll.

Law
Legal
Research
Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
16-32),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2844872.
62.
Peter Slevin, D.C JuvenileFacility Begins Needed Overhaul, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1 998/03/16/dc-juvenile-facility-begins-needed-

overhaul/a2e 1271 e-632f-4560-923d-cd55c368 I ddc.
63.
See id.
64. Id.
65.
Id.
Id.
66.
67.
See, e.g., United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Lindsey Webb,
Slave Narratives and the Sentencing Court, - NYU Rev. of Law and Social Change - (2017),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2844872.
68.
See, e.g., id.
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D. Narrativeas a Vehicle for RacialJustice
Finally, narrative has a hallowed history as an effective tool for racial
justice.6 9 In the 18th and 19th centuries, the abolitionist movement was
fueled by "slave narratives," accounts of life in slavery and escape to
freedom written by formerly enslaved people. 70 Slave narratives were
transformative works, for both abolitionists, and for the authors. Slave
narratives offered bystanders a detailed, nuanced reconstruction of the
workaday horrors of enslavement in a format that was difficult to
disentangle from the story's unflinching emotional impact. In the typical
narrative construction, the hero was the enslaved person who struggled to
freedom; the villain was always an acolyte of American chattel slaverya slave owner, an overseer, or the like; the conflict always included a
detailed account of the unimaginable conditions of enslavement, like the
constant threats of violence and rape, the complete lack of autonomy, and
the backbreaking forced labor.72 But more than that, since these were the
words and thoughts of the slaves themselves, slave narratives included
brutal recountings of how families mourned when they were split up; how
parents ached to be able to give their children a different life; how enslaved
people yearned for freedom and self-determination; and how they resisted,
in ways large and small. 73 The mere relating of these stories was disruptive
because they upended widespread fallacies about slavery as a benevolent
institution and stereotypes of black people as vacuous, dangerous, devious,
and lazy.74 In the hands of these narrators, the institution was brutal and
violent, and slaves were intelligent, courageous, industrious, and
hopeful.75
69.
For a well-written and nuanced discussion of slave narratives as a model for criminal
sentencing advocacy, see Webb, supra note 61, at 5.
70.
See WILLIAM L. ANDREWS & HENRY LOUIS GATES JR., THE CIVITAS ANTHOLOGY OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN SLAVE NARRATIVES 7 (1999) (defining slave narratives as stories that cast
American chattel slavery as "a condition of extreme physical, intellectual, emotional, or spiritual
deprivation," from which the author "undertakes an arduous quest for freedom that climaxes in his or
her arrival in the north"). The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has compiled an extensive
online collection of slave narratives. See Documenting the American South: North American Slave

Narratives, U.N.C., http://docsouth.unc.edu/neh/ (last updated Mar. 18, 2017).
71.
See Charles H. Nichols, Who Read the Slave Narratives?,20 PHYLON Q. 146, 155 (1959).
72.
See id.
73.
See id.
74.

See Jason A. Gillmer, Poor Whites, Benevolent Masters, and the Ideologies ofSlavery: The

Local Trialofa Slave Accused ofRape, 85 N.C. L. REV. 489, 535-36 (2007).
75.
See Nichols, supra note 71, at 155-56 (stating that slave narratives were written to help a
white audience understand the horrors of slavery and find commonality with enslaved people with
"[s]ensitive readers of the narratives .. . would begin to see that Negroes were not unlike themselves

[and] . . . shared with them the ordinary feelings of human beings").
In 2013, the movie 12 Years a Slave, adapted from the 1853 slave narrative memoir by Solomon
Northrup, a free black man who was kidnapped and sold into slavery in Louisiana. The movie was
nominated for and won the Golden Globe Award for Best Motion Picture-Drama. At that year's

award show, co-hosts Tina Fey and Amy Poehler discussed the film with the following joke that
humorously illustrates exactly how slave narratives worked.

Amy Pochler: "One ofthe most nominated films this year is '12 Years a Slave.' I loved '12
Years a Slave', and I can honestly say that after seeing that film, I will never look at slavery
the same way again."
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Defense attorneys are uniquely suited to recognize issues of racial
injustice. 76 Defense attorneys are the interface between the accused and
the court." Because of their role and ethical obligations, defense attorneys
can appreciate the full impact of involvement in the criminal justice system
on their clients' lives.7 8 How will the case affect the client's family? Or
the client's own personal goals? If there is a conviction, will the client
have to move out of or have difficulty moving into public housing? How
might a conviction affect the client's current custody arrangement? What
about the client's professional goals? How will a conviction for shoplifting
affect a client's chances of, for example, getting a security clearance to
work in a job deicing planes at the airport? Or working in a day care center,
if the client is convicted of disorderly conduct for getting into an argument
with her neighbor? Or becoming a nurse, if the client is currently
scheduled to shadow another nurse practitioner and there is no flexibility
in that schedule? Or getting a scholarship to attend college classes? Or
even enlisting in the military? And, importantly, how does the answer to
each of these questions interface with the fact of the client's race or
ethnicity? Defense attorneys, with their frontline access to the client, are
the ones who can best "confront[] and nam[e] race in the lawyering and
criminal justice process, and recast[] racial identity and narrative in the
defense of clients and communities of color."" This unique vantage point,
combined with the defense attorney's ethical obligation to represent the
client's stated interests, conspire to make the defense attorney the
courtroom actor most likely to even appreciate the racial disparity that
statistics across the country so uniformly etch.so In a 2011 study, when
asked whether minority overrepresentation in the juvenile justice system
was a problem, "[b]y a very wide margin, defense attorneys are most
inclined to strongly agree or agree... , followed by probation officers and
judges. Few prosecutors express any agreement with this statement." 8t

Tina Fey: "Wait, how were you looking at it?"
Alexandra Petri, Tina Fey and Amy PoehlerExplain the Problem with '12 Years a Slave' Think-Pieces

in

a

Single

Golden

Globes

Monologue

Joke,

WASH.
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(Jan.

13,

2014),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/compost/wp/2014/01/13/tina-fey-and-amy-poehler-explain-

the-problem-with-I 2-years-a-slave-think-pieces-in-a-single-golden-globes-monologue-joke.
The joke may have been a nod to the reaction of Washington Post film critic Richard Cohen to the

film. In a piece published in November 2013, Cohen wrote that the movie had showed him that
"slavery was not a benign institution in which mostly benevolent whites owned innocent and grateful
blacks." Richard Cohen, Richard Cohen: '12 Years a Slave' and Art's Commentary on the Past,

WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/richard-cohen-12-years-aslave-and-arts-commentary-on-the-past/2013/ll/04/f~e57a92-4588-1 I e3-b6f8-3782ff6cb769_story.
76.
Robin Walker Sterling, Defense Attorney Resistance, 99 IOWA L. REv. 2245, 2251 (2014).
77.
See Hon. William C. Griesbach, Defending Public Defenders, WIS. LAW., May 2008, at 20,
20-21.
78.
See id. at 21.
79.
Anthony V. Alfieri, Objecting to Race, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1129, 1157 (2014).
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Sterling, supra note 76.
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Incongruously, even though defense attorneys are in the best position
to ensure system fairness, the defense attorney's role has been limited to
vindicating legal issues associated with individual clients' cases instead of
social issues attendant to mass incarceration and disproportionate minority
contact. 8 2 Defense attorneys have specific tools to implement concerning
the adversarial process, like rules of evidence, rules of criminal procedure,
and case law. So, for example,
If the evidence is weak, counsel have litigation weapons to attack the
government's case. If police violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendment during
an investigation, counsel have constitutional tools to eliminate the
evidence obtained. Good defense counsel [is] well-situated to uncover
government errors with respect to law, evidentiary admissibility,
guidelines calculations, and the like."
But defense attorneys have far fewer tools to police systemic
unfairness. 84 Systemic unfairness leeches into the process at discretion
points like arrest, the charging decision, bail, plea negotiations, and
sentencing.85 At each of these points in the life of a typical case, there is a
courtroom actor who has an immense amount of discretion that is virtually
unreviewable. At arrest, it is the police officer; at the charging decision, it
is the prosecutor;86 at the bail hearing, it is the judge.87 But in a system
where discretion is the coin of the realm, defense attorneys are paupers.
Defense attorneys are the system actors with the least amount of
discretion. And discretion matters far more in the petty offense context:
To put it another way, when case outcomes actually depend on the
law and the evidence, defense counsel can be very powerful. But at the
bottom of the penal pyramid where offenses are petty, caseloads immense,
and litigation rare, law and evidence exert weak influences. Instead,
prosecutorial discretion and institutional habits dominate cases, and
defense lawyers are at a structural disadvantage. 88
Employing narratives about mass incarceration and all its contours is
a possible response to all the cases that have foreclosed race-based
arguments in criminal proceedings. With the same goals that motivated
abolitionists to promote slave narratives, criminal defense attorneys can
promote narratives about the decimating impact of mass incarceration on
black communities and other communities of color.

82.

See Sterling, supra note 76, at 2263-64.

83.

Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1049, 1054 (2013)

(footnotes omitted).
See Sterling, supra note 76, at 2256-57.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

See id.
Natapoff, supra note 83, at 1064.
Note, Judicial Discretionin GrantingBail, 27 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 56, 57 (1952).
Natapoff, supra note 83, at 1054-55 (footnote omitted).
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III. NARRATIVES AND CONCEPTIONS OF HOPE OF JUSTICE

This year marks the 147th anniversary of the passage of the 15th
Amendment, the third and last of the Reconstruction Amendments. 89 In

the wake of the Civil War, Congress looked to take steps to interpose the
federal government as a shield between the newly-freed black Americans
and southern white landowners' continuing need for exploitable labor.
Congress was concerned that black Americans would be effectively
re-enslaved through state provisions that might revive all the
characteristics of slavery. The Reconstruction Amendments were meant to
be that legislative shield.
The 13th Amendment, which was ratified by three-fourths of the
states on December 6, 1865, abolished slavery except in cases of criminal
conviction.90 The 14th Amendment, which was ratified on July 9, 1868,
granted citizenship to everyone born or naturalized in the United States
and guaranteed everyone equal protection under the law, 9 1 to protect the
new freedmen and women from the vagaries of white landowners who still
subscribed to the prevailing myths about black criminality, intellectual
inferiority, and dangerousness, and about white superiority, which had
been created to sustain American chattel slavery. 92 The 15th Amendment,
which was ratified on February 3, 1870, prohibited states from preventing
people from voting by reason of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. 93 Unfortunately, the Amendment left room for the states to
impose ostensibly race-neutral voter qualifications, like poll taxes and
literacy tests, that were anything but race-neutral. 94
As many historians and legal scholars have noted, periods of civil
rights advancement are almost always followed by periods of
retrenchment. 95 Reconstruction is the quintessential example of that

89.
The Battle Over Reconstruction: The Reconstruction Amendments, BOUNDLESS,
https://www.boundless.com/u-s-history/textbooks/boundless-u-s-history-textbook/reconstruction(last
1865-1877-19/the-battle-over-reconstruction-i 39/the-reconstruction-amendments-740-2340
visited Mar. 14, 2017).
90.
The United States Ratifles the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, AFR. AM. REGISTRY,
http://www.aaregistry.org/historicevents/view/united-states-ratifies-I 3th-amendment-constitution
(last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
91.
Primary Documents in American History: 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, LIBR.
OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/ I 4thamendment.html (last updated Mar.
6,2017).
1 92.
See Paul Finkelman, OriginalIntent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole
of ConstitutionalLaw, 89 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2014) ("Congress tried to figure out how to
prevent former Confederates from regaining political power in the South and the nation, which would
enable them to oppress former slaves and white unionists.").
PrimaryDocuments in American History: 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, LIBR.
93.
OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/I 5thamendment.html (last modified Dec.

20, 2016).
94. Id.
95.
Alton Hornsby Jr., Looking Back on the Fight br EqualAccess to PublicAccommodations,
ECON. POL'Y INST. (July 2, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/fight-equal-access-publicaccommodations.
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premise. 96 After Reconstruction, white southerners succeeded in
re-establishing legal and political dominance over blacks through brutal
violence, financial exploitation, intimidation, and, above all, the
persistence of the narratives that undergirded the peculiar institution. 97
Southern white landowners and business owners first employed convict
leasing, a system by which convicts were used to fill the South's demand
for exploitable labor." Convict leasing was followed by Jim Crow, our
own American system of apartheid, an intricate latticework of laws that
relegated black people to permanent second class citizenship. 9 Jim Crow
was sustained by a spectrum of social checks, that included intimidation
and lynching on the one end and active indulgence of narratives about
black inferiority on the other."o Jim Crow put in place a strict group of
laws that reinforced social mores circumscribing how black southerners
had to act in almost every aspect of life: segregated water fountains,'0 1 not
passing white motorists, 02 and swearing on a different Bible in court.1 03
Colorado became the 38th state in the Union on August 1, 1876, after
the end of the Civil War and before the end of Reconstruction ended in
1877, just in time for the retrenchment that followed.104 So it is not
surprising that here in Colorado the vestiges of the debates around the
passage of those Amendments persist in protean guises.
For example, the myths about black dangerousness and criminality
seem to show up in modern-day shibboleths about black criminality and
predictably concomitant disparate arrest and imprisonment rates of people
of color."o0 And myths about black intellectual inferiority-that justified

96.
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97.
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around Wilmington, North Carolina used a "substantially fictional white narrative
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(2012),
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101.
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Id.
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See Garrett Epps, The Other Sullivan Case, I N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 783, 787 (2005)

(noting that "even the Bibles were segregated").
104.
See Colorado Became a State August 1, 1876, AMERICA'S STORY FROM AMERICA'S LIBR.,
http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/recon/jb_recon_colorado_1.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
Nazgol Ghandnoosh, SENT'G PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF
105.
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not allowing slaves to go to school or learn to read Englishi'-seem to
manifest in disparate school funding, suspension, and expulsion rates.' 0 7
In 2010, black public-school students were nearly three times as likely to
face serious discipline as their white peers, most often for subjective
reasons like disobedient behavior.' 0 8

While black students make up just 5.9 percent of the student
population, they were the subject of 12.7 percent of the discipline cases,
up from 11.7 percent five years ago. White students, on the other hand,
who were about 61 percent of the population, were the subject of 46.8
percent of discipline cases.' 0 9
Certainly justice reinvestment requires a reallocation of money, but
it also requires reinvestment of the emotional capital that undergirds the
money flow. The best way to re-channel that emotional capital is through
promoting new narratives of many different kinds, but in particular, a new
narrative that promotes an alternative vision of justice. Vaclav Havel, in
defining hope, also sketches an alternative vision of justice: "Hope is
definitely not the same thing as optimism. It is not the conviction that
something will turn out well, but the certainty that something makes sense,
regardless of how it turns out."I"o Described in this way, hope and justice
seem to be the two sides of the same narrative about reliable fairness. A
narrative built on hope and fairness would be an excellent place to locate
reform.

106.
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